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ABSTRACT
The Internet promises widespread access to the world’s collective information
and fast communication among people, but common government censorship and
spying undermines this potential. This censorship is facilitated by the Internet’s
hierarchical structure. Most traffic flows through routers owned by a small num-
ber of ISPs, who can be secretly coerced into aiding such efforts. Traditional
crypographic defenses are confusing to common users. This thesis advocates
direct removal of the underlying heirarchical infrastructure instead, replacing it
with non-hierarchical networks. These networks lack such chokepoints, instead
requiring would-be censors to control a substantial fraction of the participating
devices—an expensive proposition.
We take four steps towards the development of practical non-hierarchical net-
works. (1) We first describe Whisper, a non-hierarchical mobile ad hoc network
(MANET) architecture for personal communication among friends and family
that resists censorship and surveillance. At its core are two novel techniques,
an efficient routing scheme based on the predictability of human locations and
a variant of onion-routing suitable for decentralized MANETs. (2) We describe
the design and implementation of Shout, a MANET architecture for censorship-
resistant, Twitter-like public microblogging. (3) We describe the Mason test, a
method used to detect Sybil attacks in ad hoc networks in which trusted author-
ities are not available. (4) We characterize and model the aggregate behavior of
Twitter users to enable simulation-based study of systems like Shout. We use





The Internet promises easy access to the world’s information and communication among
people. Discovery that used to require hours browsing shelves in a library or days watching
a mailbox for materials from another institution now entails a simple web search, often com-
pleted in several minutes. Conversions with distant family members or colleagues endured
the high latency and cost of physical letters and documents1. Wide-spread distribution of a
new idea required significant capital backing, a distribution channel like a newspaper, radio
station, or television show. For the niche, controversial, or unpopular, such distribution
was often not available. The Internet, in principle, removes these limitations. Hosting and
finding content on the World Wide Web is cheap enough that anyone who so desires2 can
participate. Email, instant messaging, and voice chat are ubiquitous and essentially free of
cost.
This promise is only realized, though, when communication within the Internet is open.
Intentional blocking of some traffic, e.g., identified by content, source, or destination, can
hide specific knowledge from a significant fraction of entire populations and discourage
those affected from engaging in thoughts or discussions deemed undesirable by the censors.
Unfortunately3, such censorship is commonplace and widespread, instituted by governments
1The telephone and fax machine also addressed this type of communication. All the problems of the
Internet discussed in this thesis apply to the telephone network as well.
2This is not yet the case in severely economically-disadvantage areas, but the principle remains true. Much
ongoing work is dedicated to bringing access to these places.
3We take as an axiom that both unfettered access to willingly-shared information and the ability to privately
communicate with people of one’s choosing is fundamentally a good thing. This view is widely debated, but
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and network providers alike.
The Chinese government is likely the most familiar Internet censor to American au-
diences. In addition to blocking some content considered harmful to individuals, e.g.,
pornography, gambling, or violence, they censor information that might influence public
opinion against the government and its actions, e.g., information about Tiananem Square
protests, Taiwanese independence, and the Fulang Gong discipline [9]. Access to foreign
news media that might report on such events like the BBC or Yahoo News is frequently
blocked. Domestic social media channels like Weibo are selectively filtered [10] and foreign
sites not implementing such filters like Facebook and Twitter are frequently blocked [11].
China is not alone. Classifications from the OpenNet Initiative [12] and Reporters
Without Borders [13] label Iran, Syria, and North Korea, among others, as employing
pervasive censorship. Other countries like Tunisia and Egypt experienced significant filtering
before or during the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings [14–16]. As an extreme example, Egypt
completely disabled Internet access for several days in February 2011 [17, 18].
Although providing historically unprecedented access to information and communi-
cation, the Internet also presents an unprecedented opportunity to surveil individuals for
possible reprisal. Internet traffic monitoring is used to determine the interests, social rela-
tionships, and daily habits of individual users. Some of this analysis can be good4, e.g.,
for recommending interesting content or better targeting advertisements, but much is also
negative.
Examples abound. In December 2008, at least 56 online journalists were imprisoned on
charges stemming from reporting on or voicing disagreement with government policies [19].
In China, citizens posting online essays criticizing government policies and exposing
corruption were censored and sentenced to jail terms [20, 21]. In the United States, recent
reports about so called warrantless wiretapping suggest that much telephone and Internet
both supporting and dissenting arguments are left to philosophers.
4It is still important to remember that even when the initial intent is good, the collected data might fall into
more nefarious hands at a later date.
2
traffic is streamed through government facilities for monitoring [22]. Even worse, large data
centers to store years worth of collected data are under construction [23, 24].
In its early years, people thought that the Internet’s resilient routing protocols would
resist censorship.
The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.
(John Gilmore, 1993)
Unfortunately, this is untrue, as is now recognized.
I used to believe the Internet offered limitless opportunities for free speech;
now I believe it is becoming a smorgasbord of opportunities for authoritarian
control. (Simon Davis, 1998)
The Internet enjoyed by the West is a choice—not fate, not destiny, and not
natural law. (Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, 2006)
In fact, the hierarchical structure of the Internet facilitates censorship and surveillance. Most
traffic flows through a few backbone routers where filtering and monitoring is easily and
cheaply applied. In many cases, these routers are government-owned, giving authorities full
control over the traffic flowing through them. In the case of privately-owned routers, their
concentration in the hands of a small number of communication corporations simplifies the
installation of monitoring software as well. Coercing a small number of businesses into
installing monitoring software is simpler—and more easily kept out of the common public
knowledge—than a larger number.
A large body of work attempts to add censorship-resistance and surveillance to the
Internet through a variety of, usually cryptographic, means. To date, such efforts have not
seen wide-spread adoption, likely due to the difficulty of managing encryption keys 5 [26].
5Public key infrastructure has worked reasonably well for securing sensitive web transactions against
arbitrary attackers, but is, at least in its current form, highly susceptible to government attack [25]. As a
hierarchical system, a government can relatively easily coerce a widely-trusted root certificate issuer into
signing an invalid key.
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In this thesis, we instead propose non-hierarchical communication networks comprising
the smartphones already carried by millions of people that we believe make wide-scale
surveillance and censorship economically infeasible6. Such networks do not contain choke-
points through which most traffic flows, so wide-spread censorship or surveillance would
require controlling a substantial fraction of the devices or, in the case of wireless trans-
missions, monitoring a substantial fraction of the airspace. Eliminating hierarchy does
have disadvantages—particularly in reduced bandwidth and increased latency—and the
resulting networks cannot support all types of Internet traffic. But for many important appli-
cations, like text-based communication among friends and family, the network performance
is acceptable.
1.1 Techniques for Combating Censorship and Surveillance
in the Internet
Internet traffic is subject to observation and selective blocking, due to the hierarchical
structure. Thus, methods to combat surveillance must obscure the information contained in
the traffic, referred to as privacy, and the identities of those communicating, referred to as
anonymity. Methods to combat censorship must further make the traffic indistinguishable
from that which should not be blocked, e.g., economically-vital business transactions.
Privacy is usually maintained by encryption [27]. Protocols like SSL/TLS [28] are used
for end-to-end encryption of general traffic streams, e.g., between a browser and a web
server or an email client and an IMAP server. PGP [29] and OTR [30] provide encryption of
emails or instant messages, respectively, between two parties, regardless of the intermediate
transmission or storage protocols.
Anonymity is usually provided through variants of Chaum’s mix-nets [31]. For exam-
ple, mixminion [32] anonymous remailers provide anonymous email delivery. The Tor
6If not infeasible, at least much more expensive and much more visible to the public.
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network [33] uses onion routing to provide anonymity for arbitrary TCP streams, including
web traffic.
Others have noted that defeating censorship and surveillance does not always require
full end-to-end privacy or anonymity. Those are only necessary while the traffic is flowing
through the censor-controlled routers. For example, consider a user in Iran accessing a
website critical of the Iranian government and hosted in the United States. Only while inside
of Iran’s network must the traffic be indistinguishable from other government-approved
traffic. The recent Telex system [34] addresses traffic intended for a blocked service to
uncensored services, but cryptographically tags the content such that trusted routers outside
of the censored network can identify and redirect the packets to the intended destination.
Encryption is not a panacea, however, due to possible man-in-the-middle attacks and the
resulting key distribution problem. A method of ensuring that the key used for encryption
(public or secret) actually belongs to the intended recipient is needed. Most services, like
SSL/TLS, use some form of public key infrastructure. Centralized authorities, whose public
keys are distributed a priori and implicitly trusted, sign certificates linking identities to
public keys. Clients needing to verify the public key for a particular party can validate the
digital signature on the presented certificate. Unfortunately, the centralized nature of public
key infrastructure makes it susceptible to government control. A centralized authority can
intentionally issue false certificates due to coercion or unknowingly due to hacking [25].
Decentralized key distribution schemes are used as well. For example, PGP uses the
web of trust. Individual users can sign each others’ public key, attesting to their authenticity.
Although one may directly trust a particular key, if it is signed by someone (or several
people) that are trusted, one can choose to trust it. Systems like OTR [30] and ZRTP [35]
do not require a prior key exchange, but instead use Diffie-Hellman key exchange [36] to
establish a shared secret on first contact. OTR uses verification of arbitrary mutually-shared
information to detect man-in-the-middle attacks and ZRTP uses voice-based verification of
a shared value derived from the supposedly-shared key.
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1.2 Advantages of Non-Hierarchical Networks
Non-hierarchical architectures have two primary advantages over their hierarchical counter-
parts.
Wide-scale censorship is nearly impossible, because it requires controlling a significant
fraction of the participating devices.7
Similarly, spying on large fractions of the network traffic requires monitoring or con-
trolling large portions of network and thus is difficult and likely prohibitively expensive.
This property is particularly useful for some anonymity techniques, like onion routing, that
are subject to traffic analysis attacks. Obtaining a broad view of the traffic patterns is much
more difficult in the non-hierarchical network.
1.3 MANET Architectures for Communication
In this thesis, we consider a particular type of non-hierarchical network called a Mobile
Ad Hoc Network (MANET). A MANET is a self-organizing network of mobile devices
that communicate directly with nearby devices via wireless radio. Messages intended for
recipients not in direct radio can hop through multiple devices to reach their destination.
Such networks are inherently non-hierarchical, as all participants have essentially equal
computational power, bandwidth, and range.
Most smartphones and latops are equipped with WiFi transceivers capable of ad hoc
communication, making such networks an economically-feasible alternative to the Internet
or cellular networks. These devices are already owned and used by a large number of people.
Missing are the network protocols and software implementations needed to use the ad hoc
capabilities for censorship and surveillance-resistant communication, a problem we begin to
address in this thesis.
7Such control is theoretically possible, for example, by mandating that all devices come with special
hardware or software, but this is disruptive, noticeable, and expensive to enforce.
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MANETs are not without disadvantage. Bandwidth, latency, and energy consumption
scale much more poorly than in infrastructure-based, hierarchical networks. Consequently,
we focus on personal communication—email, text messaging, microblogging—whose
throughput (<500 kbps) and latency (5–10 s) requirements are achievable.
1.4 Contributions and Organization
This thesis starts from the proposition that non-hierarchical network structures are inherently
more resistant to censorship and surveillance than the hierarchical Internet8 and thus should
be designed and developed for real world use. Although promising from a censorship
perspective, wireless ad hoc networks are known to have limited scalability due to contention
of the wireless channel and the super-linear scaling of routing traffic. However, we show
that these challenges are not insurmountable, as summarized by the following statement.
Thesis Statement: Non-hierarchical network architectures, which we believe are in-
herently more resistant to censorship and surveillance than the hierarchical Internet, can
support common, useful, text-based communication applications, i.e., text-messaging and
microblogging.
Towards this end, we propose architectures for two styles of communication, develop
tools to address the difficulty of testing ad hoc networks with real users, and solve theoretical
problems underlying the proposed architectures.
• In Chapter 2, we propose Whisper, a MANET architecture for secure and anonymous
personal communication among friends and family. At the core of Whisper are two
novel techniques: (1) a variant of onion-routing suitable for ad hoc networks, in which
a set of onion routers is not available a priori, and (2) an efficient routing scheme
based on the predictability of human motion. Chapter 5 solves a particular technical
8Aside from the arguments in this introduction, this thesis does not attempt to defend this claim. The
arguments justify the contained research and development of non-hierarchical networks, but only time will tell
if these intended benefits prove true in the real world.
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problem, identifying non-Sybil identities in a one-hop neighborhood, required by the
Whisper architecture.
• In Chapter 3, we propose Shout, a MANET architecture for censorship-resistant,
Twitter-like, public microblogging. Shout uses manual human interaction to propagate
messages, concentrating limited network bandwidth on messages of broad interest.
Chapter 6 solves a particular technical problem, identifying spammers in a fully-
decentralized network, needed for Shout to see widespread adoption.
• In Chapter 4, we describe MANES, a mobile ad hoc network emulation system
designed to allow researchers to test their ad hoc networking protocols and applications
with hundreds or thousands of real users by deploying them on standard Android
smartphones. Most research on ad hoc network protocols is based on simulation
or small-scale studies with tens of users, primarily due to the difficulty and cost of
large-scale deployment. Both Whisper and Shout depend critically on behaviors of
the underlying human users, so large-scale studies are needed. MANES emulates ad
hoc connectivity over a cellular or Internet connection, and thus can be used with any
Android phone without interfering existing WiFi usage. Further, it gives the researcher
view of and control over the network.
• In Chapter 5, we describe the Mason test, a protocol for detecting Sybil attacks
in wireless networks. The Whisper protocol requires participants to periodically
gather sets of distinct neighboring identities, for later use in mix-chains. A neighbor
conducting a Sybil attack, i.e., pretending to be multiple identities, would violate
the distinctness requirement and potentially the security of later mix-chains. Noting
that the received signal strengths of transmissions are hard to predict, the Mason test
uses the untrusted RSSI observations reported by network participants to identify
transmission originating from the same node.
• In Chapter 6, we characterize the user behavior in and the retweet graph of Twitter.
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The resulting models are useful for driving simulation-based analysis and design
of other microblogging systems. Implications of these results are discussed. As
an example application, we develop a method for detecting spammers suitable for
decentralized microblogging systems based the connectivity of the reshout graph. The
identified properties of the retweet graph—scale-free and small-world—enable the





Wireless mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) composed of volunteer, mobile devices offer
some advantages over traditional infrastructure networks because their nonhierarchical
nature eliminates critical points of failure that can be exploited by attackers to reduce
reliability and enable censorship, surveillance, and other forms of undesirable interference.
Attacks upon communication systems are easier when most network traffic is routed through
backbone networks owned by a few ISPs or a state [37]. MANETs have the potential
to significantly increase the cost of large-scale censorship or shutdowns. Unfortunately,
communication and computation capacities of individual nodes limit scalability [38] and
have, thus far, undermined general-purpose use. However, use in specific applications
remains a possibility. In particular, while MANET bandwidths and end-to-end latencies may
be insufficient to support voice conversations or video, they may support valuable services
like text messaging.
2.1.1 MANETs May Offer A More Robust Supplement to the Internet
The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it. — John Gilmore,
1993
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Although the Internet has been heralded for being robust to censorship, ongoing events
in the Middle East, North Africa, Asia, and elsewhere falsify this belief; governments
can exploit the hierarchical nature of the Internet to censor news as well as limit and
monitor communication. In an extreme example, Egypt completely disabled Internet
access for several days in February 2011 by forcing their five major ISPs to withdraw
Border Gateway Protocol routes [39]. In Tunisia, where bandwidth is leased from the
government [15], Internet access is heavily filtered. Many websites (e.g., YouTube) are
blocked [15]. Others (e.g, Facebook and Twitter) are modified to steal login credentials [16].
Emails and attachments are filtered and scrubbed [15]. In all these cases, the choke-points
inherent to the Internet’s hierarchical structure help facilitate the censorship.
In contrast, mobile ad hoc networks composed of volunteer, wireless devices (e.g.,
smartphones and laptops) have the potential to be more resistant to corruption. Due to
their nonhierarchical, ad hoc structures, censoring communication requires controlling
many of the nodes in the network. When these nodes are handheld devices owned by
private individuals numbering in the tens of thousands or more, acquiring such control is
vastly more difficult and expensive than adding filtering software to a few backbone routers.
Although MANETs will not help for long-distance or transocean communication, they
have the potential to provide secure and uncensored communication within contiguously
populated local regions, which may be sufficient to support communication among friends
and family members.
2.1.2 MANET Architectures Should Exploit Application-Specific Prop-
erties
An ideal robust supplement to the Internet would support all types of traffic. Unfortunately,
poor MANET scalability precludes their use for general-purpose networking. Thus, instead
of seeking a general MANET architecture, we argue that MANET architectures must be
tailored towards specific application-classes.
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This poor scalability stems from two primary properties. (1) The traffic forwarded by
each node increases with network size, reducing throughput for originating traffic [38]. (2)
The traffic required to maintain routing state for the mobile nodes increases with network
size, reducing available bandwidth [40]. Simulations indicate that current MANETs scale to
only a few thousand nodes, with low per-node throughput (<5 kbps) [41].
We argue that these limitations imply that useful MANET architectures must be tailored
to specific application-classes. First, the throughput and latency induced by the required
network size must be acceptable. Second, properties of the application should be leveraged
to design more efficient routing methods. In this work, we use predicted human motion
patterns to support a MANET for text-based personal communication (e.g., text messaging),
a low-bandwidth and latency-tolerant application.
2.1.3 Background on MANET Connectivity
The architecture described in this chapter requires good connectivity in the underlying
MANET. In this section, we briefly review results from Bettstetter [42] that give the node
densities for the network to be (probabilistically) connected.
Assume the participating devices are uniform randomly distributed over some geographic
area and each has a transmission range of 100 m. We would like to know the density of
devices required for the network to be connected and thus permit communication between
arbitrary devices. Bettstetter [42] derived analytical expressions for such densities. Specifi-
cally, with a device density of 538 km−2, the network is connected with 99.9% probability.
A connected network is not necessarily robust—the removal of a single device might break
the connectivity—so one can also consider the k-connectivity, where k is the number of
devices that must be removed to break connectivity. Here, a device density of 904 km−2
gives a 99.9% chance of being 5-connected. Finally, the most relevant metric is the path
probability—the probability that any pair of devices have a path between them and thus
can communicate. Although analytical results are not available for this query, Bettstetter’s
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simulations indicate that a device density of 255 km−2 gives a path probability of 99%. Real
people are not uniformly distributed—they cluster in places like rooms and buildings—so
these densities can be viewed as lower bounds.
To put these densities in perspective, consider a college town like Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Ann Arbor has a population density1, of 1580 km−2, suggesting that one-sixth of the popula-
tion would need to participate in the network to achieve the 255 km−2 device density required
for 99% path probabilities. As mentioned, people are not uniform randomly distributed,
so higher participation would be required in areas of relatively low density to bridge the
surrounding, presumably more dense, clusters. Although not conclusive (one can easily
imagine networks partitioned by areas of low density, e.g., empty parking lots at night),
these numbers indicate that town-scale ad hoc networks are feasible—the required device
density and adoption rates are achievable.
2.1.4 MANET Architecture for Text-Based Personal Communication
Applications
Text-based personal communication among friends and family members is both useful to
many people (as evinced by the popularity of text and instant messaging) and particularly
suited to a town-sized MANET, as indicated by the following two properties. (1) The
required per-node throughput is low (<500 bps) and relatively high latency is acceptable
(1–5 s). (2) People frequently communicate with relatively small groups of contacts in close
geographic proximity [43], implying a short average link length, which improves scaling
properties. Furthermore, properties of human motion patterns can be leveraged to provide
efficient routing.
A MANET architecture supporting text-based personal communications should satisfy
the following requirements.
• Scalability. A useful personal communication network must cover a region of non-
1According to the 2010 U.S. Census.
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trivial area (e.g., a small town or a university campus), providing reliable delivery for
all participants (e.g., a few thousand nodes) without imposing much computation or
battery energy overhead on participating nodes. We require a per-node throughput on
the order of 100 bps and delivery latencies on the order of 10 seconds.
• Confidentiality. The network should guarantee end-to-end message confidentiality.
Packets should therefore be protected from eavesdropping and traffic analysis as they
are relayed through arbitrary nodes untrusted by the source and destination.
• Location Privacy, defined as “the ability to prevent other parties from learning ones’
current or past location” [44]. Persistent identifiers must not be linkable to node
locations.
• Social Network Privacy. A person’s social network, i.e., the set of network peers
he communicates with, should be protected. No one (except the sender and receiver
themselves) should be able to determine both the sender and receiver of any packet
(by real identity, network identity, or location).
Meeting our scalability goals in a MANET is challenging because the route maintenance
traffic required by typical routing algorithms quickly dominates total bandwidth and energy
usage. On-demand protocols that reduce the load by delaying route-finding until necessary
can provide constant-factor reduction, but do not change the scaling behavior. Stateless
protocols try to eliminate maintenance traffic altogether by using only local information
for, e.g., geographic location, for routing. However, this merely pushes the complexity and
overhead into another domain, e.g., a distributed location service to map from node identities
to geographic locations. An end-to-end routing method with reduced traffic overhead is
needed.
In this chapter, we present the design of a location-centric MANET architecture sup-
porting text-based personal communication within town-sized regions. Properties of human
mobility patterns motivate a novel routing method, location profile routing. Geographic
routing [40] is at the core of its scalability: next-hop selection requires only local knowl-
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edge within one-hop neighborhoods. However, to address a message the sender needs to
know the destination locations, which are traditionally provided by distributed location
services [45] that scale poorly and do not easily support confidentiality and privacy. We
observed that (1) humans have highly predictable motion patterns, spending the majority
of time in a few locations [46] and (2) the frequency of change in mobility patterns is on
the order of months and years. We propose to model location patterns as location profiles
(e.g., location–probability pairs), distributing them face-to-face, instead of real locations
via the network, to reduce overheads (see Section 2.2). Direct visibility of location profiles
is often unacceptable, so we embed the pre-shared location profiles in encrypted reply
blocks [31], thus preserving location privacy by hiding the destination from the sender (see
Section 2.3). The reply blocks also provide sender–receiver unlinkability and public key
encryption provides confidentiality (keys are shared along with the location profiles, so PKI
is not necessary).
Note that our primary goal is providing a censorship-resistant communication system
for day-to-day use, when human motion is highly routine and predictable. Our primary
target is not Internet shutdowns in an active protest or revolution scenario (à la Egypt in
February 2011) where movements may be highly varied and non-routine. However, our
system still enables communication in these scenarios, with the scalability dependent on
the extent that locations are predictable (e.g., when protesters are at home). Supporting
such communication during protests is a secondary goal. Our primary goal is therefore
supporting communication among friends and family members.
We make the following primary contributions2.
• We propose leveraging the predictability of human motion to reduce routing costs in
MANETs comprising handheld devices.
• We develop a reply block-based scheme to add location privacy to geographic-based
2This work was performed in close collaboration with several people. In particular, Yue Liu made crucial
contributions to the design of the reply block technique for anonymity. Professor Robert P. Dick suggested the
use of predictable motion patterns to reduce routing overhead and also helped design the reply block technique.
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routing.
• We describe a location-centric MANET architecture that provides scalable and secure
text-based personal communication that resists censorship and shutdown.
The rest of the chapter presents a detailed description and justification for this architec-
ture. Section 2.2 presents location profile routing. Section 2.3 proposes the location reply
blocks used to address the security and privacy issues induced by location profiling. With
these two fundamental components developed, Section 2.4 describes the full scalable and
secure location-centric network architecture.
2.2 Location Profile Routing
2.2.1 Introduction
Traditional routing protocols rely on the sharing of global information and thus scale
poorly in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) with frequent changes in topology. Routing
overhead grows quadratically in the number of nodes for distance vector and link state
protocols [47] that must distribute changes to all nodes. The natural hierarchy used to reduce
the overhead traffic in networks like the Internet (e.g., CIDR) is not available. On-demand
methods [48–50] delay routing table updates until needed, but only reduce overhead by
constant factors—the scaling behavior is unchanged.3 Instead, stateless protocols that use
local information to make forwarding decisions have the potential to scale.
One stateless protocol, Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) [40], uses geography
instead, requiring messages to be addressed to specific locations. Nodes already know their
own locations (e.g., via GPS), allowing each intermediate step to bring the message closer
to its destination. No global routing state is needed. Essentially though, this technique just
shifts the complexity from routing to addressing. A forwarding node only needs its own
3We assume that sender and receiver locations are not correlated; that could change the scaling behavior.
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Figure 2.1: Illustration of the main components in location profile routing [1].
locally-known location, but the original sender requires the current location of the recipient,
a global mapping.
Distributed location services [45, 51] can maintain this identity to location mapping,
but also have drawbacks. Hierarchy is imposed to manage scalability, but overhead still
increases super-linearly [45]. Further, locations are sensitive information, so complicated
schemes are required to protect privacy and anonymity [44]. We observe that if node
locations are predictable, the mapping can be done locally as well, reducing the scaling and
privacy concerns.
In fact, human locations are highly regular with ∼93% predictability [52]. In MANETs
of human-carried devices, predicative models of future locations can be pre-shared among
trusted participants. These models combined with GPSR allow zero-overhead addressing
and routing. Network scalability is limited by the actual traffic, not routing and location
service overhead. We name this approach location profile routing (LPR) [1] and in this
section study its performance potential. We determine the number of locations that must be
addressed to achieve the peak 93% packet delivery rate and derive the associated latency
and traffic overheads. Finally, we determine the conditions under which LPR outperforms
GHLS.
2.2.2 Description of Location Profile Routing
Location profile routing (LPR) stems from the observation that humans generally have
simple, repeated motions, spending most of their time at a few common time-dependent
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locations [46] easily captured by a compact predictive model. For the many potential4
applications of human-carried MANETs that can tolerate the resulting reduction in de-
livery reliability or increase in latency (we previously detailed a particularly compelling
application—censorship-resistant personal communication [1]), LPR eliminates overhead
traffic for route maintenance.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the main steps of LPR. Nodes continuously monitor their positions
to build location profiles (step 1), which are then shared with potential future contacts
directly (step 2). This sharing happens out-of-band, shielding the MANET from worst-case
quadratic scaling behavior. A message is addressed to the location(s) predicted by the
corresponding profile (step 3) and delivered via GPSR. Routing fails if a receiver is not in
any of the predicted locations, but delay-tolerant delivery is a possible fallback. Changes to
the motion patterns are rare (e.g., when someone starts a new job or moves to a new home)
and can be distributed via the network (step 4).
Location Profiles: Motion patterns can be modeled in many ways, but a simple discrete
model is sufficient for our purposes. A location profile is a function P mapping a time
interval (e.g., Tuesday 15:30–15:40) to a set of location–confidence tuples, with higher
confidence indicating stronger belief in the node occupying that location at that time:
P : time 7→ {(loc1, conf1), . . . , (locn, confn)}
The precise discretization level is unimportant. Both cell-tower granularity (3 km2, 1 h)
and WiFi AP granularity (157 m2, 10 min) have similar predictabilities at 93% [52] and
92% [53].
Various implementations are possible, but for completeness we summarize the Prediction-
by-Partial-Match (PPM) approach of Burbey and Martin [53], which is sufficient. PPM is a
variable-order Markov model over a sequence S of observed time-interval–location pairs,
S = {T1L1T2L2 . . . TnLn}. This defines a probability distribution over the next location
4Ad hoc networks are not yet widely used by the general public.
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conditioned on the prior k elements of context. In our case, prior locations are not known, so
our definition of P corresponds to the first-order variant (k = 1, i.e., context is the current
time). We briefly discuss zero- (no context) and third-order (context includes the previous
location) variants. This scheme captures most of the predictability (90% [53] vs. the 93%
reported maximum [52]).
Profile Distribution: Location profiles are disseminated a-priori and out-of-band, simi-
lar to telephone numbers or email addresses. For our envisioned applications—communication
between friends—the profiles can be exchanged face-to-face. In other cases, a centralized
service, similar to a telephone directory, might be needed. Regardless, the salient point
is that the profiles are known a-priori and thus can be exchanged outside of the network.
Although changes could be disseminated out-of-band as well, in-network propagation is
feasible because updates are infrequent and sent only to select participants (e.g., friends).
Opportunistically updating when devices are in close proximity further bounds the overhead.
Addressing Policy: The addressing policy translates the location–confidence tuples
output by the profile into a message delivery strategy specifying when and where packets
will be sent. Only one of the locations can be correct, so the order and method in which they
are tried influences the network throughput and latency trade-off. Their spatial correlations
influence the minimum cost routing strategy (e.g., Steiner tree) to reach all locations. The
primary focus of this paper is analyzing these performance characteristics and trade-offs.
Fallback Method: LPR fails outright when nodes are in unpredictable locations, i.e., at
least 7% of the time [52]. Although this may be tolerable for many applications in which
messages can be redelivered later, it is non-ideal. As this is not our focus, we omit details
here, but possible strategies include delay tolerant delivery (in-network buffering of the
message at a common location until the node’s return) or rendezvous delivery (messages are
sent to a rendezvous location which the node, when not in a predictable location, apprises
of current forwarding instructions). Such schemes allow for reliable delivery with average
overheads still drastically lower than traditional routing approaches.
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2.2.3 Performance Analysis
We use prior empirical studies of human motion patterns to develop analytical models
suitable for studying the performance of LPR. Barabási et al. studied six-month location
traces of 100,000 European cellphone users [46, 52] at cell-tower granularity, reporting a
maximum predictability of 93%. The size and duration of the traces make this best source to
date. To confirm that locations are as predicable at WiFi granularity, we turn to Burbey and
Martin’s study [53] study of traces from 275 WiFi users at UCSD [54]. They found similar
predictability, 92%, confirming that cellular granularity is not limiting.
2.2.3.1 How Predictable are Common Locations?
A location profile returns multiple locations in order of likelihood, so delivery cost and
latency depends on how many, K, must be targeted to reach the user. Intuitively, most time
is spent in two locations—home and work—so a zero-order model (i.e., not conditioned
on current time) might be sufficient. The pmf is π̃(k) = pk
∏k−1
i=1 (1− pi), where pi is the
probability that the target is in location i. The pi’s are roughly distributed5 as pi ∝ i−1 with
proportionality constant c ≈ 0.48 [46]. K is equivalent to a beta-geometric distribution,
K ∼ Geom(L) with L ∼ Beta(c, 1− c), and has CDF
Π̃(k) = 1− 1
kB(k, 1− c)
. (2.1)
The match6 to measured data [52] is shown in Figure 2.2. The first moment diverges, but
two locations suffice only 60% of the time and ten achieve only 80% delivery. Conditioning
the model on time of day is necessary.
The first-order model (with 10 min intervals) is 90% accurate for the first location on
5A true Zipfian distribution requires a bounded domain i ∈ [1, N ] with c = 1HN for the pi’s to total one.
The following results are for the reported empirical form, not a true distribution.
6L ∼ Beta(0.60, 0.72) yields a much tighter fit, but we lack an explanatory origin. It might result from a
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Figure 2.2: The probability that a user cur-
rently occupies one of his k most-common
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Equation 2.2
Figure 2.3: The time-dependent regularity
R(t), i.e., the probability the user is in the
most common location associated with that
time interval.
the UCSD dataset [53], nearing the 93% upper bound and suggesting marginal gains for
additional guesses. A third-order model is surprisingly only slightly better at 92%. The
larger cellular dataset (with 1 h intervals) is more pessimistic. The accuracy R(t) of the
first-order model here is given by
















where c1 = 0.148, c2 = 0.077, c3 = 0.657 and t ∈ [0, 167] is the hour of the week, i.e.,
t = 0 is Monday 00:00–0:59 and t = 167 is Sunday 23:00–23:59. As shown in Figure 2.3,
this form captures one-day and half-day periodicities. On weekends, the variability is lower
and the intervals of highest predictability occur later in the day The accuracy on weekdays
ranges from 55% to 90%, averaging R̄ ≈ 65%.
Assuming the power law form, pi ∝ i−1, holds during each time interval7, equations 2.1






















Figure 2.4: Success rate of a first-order pro-
file versus the number of locations attempted.
Rates during maximum (night) and minimum














Figure 2.5: PMF of the latency increase for
the first packet in a stream induced by try-
ing multiple locations in turn. Concurrent
attempts do not impact latency.
where D(t) is the traffic density at time t, to yield the average probability that packet
addressed to the k-most common locations reaches the target, shown in Figure 2.4. We
assume a uniform density, D(t) = 1
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, but other known traffic patterns can be substituted.
k = 5 achieves 85% success and 93% requires only k = 12. More locations are required
during the day and fewer at night. The exact number of locations to attempt is application-
specific, depending on the trade-off between between desired delivery rate and cost, i.e.,
increased latency and traffic overhead.
2.2.3.2 What Additional Latency and Traffic is Induced By LPR?
Some packets must be sent to multiple locations to have an adequate packet delivery rate,
increasing latency and traffic by constant factors. Note that the costs increase only for the
first packet in a stream. Subsequent packets are sent directly to the now-known current
location. The true average overhead depends on the percentage of first packets, which is low
for applications like text-messaging and email and higher for interactive applications like
voice chat. We report overheads for first packets only, which readers should scale by the
first packet percentage of their applications.


















Figure 2.6: PMF of the traffic overhead for
the first packet in a stream induced by trying




















Figure 2.7: Pareto front of the first packet
latency–traffic trade-off of a combined
parallel-series strategy for several average
success rates.
in the network.8 Thus, we can report overheads relative to the average latency (round-trip
time) and traffic cost (round-trip hop count) for a single delivery attempt, e.g., a 2× increase.
Parallel delivery to all k common locations does not increase latency, but increases traffic
k times. Serial delivery—attempting each location only if the previous failed, using ACKs
and a timeout to determine success and failure—reduces the traffic overhead. The pmf of
the factor increase T , plotted in Figure 2.6, is
Pr[T = t] = π̃1(t), (2.4)
where π̃1 is the pmf associated with Equation 2.3. Latency increases similarly, as shown in
Figure 2.5.
A combined approach—addressing a subset of the locations in parallel—can fine-tune
the trade-off. For example, four different groupings can be used when trying three locations
(∼ 81% success rate).
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
All locations within a group (a box in the diagram) are tried concurrently and groups are tried
serially from left to right, as needed. Formally, a grouping G is a partition of the common
8Overheads can be lower if locations are spatially correlated, we discuss in later sections.
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locations, G = {g1, g2, . . .}, with the property that for i < j, all locations in group gi are
more probable than those in gj . Let κ(g) denote the index of the most common location in
g, e.g., κ(g1) = 1. Then, the probability that group g is tried, i.e., that all previous groups











Figure 2.7 shows the Pareto fronts for several average success rates, i.e., the maximum
number of locations attempted. At the knees, L̄ ≈ 1.25× and T̄ ≈ 3–4×. These curves
are network averages. At runtime when a specific location profile is known, the precise
trade-offs for that instance can be computed.
2.2.3.3 Under What Conditions Does LPR Outperform Location Services?
LPR trades the cost of updating a location service as devices move for multiple transmissions
at the first packet. We use a simple analytical model to derive the network conditions under
which LPR outperforms GHLS [45], a scalable distributed location service. Let f be the
network-wide location update rate (increases with node movement), r be the network-wide
first-packet rate, s be the average number of hops between a node and its GHLS location
server, p be the average number of hops between a source and destination, and T̄ , as
previously defined, be the average number of destinations attempted by LPR. The location
update, location query, and first-packet delivery costs (i.e., transmission counts) for GHLS
are9 fs, 2rs, and 2rp. LPR has only the first-packet delivery cost, 2T̄ rp. After rearranging
9See Das et al. (Section IV) [45] for the derivation. Our s is their 132
h−1√2.
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(2T̄ − 2)− 2. (2.7)
When s = p (source and destination are uniformly distributed over the entire field) and
T̄ ≈ 3 (from Figure 2.7), this simplifies to f
r
> 2; LPR outperforms GHLS when the
location update rate is more than twice the first-packet rate. This bound further decreases
when sources and destinations are spatially concentrated, i.e., p < s.
2.2.3.4 Reducing Overhead Via Spanning Trees
The preceding overhead and latency analysis assumed linear routing, i.e., one transmission
from the source per attempted destination. A branching route (e.g., the Euclidean Steiner
tree containing the source and destinations) would reduce this overhead, particularly when
destinations are spatially-clustered relative to the source. Unfortunately, this works only for
dense networks in which nodes are guaranteed to exist at the branching (e.g., Steiner) points.
Many real-world networks are too irregular, and the linear approach should be used.
In dense networks, the branching approach is feasible. One desires a routing tree with
low total weight to minimize traffic but also with short source-to-destination path lengths to
minimize latency. Although seemingly conflicting, both goals are achievable. Taking n as the
size of the network, trees with weights within o(n) of the O(n)-length minimal Steiner tree
and source-to-destination path lengths within o(log n) of the O(
√
n) straight-line distances
exist [55]. We refer the reader to Aldous and Kendall for details and construction [55].
2.3 Privacy and Anonymity
MANETs are open to untrusted observation and participation, inducing several security
concerns, e.g., location and social network privacy. Furthermore, our proposed routing
scheme at first appears to require that users trust their contacts enough to share location
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profiles, selectively giving up location privacy. Although this might be acceptable in
some applications (e.g., when one’s contacts already know the motion patterns), often it is
undesirable. We propose a reply-block- and pseudonym-based scheme that enables location
profile routing to operate without exposing location profiles (or identifying information),
even to contacts. In this section, we define the desired security properties and describe our
solution.
2.3.1 Attack and Trust Model
We assume that the attackers, in addition to participating, can observe all links in the network
and collaborate using side-channels. They may have storage and processing capabilities
exceeding those of a typical handheld device, allowing for traffic analysis of accumulated
observations, and may triangulate the position of transmitters. We do restrict their number,
assuming that economics dictates that conforming nodes will generally outnumber attacking
nodes.
We do not consider attacks using information from outside of our protocols, e.g., taking
photos of the human carrying a node for later identification. Similarly, we assume the other
protocol layers, e.g., physical and application, are secure (as defined in Subsection 2.3.2).
For example, wireless transmissions should not contain identifying analog “fingerprints”
that would allow a node to be tracked. Of course, full system security requires that all layers
have these security properties, but such provision is orthogonal across layers, so this work
focuses on the network layer. Finally, we assume the majority of nodes obey our protocols,
thus resisting routing attacks. We plan to quantify this resistance in future work.
We assume that the hardware and software platform, e.g., a smartphone and its operating
system, is trusted, i.e., it is not modified to specifically interfere with our protocols or spy
on the information transmitted. Although the hardware or software could be theoretically be
modified, China’s failed efforts to require the distribution of its Green Dam Youth Filtering
software with new computers, a much simpler approach, illustrates the practical difficulty of
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doing so.
We also assume that the Whisper implementation is uncompromised, e.g., it does not
contain backdoors. On the assumption that servers are more easily compromised than many
individual devices, we envision phone-to-phone distribution of the software, instead of
downloads from a public server, to reduce the likelihood of compromised installations.
2.3.2 Desired Anonymity and Privacy Properties
The trust concerns in MANETs are often addressed by listing specific requirements for
privacy (the confidentiality of information) and anonymity (the confidentiality of the re-
lationship between an identity and its information, i.e., attributes or actions). We believe
this approach has two primary flaws. First, it focuses attention on the security provided,
when the security not provided is of greater importance and interest. Second, it suggests a
false separation between the attributes of an entity and its identity. In reality, the attributes
themselves often allow identification (e.g., the Netflix dataset fiasco [56]), so separating
them from a “traditional” identity (e.g., a name or social security number) is false protection.
Further, predicting which attributes could, in the hands of a clever-enough attacker, allow
identification is difficult. Therefore, we adopt a methodology that puts focus on the security
not provided and endeavors to provide complete anonymity, removing the need to attempt
to accurately distinguish identifying and non-identifying attributes.
We focus attention on the unprovided security by starting from an unrealistically strong,
but easy-to-define, security goal, and relaxing it by describing specific security properties
that it implies but we cannot yet provide. These relaxations have two sources. Type 1
relaxations are inherent to the underlying implementation technology (e.g., with wireless
communication technology, the location of the transmitter of a packet is always linkable to
the packet). These cannot be considered flaws of our protocols and must be accepted. Type 2
relaxations are those induced by our protocols (e.g., we employ per-location pseudonyms
to prevent tracking a node across space, but it remains possible to track a node in one
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location, across time). These are clearly flaws of our protocols and are opportunities for
future improvement.
We term our unrealistically strong starting point complete anonymity and use it to address
the false separation of identity and attributes. Put simply, complete anonymity requires
that each observable attribute in the network (i.e., the act of transmission and each data
attribute within) be unlinkable to the other attributes from the same entity (i.e., node). More
precisely, in a network comprising n nodes, an observer should have belief 1
n
for each node
that a given attribute originated from that node. Equivalently, for any two attributes, an
observer will have an equal belief in their originators being the same node or different nodes.
This strong unlinkability requirement prevents the inference of identifying information. For
example, network participation is anonymous because an identifier (a set of data attributes)
is unlinkable to transmission (an action).
In MANETS, we can decompose complete anonymity into six unlinkability relation-
ships over three attributes: actions (e.g., packet transmission), traditional identifiers (e.g.,
MAC address, name, pseudonym), and locations. The following list summarizes these six
relationships, describing the Type 1 and 2 relaxations:
action–location: In a MANET, transmission location is obviously visible, so this link is an
allowed Type 1 relaxation. Actions must still be unlinkable to past or future locations of
their entity.
action–identifier: Our protocols (given in the following subsection) use visible per-location
pseudonyms, resulting in a Type 2 relaxation: each action is linkable to exactly one
pseudonym. Actions must still be unlinkable to other identifier types.
action–action: Action–location linkability induces a slight Type 1 relaxation: two actions
linkable to the same location can be linked. However, two actions at different locations must
still be unlinkable.
identifier–location: An identifier should not be linkable to the location of its entity. Again,
our solution using per-location pseudonyms will violate this slightly, resulting in a Type 2
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relaxation: each pseudonym is linkable to exactly one location of its entity.
identifier–identifier: Two identifiers for the same entity should not be linkable. For ex-
ample, a pseudonym must be unlinkable to other identities (e.g., real name) and multiple
pseudonyms for an entity must be unlinkable. For network transmissions, this means that
the identifiers of the sender and receiver cannot be linked, providing social network privacy.
For personal communication, contacts know each other, resulting in one Type I relaxation:
communicating contacts can link each other’s identifiers. Pseudonyms induce one Type
2 relaxation: the pseudonyms of the sender and receiver for a one-hop (i.e., forwarding)
transmission are linkable.
location–location: The current, past, and future locations of a node must be unlinkable. We
allow one Type 2 relaxation: the allowed identifier–location link for per-location pseudonyms
implies that past and future locations can be linked, but only when they are the same location.
Critically, this provides location privacy, with the exception that the existence of a node at a
single location may be tracked across time.
2.3.3 Unlinkability via Reply Blocks and Pseudonyms
This section presents our reply block- and pseudonym-based solution to provide the desired
unlinkability. A formal argument that the properties are satisfied requires complete enumer-
ation of all types of actions, identifiers, and locations and lengthy analysis. Such detail is
beyond the scope of this dissertation , so instead the solutions are presented with high-level
arguments for their correctness. Roughly, the following arguments derive from the premise
that two attributes are unlinkable if (1) they are never both available in the same context and
(2) transitive application of known relationships cannot be used to link them.
Geographic routing lends itself to our unlinkability requirements, because messages
are addressed to locations, not identifiers. Identifiers are not visible in packet headers
and thus the three identifier relationships are implicitly unlinkable by third parties. The
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sender and receiver themselves do know each other’s identifiers, so we use reply blocks, a
variant of Chaum’s mix-nets, to disassociate information available at the sender (receiver’s
identifier) from the information available at the receiver (receiver’s location and receiver’s
actions) and vice versa, explicitly protecting the identifier relationships10. A reply block
is a routing instruction that guides a message from a sender through a mix-chain leading
to the receiver. A mix-chain is composed of mix-servers, each of which disassociates the
incoming and outgoing messages by reordering them and changing their appearance via
layered decryption. Thus, observers (including the sender itself) cannot track the original
message; at any point, only the previous and next mix-servers are known. We give detailed
descriptions of applying reply block techniques in MANETs, including how senders choose
the mix-servers composing a chain, in the remaining parts of this subsection.
Action–action links are also protected. This linking would require transitive application
of other relationships: action A linked to X and action B linked to X implies A is linked
to B. Aside from the allowed Type 1 exception when X is a location, no such X exists; the
action–identifier and identifier–location relationships are unlinkable.
Location–location links are also protected. The location caches shared with a contact are
encapsulated in reply blocks, so the actual locations are not revealed to the contact. Further,
as with the action-action link, transitive linking of locations is not possible: the mix-chain
dissociates locations from other attributes.
Location-based addressing has one significant problem. The predicted locations are
inherently imprecise, so messages must be addressed to relatively large regions (several
802.11b hops in radius) and then flooded, wasting significant bandwidth and energy. To ad-
dress this, we introduce pseudonyms as secondary addresses. Messages are addressed to both
a location and a pseudonym (both encapsulated in the reply block), with the location used for
initial routing and the pseudonym used in the destination region. Different pseudonyms are
used in each location, preventing the pseudonyms from transitively linking other attributes.
10The usual caveats for mix-chains apply. Linking is possible if all nodes in the chain collaborate and global







Figure 2.8: Message flow for ordinary and multi-server reply blocks.
However, they still violate the strictest requirements, resulting in the previously mentioned
Type 2 relaxations. Three of these, action–pseudonym, pseudonym–location, and, for one-
hop sender–receiver links, pseudonym–pseudonym, are acceptable because the pseudonyms
map one-to-one to an already visible attribute, location, and contain no additional useful
information. The fourth though, is unfortunate. Pseudonyms persist across time and can
be used to link the times when a node is in the same location (a type of location–location
link). We are investigating possible remedies. An obvious possibility is frequently changing
pseudonyms.
2.3.3.1 Reply Block Operation and Management
The chain in Figure 2.8 illustrates the use of an ordinary reply block, specifying a two-server
mix-chain. Each transmission depends on those before, posing a deliverability problem.
Each mix-server provides a single common location, so with non-negligible probability
the server will be unreachable at the time of attempted contact. We solve this problem by
specifying multiple mix servers at each layer (also in Figure 2.8), increasing the probability
of successful delivery. Each layer of the reply block is encrypted to three servers, who each
remove an encryption layer and each forward the packet to the next three mix-nodes. Each
server remembers the previous–next hop association. The receiver sends a message back
through the fastest chain to complete, marking it as available for subsequent packets.
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Reply blocks are location profiles anonymized by mix-chains, so managing them includes
two main tasks: location profile management and mix-pool management. Each device needs
to track its motions and keep its location profile up to date. Additionally, the mix-servers
used in one’s reply blocks also need to be valid. When there are significant changes in a
device’s location profile, or there are too many unreachable mix-servers in a reply block to
permit any valid route, the reply blocks need to be updated accordingly.
2.3.3.2 Mix-Server Pool Management
Mix-server selection is important because if all mix-servers in a chain collaborate on an
attack, the sender and receiver can be linked. Two selection requirements need to be satisfied.
(1) Servers should have high probability of protocol compliance, reducing the chance that
all servers in a chain improperly collaborate to trace a message. (2) They must be directly
reachable by locations, instead of reply blocks, to prevent an infinite chain of reply blocks.
For traditional Internet mix-chains, services are chosen from semi-trusted published lists, as
with Tor [33]. However, this method is not suitable for MANETs; no semi-trusted authority
who could publish such a list exists. A new method for choosing mix-servers is needed.
We assume that physical attacker density is limited by economic constraints, and thus
propose that each node individually maintain a pool of mix-servers chosen randomly from the
various one-hop neighbors it encounters. This density assumption could be violated by Sybil
attacks [57], in which one device pretends to be many, so we develop a technique leveraging
signal strength measurements to detect Sybil identities during pool population (Chapter 5).
As a node moves in the network, it asks one-hop neighbors to act as future potential mix-
servers. Willing neighbors respond with a single 〈common location, pseudonym〉 address
and an associated contact probability. Entire profiles are not shared to preserve location
privacy. The requester saves the information from non-Sybil neighbors in its mix-server
pool for future usage.
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Figure 2.9: Main components of the location-centric network, with arrows representing
service relationships.
2.4 Location-Centric Network
Now that the two most important pieces—location profile routing (see Section 2.2) and reply
block-based privacy (see Section 2.3)—have been described, we present the architecture
of our location-centric network for secure personal communication. System scalability
relies on location-profile routing, into which we incorporate confidentiality and privacy
mechanisms. As illustrated in Figure 2.9, the system comprises three layers, (1) application,
(2) secure transport, and (3) network. The target application is low-bandwidth and delay-
tolerant text-based communication, e.g., email and text messaging. The secure transport
layer provides confidential and anonymous host-to-host delivery using mix-chains. The
reply blocks constructed by a host and shared during face-to-face contact act as the transport
layer addresses. The network layer delivers messages between mix-nodes using geographic
routing. A network address is a two-tuple containing a pseudonym and location. Keys
for encryption are exchanged face-to-face between contacts, so no PKI is required. In this
section, we will describe the network and secure transport layers in more detail.
Network. Geographic routing (e.g., GPSR [40]) is the backbone of the network, pro-
viding routing scalability. Location profiles are exchanged face-to-face, providing location-
distribution scalability, normally the Achilles’ heel of geographic routing. A node’s move-
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ment within a small region prevents addressing destinations by precise coordinates, so we
propose using geographic routing for coarse delivery and reactive routing near the receiver.
Thus, a receiver is addressed by both a destination region and a pseudonym. When a mes-
sage reaches its destination region, the intermediate node at the boundary transitions from
geographic routing to local link-state routing. If a route is known, the message is delivered
along it. Otherwise, a route discovery message is broadcast to discover one. If the node is
unreachable, the message is dropped.
Secure transport. The transport layer provides host-to-host secure communication
channels. A channel is a mix-chain between the sender and the receiver, constructed
according to the receiver’s reply block, that provides the desired location privacy and sender–
receiver unlinkability. It is constructed according to the receiver’s reply blocks. End-to-end
encryption provides confidentiality.
We now describe the operation of the transport layer, responsible for delivering messages
from the application layer to the destination node. To deliver a message, the sender first
determines whether a channel to the destination is already available. If so, the message is
sent via the channel. Otherwise, the sender sends a setup message using the receiver reply
block with the highest contact probability. If the sender does not receive a response within
a constrained time, it concludes that the receiver is not at the corresponding location of
that reply block and repeats this process for the remaining reply blocks, until a response is
received or all the reply blocks have been used. Our preliminary analysis indicates that, on
average, receivers will be contacted via a reply block 93% of the time. When a response
is received, the sender marks the channel as valid, sets a timeout for it, and messages
are delivered thorough this channel. The receiver can respond via this channel as well,
although the routing is not, in general, symmetric. Messages are encrypted with a session
key established during the channel setup process.
Overhead. Energy consumption is a significant concern, especially since much of the
work is forwarding others’ traffic and does not directly benefit the user paying the cost.
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Current 802.11 ad hoc technology is inefficient, depleting cellphone batteries in several
hours (the power save mode is only for AP networks). Implementing a periodic sleep option
for ad hoc mode will be necessary. Even with reasonable battery life, some selfish users
might refuse to forward traffic for others, but we believe they will be in the minority. Most
people derive some satisfaction from helping others, particularly at low cost (e.g., charging
ones’ phone each night instead of every other). An application feature displaying statistics
about the number of conversations relayed could encourage such altruism.
2.5 Conclusion
We have not implemented the architecture laid out in this chapter. Instead, it’s constituent
components motivate two specific areas of research. We hope this architecture (or something
similar) will be implemented, but the underlying pieces must be studied and developed first.
Specifically, it motivates two primary research directions.
Human Mobility Patterns: Predictability motion patterns can substantially improve
routing efficiency, but by how much? How predictable are human locations at the spatial
granularity of a WiFi transmission range? How large is a predictable location and how many
are non-trivially probable at a given time-of-day?
The data required to answer these questions—long duration traces of high spatial and
temporal granularity for many people—are hard to obtain. We believe some of the data
collected by the MANES system (Chapter 4) used to deploy Shout (Chapter 3) will be a
useful starting point and are investigating it now.
Mix Node Selection: Safe reply block construction requires choosing multiple, distinct,
anonymous participants chosen from among volunteering nodes. As mentioned, this is
easily defeated by a Sybil attack, in which one device pretends to be multiple participants.





Usage statistics of services like Twitter and Weibo indicate the popularity and growing
importance of microblogging communication applications. In 2012, Twitter had over 200
million active global users [58, 59] generating over 400 million tweets per day. In China,
where Twitter is blocked by the government, the approved alternative, Weibo, reported over
36.5 million active daily users [60]. These short-form, public broadcasts have become a
natural part of daily communication for many people worldwide.
In places where traditional media sources are heavily censored or controlled, social
media has offered an excellent avenue for dissidents to educate and organize the general
populace. The 2011 Arab Spring uprisings demonstrated this value, with Twitter used to
share criticisms of the existing regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, sparking increased political
debate and participation [61]. Spikes in online activity preceding protests indicated its
usefulness in mobilizing large numbers of people and continued activity proved its ability to
report from the action [61]. In China, Weibo is used by amateur reporters to great effect,
raising public awareness of issues ranging from food safety to the extravagant lifestyles
of government officials [62]. That content can be submitted by anyone and is filtered and
judged by the general audience, not a select government official or media executive, is the
real power of these services. Posts of widespread interest or importance quickly reach many
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people.
Naturally, oppressive governments have responded by banning and censoring such
services. In China, foreign services like Twitter are blocked, with domestic alternatives
supporting government-specified censorship demands, like Weibo, appeasing public demand.
Weibo appears to use a variety of censorship methods, including deleting posts containing
banned keywords, rejecting sensitive search queries, and banning some users [10]. Various
Arab governments similarly block access to Twitter [12, 13]. In response to protests in late
January 2011, the Egyptian government, which had not previously blocked such social media
sites, did so [14]. When that failed to stem the tide, all Internet access within the country
was disabled for several days, after the major ISPs were forced to withdraw their Border
Gateway Protocol routes [17, 18]. Given the demonstrated value of these microblogging
applications in affecting social awareness and change, methods for resisting such censorship
are needed.
Traditional censorship countermeasures like proxies [63, 64] and anonymous overlay
networks [33] are not ideal for microblogging applications. In particular, they (1) still route
all traffic through a few centralized chokepoints—the government- or ISP-owned routers—
facilitating advanced traffic analysis1, (2) require some level of technical sophistication for
installation and operation, impeding widespread deployment, and (3) are easily defeated
by blocking all external Internet traffic2. In this chapter, we instead argue instead for a
microblogging architecture based on ad hoc networking, which are much more difficult to
censor or surveil than the hierarchical, infrastructure-based Internet.
Certain properties of the microblogging communication style, particularly for sensitive
content likely to trigger censors and incite government response, suggest the suitability of
ad hoc networks.
1Although advanced traffic analysis does yet appear to be in wide use, its future use is likely as this
cat-and-mouse game between censors and their targets continues.
2Since such shutdowns are economically damaging and thus likely to be short, the loss of social media
access could be tolerated. But having a working Twitter-like system dissemination and organization is still
preferable.
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• Content is deliberately public. Activists intend to inform and organize broad portions
of the public, not privately chat amongst themselves. Posts are intentionally visible to
everyone, even officials of the protested government.
• The target audience is geographically dense, i.e., concentrated within a city or town.
Whether organizing a demonstration in a public square or spreading facts about a
corrupt politician, it’s most critical that messages reach those nearby3.
• High delivery latencies, on the order of minutes or hours, are acceptable. Microblog-
ging is largely a distribution mechanism, not an avenue for interactive, back-and-forth
discussion or debate. Much interesting content is relevant for several hours or days,
so immediate delivery is not necessary.
• Content size is small. 1500 tweets—that’s more than one per minute for an entire day—
consume fewer than 500 kilobytes. At volumes reasonable for human consumption,
microblogging requires very little bandwidth.
We propose Shout, a decentralized, ad hoc network-based architecture for microblogging
designed to be difficult to censor. Shouts (tweets) and reshouts (retweets) are sent to
neighbors within the one-hop broadcast range, flowing via the geographic, rather than social,
network. This flow fits the intended distribution for censorable content well and the nature
of the application tolerates the inherent bandwidth and latency limits of ad hoc networks.
The non-hierarchical network structure is free of choke-points where censorship could be
easily applied.
Our design has several unique aspects compared to traditional microblogging applica-
tions and ad hoc network protocols that greatly reduce system complexity and improve
operation efficiency.
3We do not discount the importance of communication with the outside world. The 2011 uprisings proved
this use of Twitter as well [61]. However, only a small number of links are needed to spread content between
these separated clusters, e.g., cities or countries. Tech-savvy users comfortable with traditional proxies,
anonymity services like Tor [33], or alternatives like Speak-to-Tweet [65] can fill this roll. The primary
challenge remains dissemination among the large numbers of people concentrated within the towns or cities
close to the events.
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Addressing: The intended audience for censor-triggering content is usually the general
public, so traditional addressing schemes are an unnecessary complication. For example, in
Twitter, tweets are addressed to followers 4. In Shout, messages are delivered to whomever
is nearby, simply and efficiently reaching the (much broader) target audience.
Content: The content is intended for public dissemination, so support for message confi-
dentiality5 is unneeded. All messages can be broadcast in plaintext.
Routing: Routing decisions are pushed onto the humans using Shout. Although messages
are intentionally broadcast to the general audience, they should still be restricted to portions
of the network with a high density of interested users. For example, content of interest only
to people in one neighborhood should not flood others. Complete, automatic identification
of regions of interest for particular messages is not yet feasible, so Shout uses human
involvement instead. Messages will naturally spread within regions where the reshout rate
is high—the content presumably interesting— and will die out in regions where it is not.
Automated reshout techniques can amplify the reshout rate to speed dissemination.
Adoption: Shout attempts to provide value to users not concerned with censorship to
increase the likelihood of widespread adoption. Rapid adoption of a new application by
the general public immediately after an increase in censorship is unrealistic. By delivering
messages based on geographic proximity, not social relationships, we hope Shout will
be useful in everyday life as well. For example, a shout mentioning leftover food in a
conference room would be implicitly sent to those near enough to get the food, as opposed
to an email to a listserv that includes people currently out of the building.
4Anyone may browse a user’s stream, unless set to private, but the intended primary delivery mechanism is
through the follower relationships.
5Confidentiality differs from sender authenticity or sender anonymity, which we discuss later.
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3.2 Overview
Shout is designed around the premise that for censorship-resistant microblogging, the
communication style can adapt to the most natural network architecture. In particular,
a broadcast protocol is appropriate, unlike traditional systems that address messages to
particular users or groups. Second, the participants are motivated to share content, so a
user-controlled mechanism for spreading messages, similar in principle to gossip in the real
world, is appropriate.
Ad hoc networks provide good resistance to censorship, but suffer from reduced through-
put, increased latency, and poorer routing scalability. The non-hierarchical structure implies
that censoring communication would require controlling many of the participating nodes, a
task much too expensive when the devices are the smartphones already carried by many peo-
ple. But it also hurts the traditional network performance metrics. As networks grow, more
traffic must flow through devices with constrained bandwidth and each message is routed
through more devices [38]. Fortunately, for microblogging the communication structure can
be adapted to the ad hoc structure, mitigating the impact of those scalability concerns.
We have the following goals for Shout.
Unblockable: A centralized authority should not be able to selectively block most users
from sharing messages without also blocking significant, legitimate traffic. In essence,
we wish to prevent technological means for censorship. We do not explicitly attempt to
prevent self-censorship due to fear of reprisal, but describe in Subsection 3.4.2 how the
non-hierarchical structure does provide some advantage here too.
Efficient: Total network traffic should scale with message reach. The limited throughput
available in the ad hoc network should be concentrated on messages of widespread interest
or importance.
Verifiable: As an open system, anyone can send messages, good or bad, true or false. Thus,
readers must be able to verify the authorship of each message. Note that verifying the
real-world identity of an author is not necessary. Often, simply ensuring that a message
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came from the same anonymous individual who published true, useful information in the
past is sufficient to have reasonable trust in its content.
Adoptable: Systems useful only for sharing censorable content or only during times of
extreme Internet blocking are not widely used by the general public. Providing features
useful in day-to-day life and not seen in existing applications will help with adoption.
Simple and Extendable: True solutions evolve from earlier efforts, and we hope Shout is
just one step in such a chain. Thus, it must be simple and extendable, allowing others to
invent, implement, and test future innovations and improvements.
3.2.1 Threat Model
We consider the following threat model with respect to our goal of unblockability. The censor
is assumed to be a state authority with control over infrastructure, e.g., top-level Internet
routers within the country, wanting to limit the spread of certain information, e.g. that critical
of the government. With control of the infrastructure networks, the censor can employ any
of the numerous techniques developed to detect and block potentially-objectionable content.
We assume the government allows the widespread use of WiFI-equipped computers
and smartphones, perhaps due to their significant economic benefit. WiFi transmissions
can be blocked by jamming, but we assume the censor cannot jam large portions of the
network. Doing so requires covering large geographic regions with jamming transmitters
and thus is quite expensive. Further, it seriously disrupts legitimate uses of the airwaves.
Selective jamming could block just the questionable traffic, but require specialized jamming
equipment, further increasing the cost.
Finally, we assume the censors do not control or mandate the installation of special soft-
ware on the devices running Shout, e.g., the laptops and smartphones. Although theoretically
possible, recent failed attempts, like China’s Green Dam Youth Escort initiative [66, 67],
highlight the practical difficulty.
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3.2.2 Applications
The primary motivation for Shout is censorship-resistance, but the design supports a variety
of applications in which the independence from infrastructure or geographically-based
delivery is beneficial. Such applications may help encourage early adoption of Shout, such
that it is already in use and available when its censorship-resistance is needed. We briefly
mention a few here.
As stated before, Shout is useful for censorship-resistant microblogging. The non-
hierarchical structure is difficult to shutdown or block, as Twitter was in Egypt in early
2011 [14]. Further, messages do not flow through intermediate choke-points, eliminating
opportunities to selectively censor certain posts.
Shout is also useful whenever infrastructure is unavailable. For example, after a natural
disaster that destroys cellular towers or knocked out power, the ad hoc system would continue
to function. Authorities could broadcast safety instructions. Victims could self-report their
locations and condition to others nearby. First responders could read incoming Shouts to
assess the situation without waiting to interview bystanders.
Similarly, consider dissemination of public safety messages about ongoing gas leaks
or tornado warnings. Text-messaging is commonly used for this purpose, but people in
many buildings get poor, if any, cellular coverage. The University of Michigan Emergency
Management Team is interested in applications like Shout, that extend the reach of their
emergency broadcast system into basements and laboratories with no cellular coverage [68].
Despite a very different goal than censorship-resistance, the same architecture is an attractive
solution to this problem.
Finally, Shout has potential for day-to-day use as well6. Messages flows via a geographic
network—broadcast to other nearby users—instead of via social links. This makes Shout
ideal for an ephemeral audience determined by proximity. For example, concertgoers, sports
6Many of these ideas could be accomplished with location-aware Internet-based services as well. An ad
hoc network, though, supports them naturally and without the privacy concerns.
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Figure 3.1: Shouts are broadcast to one-hop neighbors. A recipient interested in the message
can reshout, or rebroadcast, increasing the effective range. Additionally, one can reshout after
moving to a new location, reaching otherwise-isolated portions of the network. Automatic
rebroadcasts ca increase the dissemination rate.
fans, or conference attendees—people at a common event—would easily and naturally see
each others tweets during the event. No social relationships are required and none persist
after the event. Similar behaviors have emerged with Twitter, with groups choosing a specific
hashtag so tweets from the event are easily searchable. With Shout, even that effort is not
necessary.
Students might use Shout in various ways. For example, consider one struggling with
a general chemistry problem set in the library. He can send a message asking for help to
locate other nearby classmates willing to help—classmates that, in a class of hundreds, he
probably doesn’t already know. Or consider a pickup game of football that needs a few more
players. It’s easy to broadcast that request to nearby people, strangers included, that might
want to join.
3.2.3 Design Summary
Shout is designed for smartphones that can communicate via ad hoc WiFi. When a message
or shout is sent, it is broadcast to the one-hop neighborhood, as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
To avoid wasting limited bandwidth and energy on uninteresting content, messages are not
automatically transmitted further. Instead, much like gossip in the real world, a recipient can
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parent by its hash.
Figure 3.2: Each shout contains a user name, message, timestamp, location tag (optional),
the sender’s public key, and a self-signature. A shout intended as a comment on a prior
shout references that parent via a hash of the parent.
manually reshout a message to increase it’s range to his one-hop neighborhood. Reshouting
after moving to a new location can extend the reach to otherwise disconnected portions
of the network. To ensure widespread distribution, someone could act like a town crier,
intentionally moving from place to place, reshouting in each. Using manual intervention
for further broadcasts helps ensure that content only propagates through the portions of the
network with interested users. Within these regions, automatic rebroadcasts can be used to
reduce delivery latency.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the common information included in a shout. As with traditional
services, each contains a username, message, timestamp, and an optional location. Unlike
traditional services, these fields are set by the sender and thus could be falsified. As a
decentralized system, usernames are not unique, so the contents are self-signed with an
included public key. This public key serves as an unforgeable identifier, so one can determine
whether two messages claiming the same username actually came from the same source.
Finally, a shout may reference a prior shout by hash. For example, comments include a hash
of the parent shout.
Shout is a fully-decentralized system, so information is local to each device, i.e., a
user’s smartphone, as illustrated in Figure 3.3. In particular, no global database of past
shouts is maintained. Each device stores the shouts it has heard, but because users have
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Figure 3.3: Shout is fully-decentralized so information like past shouts and one’s user
profile is local to each device. Only shouts one has heard are available, so each device
has a different partial view of the history. Features like lists of favorite users must also be
managed locally.
different location histories, most will have observed different sets of shouts. Consequently,
any analysis or “view” of the world derived from the database can vary from user to user.
Features usually performed by a central server, like spam filtering, search, or authorship
verification must instead be performed locally.
3.3 Decentralized and Non-Hierarchical Architecture
In this section, we describe the Shout architecture and protocols, paying particular attention
to why these design decisions were made. First, we justify the decision to base Shout on ad
hoc WiFi networks and describe how this informs later design decisions. Subsequently, we
discuss our solution to decentralized identity management. Then, we describe the details
of the Shout network protocols, both for sharing messages and larger content like pictures.
Finally, we briefly discuss local message management, i.e., search and filtering.
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3.3.1 Ad Hoc WiFi
Decentralized microblogging services have been previously proposed [69–71], designed
to improve reliability and increase scalability by reducing the dependence on a centralized
provider. Unfortunately, these solutions are insufficient to address our primary concern—
censorship—because they still rely on a hierarchical delivery mechanism, the Internet. In
particular, these solutions assume that communication costs are similar between all pairs of
users. Hierarchical structures approximate this property, but non-hierarchical networks, in
which transmissions between distance nodes must pass through all the intermediate nodes,
do not [38].
Hierarchical networks are inherently susceptible to censorship, because much traffic
flows through a few centralized points at the highest levels. These chokepoints are a prime
location to efficiently effect censorship and surveillance. Instead, we use non-hierarchical
networks, for which similar behavior would require controlling many of the participating
devices or communication links. We believe such control is too expensive or economically
damaging to be of concern.
We based Shout on ad hoc WiFi, a non-hierarchical networking technology already
widely deployed. The prevalence of existing hardware support means that Shout is easily
deployed as a software installation7, significantly increasing the chances of real adoption. In
short, we chose ad hoc WiFi for its censorship-resistant, non-hierarchical structure and its
existing availability.
The choice of ad hoc WiFi influences many aspects of the design. The range of a
single transmission is short, 50–100 m and multi-hop throughput does not scale [38], so
most communication must be local. Generally, transmissions should be of interest to the
recipients, not just intermediate hops on the path to an interested receiver. Individual
7Some platforms, like Android, disable the ad hoc mode in software. These limitations are easily removed
by a software update and can be worked around by rooting the phone. We hope that apparent support for the
emerging WiFi Direct standard [72] signals that manufactures will better support ad hoc connectivity in the
future.
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transmission sizes are limited, usually to 1500 bytes8. Typical Shout broadcasts should
fit in such packets. All transmissions are effectively broadcast, so for highest efficiency,
all messages are public and readable by any device in range of the transmitter. We do not
naïvely support encrypted messages in Shout. Finally, routing schemes do not scale with
network size, as routing table maintenance consumes an increasing fraction of network
bandwidth [40, 41]. Thus, we do not support addressing of messages—like friends and
followers in social networks—in Shout9. Messages are assumed to be intended for those
nearby—content of broader interest can propagate further via reshouting.
3.3.2 Identity Management
Identity management in a decentralized system is not trivial. In a service like Twitter, one
trusts the centralized system to ensure that usernames are unique and only the true owner of
an account can post. Without such an omnipotent authority, the desired properties must be
explicitly enumerated and incorporated into the protocol.
The first task is determining the purpose and features desired for identities in Shout. At a
high level, we wish to support the notion of authorship. Each message should be associated
with an authoring entity, so that messages from the same entity are easily grouped and those
from different entities easily separated. Further, the authorship should be verifiable. Such
verification is useful in two ways. First, it allows confirmation that a message purporting to
be from a particular person, say a friend, is not a forgery. Second, it allows the development
of anonymous entities known only by their posts. For example, confirming that a message
containing surprising, hard-to-believe information came from an otherwise-unknown entity
who has only posted true things in the past might increase one’s belief in the new message.
Thus, we desire an identification scheme that is decentralized (i.e., no central authority
8WiFi supports larger MTUs, but the the Ethernet MTU of 1500 bytes is usually used, on the assumption
that transmissions are Internet-bound and thus eventually traverse an Ethernet link.
9Shout could be easily extended to support tags on messages—much like hashtags in Twitter—-that could

















Figure 3.4: Zooko’s triangle [2]. A single naming scheme can include only two of the prop-
erties. The Shout protocol uses both self-chosen usernames and public keys to incorporate
all three properties. Third identifiers can be generated locally to provide unique names that
are easy for humans to compare and remember.
is needed to issue them), secure (i.e., authorship is not forgeable), and memorable (i.e.,
humans can easily remember and identity important names). Further, the scheme should be
simple and not require significant network resources. Unfortunately, a scheme with all three
properties is not believed possible.
These properties are known as Zooko’s triangle, illustrated in Figure 3.4, and the general
belief is that a single naming scheme can have only two of the properties [2, 73]. Thus, for
Shout, we employ two naming schemes, self-chosen usernames and public keys. In typical
situations, with most network participants behaving, the usernames, which are decentralized
and meaningful, will be sufficient. Should two nearby people pick the same name, one will
likely change to reduce confusion. Only in the case of intentional impersonation is such
duplication a serious concern. For this, Shout employ public keys, which are decentralized
and secure. Each message includes both a username and public key and is signed by the
corresponding by private key. These signatures serve to prove the authorship of a message.
Users wishing to verify authorship against real-world identities can exchange public keys
out-of-band, much like PGP.
Of course, public keys and signatures are not intended to be human-readable. Without
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help, most users will likely rely on the username only, missing possible forgeries. We
summarize several possible solutions next.
The program could proactively warn users about duplicate usernames. When a displaying
a shout with a username used by multiple public keys (in the local set of shouts), a warning
could be display to the user. The user could then compare the shouts sent under each of
the public keys to help determine the actual author identity. This sort of solution places
significant burden on the user and is likely to be disabled or ignored.
Instead, displaying a name that spans the other leg of Zooko’s triangle—one that’s
secure and meaningful—is best. These cannot be global and thus must be local to each
user’s device. For example, consider using color as the identifier. A different color could be
locally assigned to each duplicate user and displayed as a border or background on the shout.
Textual names are perhaps more memorable. Steigler proposed a system along these lines
with his Petname system [73]. Here, one picks a local identifier, or petname, to correspond
to the global identifier, or public key, and the system translates between the two. That is, the
local petname is displayed instead of the public key. As long as the user assigns distinct
petnames, they are secure and meaningful.
Regardless, the Shout protocols are independent of these solutions. Shout supports
the two legs of the triangle possible in a decentralized system and is easily extended to
incorporate local systems for the third. Existing key-exchange and signature verification
programs, like web-of-trust and PGP, are compatible with Shout. Further, arbitrary third-
party solutions for mapping public key to local secure and memorable identifiers can be
used. We hope Shout serves as a platform to test various solutions to this problem with real
users.
Some have authors have tried to “square the triangle”, by proposing identity schemes
that claim to have all three properties [74]. For example, Namecoin [75], a distributed
DNS-alternative based on Bitcoin [76], uses hashchain-based proof of work to generate
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Figure 3.5: The three types of shouts and their relationships. Comments are restricted to a
single level so that the largest full chain (a reshout of a comment) will fit in one WiFi frame.
globally unique and secure mappings between public keys, URLs, and addresses10. These
schemes require that changes to the global hashchain be propagated to all users, and thus
are not suitable for limited-throughput ad hoc networks.
3.3.3 Messages
Two primary considerations directed the design of the Shout message format. First, each
transmission should be less than 1500 bytes, to fit the MTU of real-world WiFi devices.
Second, each transmission should carry the full context for the message, e.g., the prior shout
if the message is a comment. These requirements tightly constrain the information that can
be fit into a shout and the length of comment chains.
Figure 3.5 show the three types of shouts. Original shouts are stand-alone, new posts.
A comment is a new message that also references an original shout. When the comment is
broadcast, the original shout is included in the same transmission so the conversation context
is guaranteed to be available to the recipient. Comments may not reference another comment,
because the context chain would be too long. A reshout is more than just a rebroadcast of an
existing shout. It contains all information of regular shout except a message, but references
the original shout (or comment) being reshouted. Again, the full chain is transmitted.
10Under certain assumptions about the relative computational power of attackers to conforming participants.
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4 Has Location Fields
5 Has Parent Field 
6 Unused
7 Unused
Figure 3.6: The network packet format for a shout. The hash used to reference a shout is
also computed over this canonical form.
Each shout contains the fields one would expect for a microblogging application, as
show in Figure 3.6. The user is identified by a self-chosen username and public key, as
discussed in the preceding section. Avatar images are too large to fit in a packet and are
unlikely to change frequently, so only a hash-based reference is included. Subsection 3.3.4
describes the protocol for retrieving the actual image. A timestamp indicating the time of
sending is included, although recipients have no way to verify this time. The location from
which the shout was sent may be included, but again, it cannot be verified. The message
contents are limited to 240 bytes, to fit the 1500 byte limit. If a reshout or comment, the
parent is referenced by including its SHA-256 hash, taken over the canonical network format
of the parent. Finally, the contents are self-signed. This signature can be verified using the
public key field.
Shout uses elliptic curve cryptography for digital signatures, because keys and signatures
are shorter than for RSA. A fixed curve, secp256r1, is used so to save space—the curve
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name does not need to be transmitted. This makes changing the curve or signature algorithm
in the future more difficult, but given the nature of our application and the forecasted lifetime
of 256-bit ECC [77], we think the tradeoff is reasonable. The public keys are included
uncompressed—both the x and y coordinates are given in full.
3.3.4 Content Sharing
Internet-based microblogging services support user avatars and the referencing of additional
content via hyperlink in the message body. References to pictures, in particular, are often
automatically dereferenced, the image displayed inline with the message. Due to their
ubiquity in the online world, we believe these features are necessary in Shout to help
adoption, but implementing them in an ad hoc network is much more involved. As already
mentioned, bandwidth is limited, so transmitting kilobytes or megabytes of image or content
with each reshout is infeasible.
To reduce the bandwidth demands, images11 are instead shared asynchronously and
on-demand. Avatars change infrequently—most users will send many shouts with the
same avatar. Thus, a particular avatar need propagate through the network only once. On
subsequent shouts, it is already available locally and need not be re-transmitted. Attached
images may not see the same reuse, but the asynchronous, on-demand sharing still ensures
that the content is transmitted only when a recipient first requires it.
To ensure integrity, images are referenced in shouts by a cryptographically-secure SHA-
256 hash. Thus, the digital signature of the shout covers the image as well. The avatar hash
has its own field in the shout message format. Other images are included as URIs in the
message body, much like hyperlinks in Twitter, in the form shout://<hash>, where
<hash> is the 64 character hexadecimal encoding of the content hash.
Were the hash reference taken directly over the image, one would have to receive the
11The described scheme can share arbitrary content, but we envision images as the most popular use. We
use image in the remainder to ease explanation.
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Figure 3.7: Hash tree mechanism used to reference and distribute images and other large
content in Shout. The leaf nodes are packed to the left and contain the content is sequential
order. The content descriptor includes a MIME type, so that hash references to the tree
specify both the content bit string and how it should be interpreted.
entire content to verify its correctness. This opens a possible attack. In response to a request
for the image referenced by a given hash, an attacker could respond with an arbitrarily
large amount of incorrect content and the receiver would be forced to store it all, unable
to check its correctness until all was received. Instead, the hashing scheme should allow
the correctness to be verified at each transmission, so that falsified chunks can immediately
discarded.
Shout uses a hash tree to obtain this property, as illustrated in Figure 3.7. The content is
split into chunks of no more than 1450 bytes each—with headers, this fills the 1500 byte
MTU. These form the leaves of a binary tree, with each parent node containing the hashes
of its two children. The veracity of a particular node can be checked given only the hash
contained in its parent—no other portions of the tree are necessary. The packet formats
for leaf and inner nodes are shown in Figure 3.9. Hashes are taken over the entire packet
contents, as shown in Figure 3.8.
It is important that the recipient interpret the received binary content in the intended way.
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IH(L,R) = SHA256(0x02 | size(0x00 | L | R) | 0x00 | L | R)
LH(X)  = SHA256(0x02 | size(0x10 | X) | 0x10 | X)
CDH(X,M) = SHA256(0x01 | size(0x00 | X | size(M) | M) | 0x01 | X | size(M) | M) 
Content: X1 X2 X3 X4
A = LH(X1) B = LH(X2) C = LH(X3) D = LH(X4)




Figure 3.8: Example hash tree for content four data blocks long (X1, X2, X3, and X4) and
with MIME type M . The hash H would be included in the avatar field or Shout URI. The
SHA-256 hashes, computed over the canonical network format shown in Figure 3.9, are




Message (up to 255 bytes)
MSB LSBPacket Length (max 289)
MSB (31)
LSB (0)
Hash of Root of Tree







4 1 — Leaf Node
5–7 Unused
Version FlagsPacket Length (max 1451)Type (0x02) MSB LSB




4 0 — Inner Node
5–7 Unused
Figure 3.9: The network packet formats for content descriptors and hash tree nodes.
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Unused
Version FlagsType (0x03) MSB LSBPacket Length (33)
MSB (31)
LSB (0)
Hash of Content Descriptor
Figure 3.10: The network packet format for content requests.
A bit string might be, for example, both a valid image file and a valid, but malicious, exe-
cutable. A trusted sender might reference the image and a recipient tricked into interpreting
it as an executable. To prevent this, Shout embeds a MIME type into the hash tree for each
piece of content, so that the digital signature of the shout covers not only the content, but
also how it should be interpreted. This content descriptor is illustrated in Figure 3.7 and
Figure 3.9. It contains both the MIME type of the content and the hash of the root of the
tree. The avatar field and Shout URIs reference the hash of the content descriptor.
The content descriptor and hash tree packets are transmitted on demand. When a client
tries to view an image it does not have, Shout sends a content request packet, shown in
Figure 3.10, to request it. Any one-hop neighbors with that content will respond. Responses
are randomly delayed to reduce collisions and if a valid response from another device is
overhead, the response is not sent. If no neighbor responds, the request is retried with
exponential back-off.
On the assumption that a device missing a parent node is also missing its children, the
subtree rooted at the requested node is sent proactively. For the typical case, where the
entire tree is needed, this requires only a single content request packet, instead of one for
each tree node.
The content is most easily available when the shout referencing it is first heard—the
node sending the shout likely has the content—so it is proactively requested then. Each
incoming shout is scanned for avatar and image references and those that are unavailable (or
partially unavailable—some tree nodes are missing) are requested immediately.
This system does not guarantee the availability of avatars, images, and other content,
because content is requested only from one-hop neighbors. Although this request range
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could be extended at the cost of additional bandwidth and energy, we think the one-hop
neighborhood provides a good tradeoff between efficiency and availability.
3.3.5 Message Management and Filtering
Internet-based microblogging services employ a variety of means to help users sift through
the flood of posts for the ones they are interested in. The two most common are user
whitelisting (following in Twitter parlance) and search. All posts from whitelisted or
followed users show in one’s main feed, providing an easy way to specify the exact sources
to listen to. Search provides an easy way to find recent posts about specific events or ideas.
Hashtags, user-directed labels, facilitate such searches. Further, the services filter spam
and fraudulent posts to increase message quality. In Shout, all such filtering must be done
locally.
All overheard shouts are included in the local database, so searching and filtering is
largely independent of the Shout protocols. The local application responsible for displaying
shouts to the user can support arbitrary methods independent of other Shout users. This
makes Shout an excellent platform for experimenting with search and filtering ideas.
We believe that persistent, user-defined search queries can fulfill the same features
offered by Internet-based services. For example, a search query that selects all shouts from
a group of users is essentially equivalent to a follower-based Twitter feed12. Similarly,
persistent searches for particular keyword, hashtags, or locations offer alternative methods
of subscribing to certain shouts.
Spam is a more vexing problem. Although the follower-like search queries mentioned
previously offer a method to whitelist certain senders, effectively hiding spam, they hurt
one of the primary motivators for Shout. Shout should be useful for exchanging ideas with
nearby strangers—people one has no knowledge of or reason to whitelist. Thus, a different
12The primary difference is that such a search can return only the shouts heard, not necessarily all shouts
sent by that group of users
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approach for spam filtering is needed.
Chapter 6 develops a spam detection technique, but we briefly describe the intuition here.
Spam filtering can be done in two ways, blocking content (spam) or senders (spammers).
We believe the first is too difficult to do automatically, as messages are short and spammers
clever [78]. Shout offers natural resistance to the spread of spam—most people will not
reshout junk and thus it will not spread—but it will still annoy people in the one-hop range
of the spammer. Thus, we focus instead on identifying and blocking spammers.
Blocking of spammers comes in two fashions, whitelisting and blacklisting. With
blacklisting, all senders are presumed innocent and only blocked after exhibiting behaviors
of a spammer. With whitelisting, all users are presumed guilty and only unblocked after
exhibiting behaviors of a non-spammer. Blacklisting is useless in Shout, because the
spammer can simply create a new identity once blacklisted13. Thus, we are forced to
consider whitelisting.
We have already ruled out explicit manual whitelisting, because strangers will not
be whitelisted. Instead, we develop an implicit whitelisting strategy based on reshouts.
Intuitively, non-spammers should be reshouted more frequently and by more users than
spammers. Consider a graph with users as nodes and a directed edges representing that one
user reshouted another. Non-spammers should be more-connected in this graph and have
shorter paths between them. Our strategy classifies spammers and non-spammers according
to their connectivity in this graph.
Spammers are free to create arbitrary connections between their own identities, altering
that portion of the graph. To combat this, the graph is rooted at the user doing the spam
filtering. The spammer identities, no matter how connected amongst themselves, should still
have low connectivity to this trusted node.
This approach requires some bootstrapping. The graph can be constructed only over the
locally-available shouts. When first joining Shout, this set is small. Instead, one can prime
13The Shout software can still support blacklisting, as it may be helpful against some advertisers or otherwise
annoying users. But it is not, on its own, a sufficient defense against spam.
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the set by retrieving all shouts from a trusted friend or acquaintance who has been using
Shout longer.
Further, a new user joining Shout will not have been reshouted and thus will not be
connected in the reshout network. We deal with this in two ways. First, friends can manually
whitelist the new user. They will see his shouts and, if appropriate, reshout, building the
users reshout connectivity. Second, some users may wish to browse the unfiltered timeline
of shouts and, upon seeing good content, reshout it. We suspect that if the spam filtering
strategies are good, the unfiltered timeline will still be relatively spam free. (Remember that
spammers can only reach one hop, so spamming many locations is at best complex and at
worst very expensive).
3.4 Security Analysis
This section describes several attacks on Shout and its primary goal, censorship-resistance.
Censors can employ two classes of techniques against Shout. First, they could block
transmissions by technical or legal means. Second, they could fine, imprison, or otherwise
harm individuals using the system such that a fear of reprisal discourages further use. We
discuss both classes and describe how Shout defends against or mitigates these attacks.
Some of these attacks are outside of our attack model—largely because we believe them
infeasible—but are mentioned here for completeness.
3.4.1 Censorship by Blocking
The most obvious technical means to block Shout transmissions is to jamming the radio sig-
nals. Although technically feasible, Shout’s distributed nature mitigates this risk. Blocking
most Shout traffic require jamming the airwaves around most users, a very expensive and
disruptive proposition. Legitimate and economically-important business uses of WiFi would
also suffer. Practical jamming attacks will be limited to small regions and thus not a serious
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concern for our distributed architecture.
To avoid blocking allowed traffic, censors could instead employ selective jamming,
blocking only those transmissions that appear to be Shout content. This method has even
greater expense—the airwaves around most users must be monitored and jammed using
more-sophisticated, and thus more-expensive, jamming equipment—so again we do not
find this to be a serious practical concern. Steganographic techniques for Shout traffic to
masquerade as other legitimate traffic (e.g., standard encrypted AP-based WiFi traffic) could
be developed, but we believe the costs of the increased complexity outweigh the near term
risks of selective jamming.
A potentially more cost-effective approach is to mandate that smartphones (laptops,
etc.) come equipped with software that blocks the installation or use of tools like Shout.
Again, although technically feasible, we believe this is practically difficult. This type of
cenosrship is much more publicly visible than filters on top-tier routers and requires the
direct cooperation of many people in the supply chain. Public response and disagreement
is much more likely. History supports our view. The Chinese government mandated that
by July 2009 that every computer sold in China must include the Green Dam Youth Escort
software content filter [66, 67]. The law prompted significant criticism levied at both the
moral implications of such a requirement and practical flaws in the software itself. Shortly
before it was to take effect, the mandate was postponed and, as of 2013, has not been
reinstated.
As an extreme approach, a government could ban the sale of devices containing WiFi
transceivers. Again we think this is infeasible in the long run, as wireless network access is
both extremely popular among the public and important to many businesses. China has had
some success in mandating that WiFi devices sold there support the government-approved
WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) protocols, custom alternatives to
the standard 802.11b and 802.11i security protocols [79]. Some devices were initially sold
without WiFi capability, but demand has lead to later models including it. Use of WAPI,
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instead of 802.11i, appears scarce.
3.4.2 Censorship by Reprisal
A more concerning avenue for censoring Shout users is reprisal—people concerned for their
property, safety, or freedom are more likely to self-censor. Although Shout is not designed
to completely eliminate such concerns or provide a strong notion of anonymity to senders,
we describe here the extent to which such anonymity is possible in Shout.
Perhaps the most important protection is that users cannot be required to explicitly
link their real-world identities to those in Shout. China is attempting to force users to
register with Internet services using their real names [80] and Saudi Arabia is considering
similar legislation for Twitter14 [81]. In Shout, identities (usernames and public keys) are
decentralized and changed at will; no authority can mandate any structure or content. That
Shout posts do not (have to) contain directly identifying information significantly increases
the challenge of identifying those posting messages.
Senders can still be identified by the location of transmissions, albeit at much greater dif-
ficulty and expense. Triangulation methods can identity the precise location of a transmitter.
Simply observing a shout in some location reduces the anonymity set of the sender to those
within WiFi range, 50–100 m. More sophisticated traffic analysis can reduce the anonymity
sets further. For example, one could correlate the multiple locations of objectionable shouts
to find the people who frequent both locations—say home and work.
Although Shout does not directly protect against these schemes, it does reduce the risk.
Monitoring and collecting all traffic is prohibitively expensive, so such attacks are likely to
be targeted at specific individuals, not levied against the entire population by large-scale,
preemptive data analysis. For users already on government watchlists, Shout may be too
risky. For typical people, it should offer a method to communicate free of the censorship
often imposed on Internet-based services.
14How this would be implemented or enforced is unclear.
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Figure 3.11: Architecture of Shout implementation for Android.
3.5 Implementation
This section describes our implementation15 of Shout for Android smartphones. The Shout
protocol could be implemented for other platforms as well, e.g., iOS. We only require
support for device-to-device ad hoc communication. At this point in time, it is not clear
which mobile platforms will provide the best support moving forward. We chose Android
for our prototype because it is the most popular smartphone operating system [82], has good
support for background services and extensible applications, and is open-source, potentially
useful for future experimentation or research.
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Figure 3.12: Screenshots of the Shout activities for browsing received shouts and viewing
detailed information about a specific shout.
3.5.1 Implementation for Android
Figure 3.11 shows the application architecture. The activities are the main interface and
display for users, the service runs in the background listening for new shouts and responding
to content requests, and the content provider stores and provides access to the received
shouts.
This architecture is intended to be extensible. The service behavior and provider contents
are largely determined by the Shout protocols, but other activities may interact with them.
We hope others experiment with, improve, extend, and maybe even replace the activity
components.
15Many people contributed to the implementation, including David Adrian, Nate Jones, Yue Liu, Gulshan
Singh, Anthony Tesija, Jonathan Tiao, and Bowen Xu
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Activities: Screenshots of the two main activities are shown in Figure 3.12. The timeline
activity shows an ordered list of received shouts. Tapping on a shout reveals any comments
and buttons for reshouting, adding a comment, or opening the details view. The details
activity shows extended information about a shout, including when it was received, a map
of its location of those comments and reshouts, and a list of the reshouts.
Service: The service runs in the background listening for new shouts. When new shouts
arrive, they are stored in the content provider. The service manages the exponential backoff
policy for requesting missing content and responds to content requests, if that content is
available.
Content Provider: The content provider stores and provides access to the shouts. Other
applications may access the provider, so methods of displaying, filtering, or analyzing the
shouts not directly supported by our release are easily added.
3.5.2 Practical Implementation Concerns for Ad Hoc WiFi
Unfortunately, Google has disabled the ad hoc feature of WiFi, so it cannot be used without
rooting the phone. Instead, Shout is deployed on MANES (Chapter 4), a mobile ad hoc
network emulation system. MANES estimates the ad hoc topology of client devices by
monitoring their locations and visible WiFi access points. Packets intended to be broadcast
over the ad hoc WiFi are instead send to the MANES server, which relays them to the
devices estimated to be within range. Shout itself does not depend on MANES and when ad
hoc WiFi (or other solutions like QualComm’s AllJoyn [83]) is available on stock Android
phones, Shout will run on them as well.
There are two other practical difficulties with deploying ad hoc WiFi.
First, many users employ WiFi to connect to an access point and the Internet. Using the
WiFi card in ad hoc mode instead is not acceptable. Time-multiplexing methods exist to
connect to two network “simultaneously” [84–87], but these are not yet widely deployed.
The emerging WiFi-Direct standard [72] is new peer-to-peer technology based on WiFi that
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is supported by Android. Some WiFi drivers do support simultaneous use of WiFi-Direct
and an access point, so we hope simultaneous support for the ad hoc is forthcoming as
well16.
Second, average power consumption is much higher in ad hoc mode. When connected
to an access point, WiFi transceivers may sleep most of the time, allowing the AP to buffer
incoming packets and waking up only occasionally to check this queue. In ad hoc mode, no
buffering access point exists and the device must remain listening at all times. This problem
is solvable—for instance, by synchronizing the sleep schedules of the ad hoc devices—but is
beyond the scope of Shout. Solutions needs to be incorporated into the WiFi protocols and
device drivers. As with dual use, we hope the emergence of WiFi-Direct leads this charge.
16An alternative is to use WiFi-Direct, instead of ad hoc WiFi for Shout. This direction looks promising, but
we have not pursued it yet.
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CHAPTER 4
Mobile Ad Hoc Network Emulation System
4.1 Introduction
For ad hoc network applications like Whisper and Shout, the human participants strongly
affect performance. As device carriers, their motions define the topological characteristics of
the network, determining connectivity and influencing throughput and latency. As the users
of the applications, their interactions and interests determine the ideal information flow—
what should be sent where and when. Accurate consideration of these human properties is
paramount for ad hoc system design and optimization.
Testing and characterization is commonly done through simulation—model- or trace-
based—or small-scale deployment, but these approaches suffer some limitations. Models of
human motion don’t capture the nuance of the real world and detailed models of human–
application interaction simply do not exist. Traces can provide finer granularity, but cannot
capture the influence of modifications to the application on the human behavior. Deployment
with real people is much better, but is usually limited to small groups. Specialized hardware
and platform software impose significant per-participant costs. Larger-scale deployments
are needed.
The ubiquitous smartphone appears an excellent avenue for large-scale deployments, as
the hardware is already paid for, distributed, and in everyday use. Unfortunately, Android,
the most popular smartphone platform, disables the ad hoc functionality of the included
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WiFi chipset, crippling its use. Further, the WiFi transceiver is usually employed for Internet
access and thus not available for ad hoc use1. Additionally, the WiFi ad hoc mode does
not use the same power-saving tricks as infrastructure mode and thus has higher power
consumption2.
Using existing smartphones still appears the easiest and cheapest path for large-scale
deployments, so we have built MANES, a mobile ad hoc network emulation system that
works around the aforementioned issues with ad hoc connectivity. The system estimates the
network topology using sensor readings provided by the client devices and relays packets
through the infrastructure network—WiFi access points or cellular towers—to the estimated,
in-range neighbors. Other efforts, like QualComm’s AllJoyn3, tackle a similar problem, but
are designed for long-term production deployments, not research. That approach, based
on peer-to-peer networking, does not offer the same controllability and observability as
MANES.
We make the following primary contributions4.
• We describe MANES, an emulation system for ad hoc 802.11 that allows researchers to
run their protocols and applications on commodity smartphones, enabling large-scale
deployments at low cost.
• We provide a production implementation of the MANES server and an Android client.
The client could be easily ported to other platforms as well. This software will be
released to the research community.
• We develop a technique to estimate ad hoc connectivity from the signal strengths of
the access points visible to both devices.
1Solutions based on time-multiplexing allowing “simultaneous” connect to multiple APs or ad hoc networks
exist [84, 85], but none ship with commodity smartphones.
2Solutions are possible here too, but would not be available on existing commodity devices.
3http://www.alljoyn.org
4MANES is very much a collaborative effort. In particular, David Adrian, Yue Liu, and Gulshan Singh
contributed to the implementation. Yue Liu and Rongrong Tao designed and implemented the topology
estimation. All portions of the system are described in this chapter for completeness.
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4.2 Difficulties with Mobility Models or Why MANES?
When human motion patterns are the primary concern, mobility model-based simulations
may appear sufficient. Selecting an appropriate model is necessary—random waypoint is
clearly insufficient [88]—but much work has gone into developing such models and many
have been proposed [3, 4, 50, 89, 90]. Despite this plentiful supply, selecting one appropriate
for a given simulation is still rather difficult. Many of the models are incomparable (i.e.,
they model different features of human mobility), so a single “correct” model does not exist
and selecting an appropriate one is difficult.
Current human mobility models each attempt to capture various statistical features of
human motion determined from motion traces for real humans. Consequently, the models
are distinguished in two primary ways: (1) by the qualitative set of features modeled (e.g.,
distribution of flight lengths) and (2) the quantitative fits (e.g., power law distribution with
α = 2) for those features, usually inferred from human traces. Figure 4.1 illustrates the
qualitative difference by showing the spatial density of nodes for traces from two mobility
models, TLW [3], which does not model the “hotspot” nature of human locations, and
SLAW [4], which does.
The quantitative differences are more nuanced, as they depend on the traces to which a
model was “fit” and, consequently, are influenced by any biases (intentional or accidental) in
the trace populations and measurement methods. Figure 4.2 illustrates this for aggregate (i.e.,
population, not single individual) flight length distributions derived from three populations:
(1) fine-grained traces (from GPS) for students on a university campus [4], (2) coarse-grained
traces (from cell-tower locations during calls) for two populations of cell-phone users in
Europe—a set of 100,000 users and a subset of 10,000 users chosen for their frequent
and regular calling activity— [46] and (3) coarse-grained traces (from airline ticket data)
for United States travelers. All four capture the long-tailed nature of human movement,
but with three different distributions (power-law, power-law with exponential cut-off, and
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(b) SLAW: “hotspots”
Figure 4.1: Example node spatial distributions (over 20 individual traces) from the TLW [3]
and SLAW [4] models. SLAW captures the notion of “hotspots” in human locations, while
TLW does not.
power-law distribution but with different parameters.
In theory, with enough fine-grained traces, a more comprehensive model could be
developed. Unfortunately, obtaining such traces is difficult; privacy concerns (and, before the
proliferation of GPS-equipped smartphones, technical and economic constraints) preclude
the collection and distribution of fine-grain, long-duration spatio-temporal traces for large
sample sets. Instead, the traces used for modeling are biased by reducing spatial and temporal
resolution, Thus, choosing an appropriate model requires determining both the desired
qualitative features and their quantitative instantiations, selecting one whose underlying
data-set properly captures them.
These differences raise several concerns for those using the models. How should one
select a model? How does one determine if the model correctly captures the behaviors on
which the one’s protocols are sensitive, especially when the model is used to discover those
behaviors? How much confidence should be placed in the result?















































































Figure 4.3: Overview of MANES architecture. All clients report GPS and WiFi observations,
which are used to form an estimated topology. Packets are relayed via MANES, according
to this estimate. In the example, device C broadcasts a packet that is relayed to B, D, and
E.
MANES is the result. Simulation is still valuable—as discussed later, MANES does not
accurately model congestion, collisions, or the detailed network timing—but for applications
where human behavior is the primary independent variable, we believe deployment is not
just better, but necessary.
4.3 Architecture
This section describes the design considerations and architecture of MANES.
4.3.1 Architecture Overview
Figure 4.3 illustrates the portions of the operation of MANES, topology estimation and
packet relaying.
Client devices report the observed signal strengths of visible WiFi access points and,
when available, the location reported by GPS. The server analyzes these reports to estimate
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the ad hoc network topology. Intuitively, many devices that can see the same access points
will be within ad hoc range. Similarly, devices determined to be in close proximity by GPS
should be within ad hoc range. The methods used to compute scalar link qualities from
these readings are described in Section 4.4.
To broadcast a packet, a client first sends it to the MANES server. The server relays the
packet to each connected device in the estimated topology. Packets are delivered to clients
via UDP, but some may sit behind NATs or firewalls. Periodic keepalives are sent to the
server to keep the NAT mapping or firewall hole open.
4.3.2 Problem Domain
MANES is intended for deploying and testing low throughput ad hoc applications dependent
on human motion and interaction. Packets are relayed through a MANES server, over
cellular and WiFi connections with highly variably latency and bandwidth. The protocols
(and subsequent analysis) should
• tolerate occasional delivery latencies of up to several seconds, as packets traverse
cellular networks [91],
• have little total throughput, as cellular plans are often limited to several gigabytes/month
or less,
• be insensitive to collision or congestion control, as these are not modeled (most
protocols meeting the throughput requirement will meet this as well), and
• be robust to inaccuracies in topology estimation, for device pairs that are borderline.
Whisper and Shout—our applications of interest—both fit this category, but low-level
protocols may not. For example, those attempting to maximize throughput or reduce
collisions in indoor environments are not good candidates for MANES.
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4.3.3 Desired Properties and Design Challenges
An emulation system for ad hoc network researchers should not just emulate topologies, but
also help researchers and developers create, deploy, and test their applications, eventually
migrating them to true ad hoc support. As such, we desire the following properties for
MANES.
• Accuracy: We attempt accurate estimation of link qualities, as this implies accurate
topology. As will be discussed, such estimation can be difficult. When signals are
strong or non-existent, MANES does well. Weak signals are estimated more poorly.
• Scalability: The system should handle hundreds or thousands of users, for large-scale
deployments. MANES is built to be horizontally-scalable, so the limiting factor
is server and bandwidth costs. Delivery latencies scale with neighborhood density,
which are usually bounded.
• Usability: Developers should find the system easy-to-use. MANES provides a
simple API—standard send() and receive()—methods, so applications can be easily
transitioned to other underlying transmission protocols, like pure ad hoc WiFi.
• Efficiency: Smartphone battery capacity is limited and generally needs to last at least
a day. On the author’s phone, MANES uses just 4% of battery capacity over a typical
10 hour work day5.
• Observability: Researchers need access to topology and transmission histories to
characterize performance and possibly drive trace-based simulations. MANES logs
topology changes, the raw data used to estimate the topology, and all transmissions in
flat textual files for easy analysis.
• Controllability: Researchers may want to modify the network topology, inject trans-
missions, or block others to study various effects. The centralized MANES architec-
5Energy usage increases with the traffic rate. Most of that 4% is attributable to the topology estimation, not
packet transmission.
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ture makes this easy. As an example, with Shout, we employ “virtual” reshouters to
increase the effective density and improve connectivity during early adoption.
Satisfying these properties requires solving two primary technical challenges.
Accurate Topology Estimation: Inferring the WiFi link quality between two devices
from indirect measurements is non-trivial. We take a two-pronged approach. First, when
both devices can observe some WiFi access points, we use the signal strengths of the APs
visible to both devices. Intuitively, if both see distinct sets of APs, they are not within
WiFi range of each other. If both see the same set, they are likely nearby and within range.
The actual AP signal strengths are used to estimate a more-detailed scalar link quality,
as described in Section 4.4. On the assumption that if no WiFi access points are visible,
then devices are outdoors, the link quality is determined by the distance between them, as
reported by GPS.
Energy Efficient Topology Updates: The topology must be up-to-date to ensure pack-
ets are delivered to the correct devices. Reporting the data used for estimation is consumes
energy on the clients, so the topology update latency and client energy usage must be
balanced. The more-efficient WiFi scans are used to detect motion. This scan runs periodi-
cally, and only when the results change is the power-hungry GPS turned on. Between GPS
readings, a simple velocity model is used to predict the current location.
4.3.4 Design Choices
API: The interface provided to application and protocol developers influences how easily
applications can be switched between MANES and other transport mechanisms6. MANES
is intended to emulate the 802.11 ad hoc broadcast mode, a layer 2 networking protocol,
so we mimic that interface [92]. The frame includes both the packet contents and an L3
protocol identifier, indicating which protocol or application should handle the incoming
6Systems like AllJoyn provide much higher abstractions to application developers, reducing working at the
risk of platform lock-in.
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packet. Unlike typical network stacks, the receive method is a blocking and called by
the application, not a callback initiated by MANES. This approach is more familiar to
application developers used to the socket abstraction.
register(int protocolId) registers the application for a particular protocol id.
send(byte[] packet) broadcasts a frame with packet contents. The protocol id
specified during registration is used.
byte[] receive() awaits (blocks for) the next incoming packet for the registered
protocol id.
Scalability: Topology estimation should be fast, regardless of the number of users.
Consider that naïve topology estimation would require O(n2) comparisons. MANES scales
through two techniques, a horizontal, distributed architecture to spread load and an efficient
O(1) topology estimation algorithm7.
The distributed architecture is backed by a horizontally-scalable, key-value database,
Voldemort [93], an implementation of Amazon’s Dynamo architecture [94]. All MANES
servers are stateless, so requests from multiple clients are easily spread among them. Topol-
ogy estimation is performed by the server handling the upload of new WiFi or GPS readings.
Thus, the latency for the topology update is independent of the client upload rate; it depends
solely on the time for one topology computation.
Topology estimation is kept efficient by only comparing AP signal strengths or locations
with those nearby. The database is used as a large hash-based index for this purpose. A
reverse mapping from AP to client id is maintained, allowing quick look up of all clients that
reported observations for a given AP. Similarly for GPS, the Earth’s surface is divided into
250 m by 250 m “squares” and a reverse mapping from grid to clients stored, allowing fast
retrieval of all clients within 250 m of a given location8. With this approach, the computation
time is independent of network size, scaling instead with network density.
7The topology estimation algorithm is actually O(d2), but d, the network density, is bounded.
8All clients in the nine squares surrounding the location must be checked for proximity. This process is still
constant time and reasonably quick, although it could be reduced through a more precise indexing scheme.
74
Packet Delivery: Packet delivery from server to smartphone client is, unfortunately,
non-trivial. The NAT and firewalls guarding many networks prevent devices from accepting
incoming messages from unknown sources—all connections must be initiated by the device
and only responses are allowed through. Instead, a persistent connection—like an open TCP
connection—to the server and initiated by the client is needed.
Managing large numbers of TCP connections takes care, because they are stateful,
occupying resources like memory and port numbers. Further, on smartphones that frequently
drop connections as network connectivity changes, they must be carefully monitored and
restarted. MANES does not require the ordering and reliability guarantees of TCP, so to
simplify, we use the stateless UDP protocol.
Each client periodically (e.g., every 30 seconds) send a UDP packet to the MANES
server. The IP address and port number are stored in the database and used when relaying any
packets. This system consumes no resources on the servers (just in the scalable database) is
implicitly resilient to changes in network state. responds to changes in network connectivity.
4.3.5 Client Architecture
Figure 4.4 shows the architecture of the client software, implemented for Android. Most
components run in background service.
Location Tracker: The location tracker collects the information needed for topology
estimation, i.e., WiFi access points signal strengths and GPS readings. When the readings
have changed, it uploads them to the MANES server so the topology can be recomputed.
Packet Manager: The packet manager accepts incoming frames from the MANES
server and routes the contained packet to the appropriate application by protocol id. Frames
with no registered application are dropped. The packet manager also takes packets from the
applications, forwarding them to the MANES server for broadcast.
Keepalive Manager: The keepalive manager sends the UDP keepalive packet every 30
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Figure 4.4: Architecture of MANES client software.
WiFi to cellular—to minimize down time.
ManesInterface: Each application instantiates its own instance of ManesInterface,
which provides the register(), send(), and receive() methods mentioned earlier. This gives
developers simple API, masking the complexity of communicating with a background
service in Android.
4.3.6 Server Architecture
Figure 4.5 shows the architecture of the server.
Topology Database: The topology database is multi-server Voldemort cluster that stores
the current topology, past WiFi and GPS readings needed for future topology estimations,
and the hash-based indexes needed for efficient topology estimation.
Topology Estimator: The topology estimator servers accept location and WiFi scan
reports from clients, store them in the database, and then compute a new topology estimate.











Figure 4.5: Architecture of MANES server system.
Packet Relayer: The packet relay servers accept incoming packets, relaying them to
the clients in-range according to the current topology estimate. It also handles the keepalive
packet, storing the current IP address and port number of the client in the database.
Text-based Logs: All information, namely raw GPS and WiFi scan reports, estimated
topologies, and sent packets are logged into text-based logs for observability and later
analysis.
Virtual Nodes: The virtual nodes represent the option for controllability. This could
be a component that mimics real clients, increasing effective density, or a component that
injects specific content to study the impact. MANES is intentionally modular, so researchers
introduce the specific control they need.
4.4 Topology Estimation
MANES estimates the link quality between devices to build the topology—if these link
estimates are accurate, so is the overall topology. However, determining the link quality
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from the limited sensors on a smartphone is non-trivial. In this section, we summarize our
approach9, which uses WiFi access point scan results and GPS readings.
We use Packet Reception Rate (PRR), the fraction of sent packets successfully received,
to quantify link qualities. MANES randomly drops packets with probability proportional to
1−PRR to model this effect. PRR cannot be directly determined from a single measurement
(it’s an average over multiple transmissions), so we instead look for measurements from
which to estimate it.
The Received Signal Strength (RSS or RSSI), a value reported by commodity WiFi
devices, fits the bill10. Experiments with Nexus One smartphones, rooted and modified
to support ad hoc WiFi, were used to determination the ground truth PRR. Pairwise RSSI
and PRR measurements were made in a 110 locations spread throughout a large academic
building, including multiple floors, hallways, offices, labs, and open spaces. RSSI correlates
well with PRR at the extremes, i.e., when the signal is weak and PRR is zero or when the
signal is strong and the PRR is one. The prediction accuracy is worse in the transition




4.4.1 Received Signal Strengths of Visible WiFi Access Points
WiFi Direct is a new technology and not yet widely supported. Thus, most devices cannot
use it to directly measure RSSI. Instead, we develop a method to estimate RSSI from those
of visible access points. Intuitively, devices observing the same APs should be physically
close and thus able to communicate directly. Further, observed AP signal strengths should
be correlated with the attenuation of that wireless environment and thus reveal something
about the inter-device signal strength.
9This method was primarily developed and analyzed by Yue Liu with the help of Rongrong Tao, but is
summarized here for completeness.
10The Signal-to-Interface plus Noise Ratio (SINR) is better proxy for PRR [95], but is not calculated or





Figure 4.6: Heuristic for estimating the signalstrength P between two devices from observed
APs.
Figure 4.6 illustrates the heuristic approach, based on this intuition. Imagine that an
access point X was on the straight line between two devices, A and B. The inter-device
attenuation can be estimated as the sum of the two device-to-AP attenuations. Thus, the
inter-device RSSI, P can be estimated from the two RSSI observations of the AP, PA and
PB:









where r is an assumed path loss exponent shared by all paths.
In reality, an AP is unlikely to sit directly on that line. Instead, we heuristically choose













This technique accurately predicts PRR when the signals are strong (PRR = 1) or non-
existent (PRR = 0), but lacks the fidelity to determine intermediate PRRs when connectivity
is borderline.
4.4.2 GPS Distance Measurement
Some environments, particular those outdoors, may not have enough access points to support
RSSI estimation. In these scenarios, we instead fall back to location-based PRR estimation
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using GPS. Distance and PRR is not as highly correlated as RSSI and PRR, but is still
sufficient, particularly for outdoor devices. WiFi-based estimates are preferred; GPS is used





The open nature of wireless ad hoc networks (including delay-tolerant networks [96])
enables applications ranging from collaborative environmental sensing [97] to emergency
communication [98], but introduces numerous security concerns since participants are not
vetted. Solutions generally rely on a majority of the participants following a particular
protocol, an assumption that often holds because physical nodes are expensive. However,
this assumption is easily broken by a Sybil attack. A single physical entity can pretend to be
multiple participants, gaining unfair influence at low cost [57]. Newsome et al. survey Sybil
attacks against various protocols [99], illustrating the need for a practical defense.
Proposed defenses (see Levine et al. for a survey [100]) fall into two categories. Trusted
certification methods [101, 102] use a central authority to vet potential participants and thus
are not useful in open ad hoc (and delay-tolerant) networks. Resource testing methods [103–
106] verify the resources (e.g., computing capability, storage capacity, real-world social
relationships, etc.) of each physical entity. Most are easily defeated in ad hoc networks
of resource-limited mobile devices by attackers with access to greater resources, e.g.,
workstations or data centers.
One useful class of defenses is based on the natural spatial variation in the wireless








(a) RSSI observations from
trusted APs identity the Sybils,







(b) In ad hoc networks, the par-
ticipants themselves act as ob-







(c) If I believes the falsified
observations from S1 and S2,
it will incorrectly accept them
and reject A and B as Sybil.
Figure 5.1: Prior work [5, 6] assumes trusted RSSI observations, not generally available in
ad hoc and delay-tolerant networks. We present a technique for a participant to separate true
and false observations, enabling use in ad hoc networks. (Arrows point from transmitter to
observer.)
greater than half the transmission wavelength [107] (6.25 cm for 2.4 GHz 802.11), so
two transmissions with the same channel response are likely from the same location and
device [5, 108]. However, the existing Sybil defenses in this class are not directly usable in
open ad hoc networks of commodity devices.
Xiao et al. observe that in OFDM-based 802.11 the coherence bandwidth is much smaller
than the system bandwidth and thus the channel response estimates at well-spaced frequency
taps are uncorrelated, forming a vector unique to the transmitter location and robust to
changes in transmitter power [5]. Unfortunately commodity 802.11 devices do not expose
these estimates to the driver and operating system, restricting this technique to specialized
hardware and access points.
Commodity devices do expose an aggregate, scalar value, the received signal strength.
RSSI is not robust to changes in transmitter power, so a vector of observations from multiple
receivers—a signalprint—is used instead. Several authors have proposed such methods [5,
6, 109–113] assuming trusted, true observations. In open ad hoc networks, observations are
untrusted, coming from potentially-lying neighbors, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. Trust-less
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methods have been proposed, but have various limitations (e.g., devices must be non-
mobile [114], colluding attackers can defeat the scheme [115], or are limited to outdoor
environments with predictable propagation ranges [116]). Instead, a general method to
separate true and false observations is needed.
We make two observations that enable separation. First, with high probability attackers
cannot produce false observations that make conforming identities look Sybil. Second,
nodes complying with the protocol outnumber physical attacking nodes (motivating the
Sybil attack), implying that most non-Sybil identities tell the truth.
Most past work assumes nodes are stationary, as moving attacks can easily defeat
signalprint-based detection. As noted, but not pursued, by Xiao et al., successive trans-
missions from the same node should have the same signalprint and attackers likely cannot
quickly (i.e., in milliseconds) switch between precise positions [5]. We develop a challenge–
response protocol from this idea and study its performance on real deployments.
We make the following primary contributions1.
• We prove conditions under which a participant can separate true and false RSSIs
reported by untrusted neighbors, enabling signalprint-based Sybil detection in ad hoc
networks of mutually distrusting nodes.
• We develop anO(n3) algorithm for this separation suitable for networks with hundreds
of one-hop neighbors.
• We develop a challenge-response protocol to detect attackers using motion to bypass
the signalprint-based Sybil defense.
• We describe the Mason test, a practical protocol for Sybil defense based on these
ideas. We implemented the Mason test as a Linux kernel module for 802.11 ad hoc
networks2 and characterize its performance in real-world scenarios.
1This work was performed in close collaboration with Yue Liu. She identified the initial problem, developed
















(a) Nodes record their ob-
served RSSIs of probes broad-
cast by neighbors. A and B
























































(b) RSSI observations are
shared among all participants.
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(c) Each participant selects a
subset of the observations to
form signalprints for Sybil de-
tection.
Figure 5.2: The solution framework for signalprint-based Sybil detection in ad hoc networks.
This chapter fleshes out this concept into a safe and secure protocol, the Mason test.
5.2 Problem Formulation and Background
In this section, we define our problem, overview the solution framework, describe our attack
model, and briefly review the signalprint method.
5.2.1 Problem Formulation
Our high-level goal is to allow a wireless network participant to occasionally determine
which of its one-hop neighbors are non-Sybil. These identities may safely participate in
other protocols. In mobile networks, the process must be repeated occasionally (e.g., once
per hour) as the topology changes. Safety is more important than system performance, so
nearly all Sybil identities should be identified, but some non-Sybils may be rejected.
Prior work showed the effectiveness of signalprint techniques with trusted RSSI ob-
servations. We extend those methods to work without a priori trust in any observation.
As illustrated in Figure 5.2, we assume an arbitrary identity (or condition) starts the pro-
cess. Participants take turns broadcasting a probe packet and recording the observed RSSIs.
These observations are then shared, although malicious nodes may lie. Each participant
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individually selects a (hopefully truthful) subset of identities for signalprint-based Sybil
classification.
This paper presents our method for truthful subset selection and fleshes out this frame-
work into a usable, safe, and secure protocol. As with any system intended for real-world
use, we had to carefully balance system complexity and potential security weaknesses.
Section 5.9 discusses these choices and related potential concerns.
5.2.2 Attack Model
We assume attackers have the following capabilities and restrictions.
1. Attackers may collude through arbitrary side channels.
2. Attackers may accumulate information, e.g., RSSIs, across multiple rounds of the
Mason test.
3. Attackers have limited ability to predict RSSI observations of other nodes, e.g., 7 dBm
uncertainty (see Section 5.5), precluding fine-grained pre-characterization.
4. Attackers can control transmit power for each packet, but not precisely or quickly
steer the output in a desired direction, e.g., beam-forming.
5. Attackers cannot quickly and precisely switch between multiple positions, e.g., they
do not have high-speed, automated electromechanical control.
These capabilities and restrictions model attacking nodes that are commodity devices,
a cheaper attack vector than distributing specialized hardware. These devices could be
obtained by compromising those owned by normal network participants or directly deployed
by the attacker.
One common denial-of-service (DOS) attack in wireless networks—jamming the channel—

































Figure 5.4: The distance threshold trades
false positives for negatives.
Notably, we assume attackers do not have per-antenna control of MIMO (Multiple-Input
and Multiple-Output) [117] devices. Such control would defeat the signalprint method
(even with trusted observers), but is not a feasible attack. Commodity MIMO devices (e.g.,
802.11n adapters) do not expose this control to software and thus are not suitable attack
vectors. Distributing specialized MIMO-capable hardware over large portions of the network
would be prohibitively expensive.
We believe that the signalprint method can be extended to MIMO systems (see our
technical report for an overview [118]), but doing so is beyond the scope of this work. Our
focus is extending signalprint-based methods for ad hoc networks of commodity devices by
removing the requirement for trusted observations.
5.2.3 Review of Signalprints
We briefly review the signalprint method. See prior work for details [5, 109]. A signalprint
is a vector of RSSIs at multiple observers for a single transmission. Ignoring noise, the
vector of received powers (in logarithmic units, e.g., dBm) at multiple receivers for a given
transmission can be modeled [107] as ~s = ~h + p~1, where p is the transmit power and ~h
is the attenuation vector, a function of the channel amplitude response and the receiver
characteristics. Transmissions from different locations have uncorrelated signalprints, as the
channel responses are likely uncorrelated. Those from the same location, however, share
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a channel response and will be correlated. That is, for two transmissions a and b from the
same location with transmit powers pa and pb = pa + c, the signalprints ~sb = ~h + pa~1 and
~sb = ~h + (pa + c)~1 are related as ~sb = ~sa + c~1.
This is illustrated geometrically in Figure 5.3 for a two-receiver signalprint. A and B
are Sybil, while C is not. D and E are also Sybil, but due to noise the signalprints are not
perfectly correlated. Instead, signalprints occupying lines closer than some threshold are
taken to be Sybil.
Definition. The signalprint distance d(~sa,~sb) between two signalprints ~sa and ~sb is the
perpendicular distance between the slope-1 lines containing them. Letting
~w , ~sa −~sb
be the distance vector between the signalprints and




be the vector rejection of ~w from ~1, then
d(~sa,~sb) = ‖~v⊥‖.
As shown in Figure 5.4, the distance distributions for Sybil and non-Sybil identities
overlap, so the threshold choice trades false positives for negatives. A good threshold can
detect at least 99.9% of Sybils while accepting at least 95% of non-Sybils [5, 109].
5.3 Sybil Classification From Untrusted Signalprints
We describe our method to detect Sybils using untrusted RSSI observations. No general
solution exists, so we derive sufficient, likely conditions that enable classification.
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5.3.1 Power of Falsified Observations
Signalprints contain observations from multiple observers (4–6 for reasonable accuracy [6]).
Since a node trusts only its own observations, those from other observers are untrusted.
Consider how falsified RSSI observations can influence Sybil detection. First, one can easily
construct false observations to make a Sybil identity look non-Sybil. To see this, recall that
two identities are considered Sybil only if all observers report the same RSSI difference.
Randomly chosen values will almost certainly not satisfy this condition. The second, making
non-Sybils look Sybil, is much harder. The RSSI difference is fixed by the initiator’s trusted
self-observation, so an attacker would have to learn or guess this difference. The method
described in this section relies on this difficulty, which is quantified in Section 5.5.
5.3.2 Terminology
I is the set of participating identities. Each is either Sybil or non-Sybil and reports either
true or false3 RSSI observations, partitioning the identities by their Sybilness (sets S and






Truthtelling, non-Sybil identities are called conforming (set C). Liars and Sybil identities are
called attacking (sets LS , LNS , and TS ). Our goal is to distinguish the S and NS partitions
using the reported RSSI observations without knowing a priori the L and T partitions.
Definition. An initiator is the node performing Sybil classification4. It trusts its own RSSI
observations, but no others.
3A reported RSSI observation is considered false if signalprints containing it misclassify some identities.
4All participants perform classification individually, so each is the initiator in its own classification session.
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Definition. A receiver set, denoted by R, is a subset of identities (R ⊆ I) whose reported
RSSI observations, with the initiator’s, form signalprints. Those with liars (R ∩ L 6= ∅)
produce incorrect classifications and those with only truthtellers (R ⊆ T ) produce the
correct classification.
Definition. A view, denoted by V , is a classification of identities as Sybil and non-Sybil.
Those classified as Sybil (non-Sybil) are said to be Sybil (non-Sybil) under V and are
denoted by the subset VS (VNS). A view V obtained from the signalprints of a receiver set
R is generated by R, denoted by R 7→ V (read: R generates V ), and can be written V (R).
Identities in R are considered non-Sybil, i.e., R ⊆ VNS(R). A true view, denoted by V ,
correctly labels all identities, i.e., V S = S and V NS = NS . Similarly, a false view, denoted
by V̂ , incorrectly labels some identities, i.e., V̂S 6= S and V̂NS 6= NS .
Definition. Incorrectly labeling non-Sybil identities as Sybil is called collapsing.
Assumption. To clearly illustrate the impact of intentionally-falsified observations, we first
assume that true RSSI observations are noise-free and thus always generate the true view. In
Subsection 5.3.6, we extend the method to handle real-world observations containing, for
example, random noise and discretization error.
5.3.3 Approach Overview
It is easy to see that a fully-general solution to our problem does not exist by noting that
different scenarios can result in the same reported RSSI observations (under the symmetry
of identities) and are thus indistinguishable. To illustrate, consider identities I = {A|B}
reporting observations such that
R ⊆ A 7→ V 1 = {V 1NS = A|V 1S = B} and





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and two different scenarios x and y such that
in x, {T x = A|Lx = B} = I and
in y, {T y = B|Ly = A} = I.
Remembering that R ⊆ T 7→ V , the true view for scenario x is V 1 and for scenario y is V 2.
Consequently, no method can always choose the correct view.
Since a general solution is not possible, we instead look for restricting conditions that
hold in situations of practical importance and permit a method to identify the true view. In
particular, we use the following two notions, formalized when needed.
• Fabricating RSSI observations that make non-Sybil identities look Sybil is difficult,
so all views will correctly classify some conforming identities.
• Conforming identities outnumber lying, non-Sybils (often the very motivation for the
Sybil attack).
Our approach stems from the idea that true observations, which all describe the same
world, are consistent. Lies, however, are often contradict themselves. We use a notion of
consistency that is quite difficult for attackers to achieve to separate the true observations.
5.3.4 View Consistency: Selecting V if LNS = ∅
This section introduces the concept of a consistent view, using the following unrealistic
restriction. In Subsection 5.3.5 we lift this restriction.
Restriction 1. All liars are Sybil, i.e., LNS = ∅, and thus all non-Sybil identities are
truthful, i.e., NS ⊆ T .
Restriction 1 endows the true view with a useful property: all receiver sets comprising
the non-Sybil identities under the true view will generate the true view. We formalize this
consistency as follows.
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Definition. A view is view-consistent if and only if all receiver sets comprising a subset of
the non-Sybil identities under that view generate the same view, i.e., V is view-consistent iff
∀R ∈ 2VNS : R 7→ V .
Lemma 1. Under Restriction 1, the true view is view-consistent, i.e., ∀R ∈ 2V NS : R 7→ V .
Proof. Consider the true view V . By definition, V NS = NS. By Restriction 1, NS ⊆ T
and thus, V NS ⊆ T . ∀R ∈ 2T 7→ V , so ∀R ∈ 2V NS : R 7→ V .
Were all false views not consistent, then consistency could be used to identify the true
view. A fully omniscient attacker could theoretically generate a false, consistent view by
collapsing all conforming identities. However, the practical difficulty of collapsing identities
prevents this. We formalize this as follows.
Condition 1. All receiver sets correctly classify at least one conforming identity, i.e.,
∀R ∈ 2I : VNS(R) ∩ C 6= ∅.
Justification. Collapsing conforming identities requires knowing the hard-to-predict initia-
tor’s RSSI observations. Section 5.5 quantifies the probability that our required conditions
hold.
Lemma 2. Under Condition 1, a view generated by a receiver set containing a liar is not
view-consistent, i.e., R ∩ L 6= ∅ implies V (R) is not view-consistent.
Proof. Consider such a receiver set R with R ∩ L 6= ∅. By Condition 1, r , VNS(R) ∩C is
not empty and since r ⊆ C ⊆ T , r 7→ V . By the definition of a liar, V (R) 6= V and thus R
is not consistent.
Theorem 1. Under Restriction 1 and Condition 1 and assuming C 6= ∅, exactly one
consistent view is generated across all receiver sets and that view is the true view.
Proof. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, only the true view is consistent, so we need only show
that at least one receiver set generates the true view. C 6= ∅ and thus R = C 7→ V .
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This result suggests a method to identify the true view—select the only consistent view.
As Restriction 1 does not hold in practice, so we develop methods to relax it.
5.3.5 Achieving Consistency by Eliminating LNS
Consider a scenario with some non-Sybil liars. The true view would be consistent were
the non-Sybil liars excluded. Similarly, a false view could be consistent were the correctly
classified conforming identities excluded. If the latter outnumber the former, this yields a
useful property: the consistent view for the largest subset of identities, i.e., that with the
fewest excluded, is the true view, as we now formalize and prove.
Condition 2. The number of conforming identities is strictly greater than the number of
non-Sybil liars, i.e., |C| > |LNS |.
Justification. This is assumed by networks whose protocol require a majority of the nodes
to behave. In others, it may hold for economic reasons—deploying as many nodes as the
conforming participants is expensive.
Condition 3. Each receiver set either correctly classifies at least |LNS | + 1 conforming
identities as non-Sybil or the resulting view, when all correctly classified conforming
identities are excluded, is not consistent, i.e., ∀R ∈ 2I : (|VNS(R)∩C| ≥ |LNS |+1)∨(∃Q ∈
2VNS(R)\C : V (Q) 6= V (R)). Note that this implies Condition 2.
Justification. This is an extension of Condition 1. Section 5.5 quantifies the probability that
it holds.
Lemma 3. Under Condition 2 and Condition 3, the largest subset of I permitting a consis-
tent view is I \ LNS .
Proof. I \ LNS permits a consistent view, per Lemma 1. Let ER , V̂NS(R) ∩ C be the
set of correctly classified conforming nodes for a lying receiver set R, i.e., R ∩ L 6= ∅.
I \ ER is the largest subset possibly permitting a consistent view under R. By Condition 3,
∀R : |ER| ≥ |LNS |+ 1.
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Theorem 2. Under Condition 2 and Condition 3, the largest subset of I permitting a
consistent view permits just one consistent view, the true view.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 3 and Theorem 1.
In the next section, we extend the approach to handle the noise inherent in real-world
signalprints.
5.3.6 Extending Consistency to Handle Noise
Noise prevents true signalprints from always generating the true view. Observing from
prior work that the misclassifications are bounded (e.g., more than 99% of Sybils detected
with fewer than 5% of conforming identities collapsed [5, 109]), we extend the notion of
consistency as follows.
Definition. Let γn be the maximum fraction5 of non-Sybil identities misclassified by a
size-n receiver set. Prior work suggests γ4 = 0.05 is appropriate (for |C| > 20) [5, 109].
Definition. A view is γn-consistent if and only if all size-n receiver sets that are subsets of
the non-Sybil identities under that view generate a γn-similar view. Two views V 1 and V 2
are γn-similar if and only if(
|V 1NS ∩ V 2NS|




)∧( |V 1NS ∩ V 2NS|





This statement captures the intuitive notion that V 1NS and V
2
NS should contain the same
identities up to differences expected under the γn bound. A view is γn-true if it is γn-similar
to the true view.
Lemma 4. Under Restriction 1, the view generated by any truthful receiver set of size n is
γn-consistent6.
5γn is not the probability that an individual identity is misclassified, but an upper bound on the total fraction
misclassified.
6This assumes that the false negative bound is negligible. If it is not, a similar notion of γ,σ-consistency,
94
Proof. Consider two views V 1 and V 2 generated by conforming receiver sets. Each correctly
classifies at least (1−γn) of the non-Sybil identities, so |V 1NS∩V 2NS| ≥ (1−2γn)|NS |. Each
misclassifies at most γn of the non-Sybil identities, so |V 1NS \ V 2NS| ≤ γn|NS | and similar for
V 2NS \ V 1NS. The ratio of these bounds is the result.
Substituting γ-consistency for pure consistency, Condition 3 still holds with high (albeit
different) probability, quantified in Section 5.5. An analogue of Theorem 2 follows.
Theorem 3. Under Condition 3, the γn-consistent view of the largest subset of I permitting
such a view is γn-true.
In Section 5.4 we describe an efficient algorithm to identify the largest subset permitting
a γ-consistent view and thus the correct (up to errors expected due to signalprint noise)
Sybil classification.
5.4 Efficient Implementation of the Selection Policy
Algorithm 1 Choose the receiver sets to consider
Require: i0 is the identity running the procedure
Require: n is the desired receiver set size
1: S ← ∅
2: for all i ∈ I do
3: R← {i0, i}
4: for cnt = 3→ n do
5: R← R ∪ {RandElement(VNS(R))}
6: end for
7: S ← S ∪ {R}
8: end for
9: return S .with high probability, S contains a truthful receiver set
Theorem 3 suggests a way to identify a γn-true view, but brute-force examination of all
2|I| receiver sets is infeasible. Instead, we give an O(|I|3) approach. The first algorithm


































































Figure 5.5: Illustration of Algorithm 1. All |I| size-2 receiver sets are increased to size-4 by
iteratively adding a random identity from those labeled non-Sybil by the current set. With
high probability, at least one of the final sets will contain only conforming identities.
picks O(|I|) receiver sets to consider and the second identifies that permitting the largest
γn-consistent subset.
5.4.1 Receiver Set Selection
The only requirement for receiver set selection is that at least one of the chosen receiver
sets must be truthful. Algorithm 1 selects |I|, size-n (we suggest n = 4) receiver sets
of which at least one is truthful with high probability. As illustrated in Figure 5.5, the
algorithm starts with all |I| size-2 receiver sets (lines 2–3) and builds each up to the full
size-n by iteratively (line 4) adding a randomly selected identity from those indicated to
be conforming at the prior lower dimensionality (line 5). At least |C| of the initial size-2
receiver sets are conforming and after increasing to size-n, at least one is still conforming
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|C| > |LNS |
Figure 5.6: Contours of probability that at least one of the receiver sets from Algorithm 1 is
conforming7.
The signalprint threshold for this process is chosen to eliminate (nearly) all false negatives,
as having a few false positives does not matter. The complexity of a straightforward
implementation is O(|I|3). Section 5.9 further discusses the runtime.
5.4.2 Finding the Largest γn-Consistent View
Given the |I| candidate receiver sets, the next task is identifying the one generating a
γn-true view, which, pursuant to Theorem 3, is that permitting the largest subset of I to
be γn-consistent. Checking consistency by examining all 2|VNS| receiver sets is infeasible,
so we make several observations leading to the O(|I|3) Algorithm 2. For each candidate
receiver set (line 2), we determine how many identities must be excluded for the view to be
γn-consistent (lines 3–17). That excluding the fewest is γn-true and the desired classification
(line 22).
7For small |C| and relatively large |LNS | the probability can be increased by building 2 · |I| or 3 · |I| or
more receiver sets instead. We omit further details due to lack of space.
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Algorithm 2 Find receiver set permitting the largest γn-consistent subset
Require: S is the set of receivers sets generated by Algorithm 1
Require: VNS(R) for each R ∈ {size-2 receiver sets} computed by Algorithm 1
Require: s is the initiator running the algorithm
1: (C,Rmax)← (∞, null)
2: for all R ∈ S do
3: Compute RSSI ratio for each Sybil set in VS(R)
4: c← 0
5: for all i ∈ VNS(R) do
6: e← 0









11: if V (R) and V ({i, s}) are not γ2-similar then
12: e← 1
13: end if
14: if e = 1 then
15: c← c+ 1 . exclude i
16: end if
17: end for
18: if c < C then





The crux of the algorithm is lines 3–17, which use the following observations to effi-
ciently determine which identities must be excluded.
1. Adding an identity to a receiver set can change the view in one direction only—an
identity can go from Sybil to non-Sybil, but not vice versa—because uncorrelated
RSSI vectors cannot become correlated by increasing the dimension8.
2. For identities a and b, R∪ {a} 7→ V (R) and R∪ {b} 7→ V (R) implies R∪ {a, b} 7→
V (R) because a and b must have the same RSSI ratios for the Sybils as R.
From these observations, we determine the excluded identities by computing, for each
identity in VS(R), the RSSI ratio with an arbitrary sibling (line 3) and comparing against
those reported by potential non-Sybils in VNS(R) (line 7). If the number not matching is too
large (line 8), the view is not γn-consistent and the identity is excluded (line 15). Further, if
the receiver set consisting of just the supposedly non-Sybil identity and the initiator is not
γ2-similar to R (line 11).
5.4.3 Runtime in the Absence of Liars
In a typical situation with no liars, the algorithm can detect the Sybils in O(|I|2) time. Since
all identities are truthful, any chosen receiver set will be γn-consistent with no exclusions—
clearly the largest possible—and thus the other |I| − 1 also-truthful receiver sets need not
be checked. With lying attackers present, the overall runtime is O(|I|3), as each algorithm
takes O(|I|3) time.
5.5 Probability that Critical Conditions Hold
Our Sybil classification method depends on Condition 3 holding, i.e., all consistent views
must correctly classify at least |LNS |+ 1 conforming identities. In this section, we quantify
8This is not true for low dimension receiver sets affected by noise, but is for the size-(n > 4) sets considered
here.
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Figure 5.7: Distribution of RSSI variations in real-world deployment.
the probability that Condition 3 holds in the presence of the optimal attacker strategy.
5.5.1 RSSI Unpredictability
The probability that Condition 3 holds is directly tied to the unpredictability of RSSIs,
because collapsing identities requires knowing the RSSI observations at the initiator, as
explained in Subsection 5.3.1. Accurate guessing is difficult because the wireless channel
varies significantly with small displacements in location and orientation (spatial variation)
and environmental changes over time (temporal variation) [107, 119]. Pre-characterization
could account for spatial variation, but would be prohibitively expensive at the needed
spatial and orientation granularity (6.25 cm [120] and 3° for our test devices).
We empirically determined the RSSI variation for human-carried smartphones by deploy-
ing experimental phones to eleven graduate students in two adjacent offices and measuring
fixed-distance, pairwise RSSIs for fifteen hours. The observed distribution of deviations9,
shown in Figure 5.7, is roughly normal with a standard deviation of 7.3 dBm, in line
with other real-world measurements for spatial and orientation variations (4–12 dBm and
5.3 dBm [107]). We use this distribution to model the attacker uncertainty of RSSIs.
9For each pair of transceivers, we subtracted the mean of all their measurements to get the deviations and














































Figure 5.8: Contours of a lower bound on the probability that Condition 3 holds under
an optimal attacker strategy with the attacker’s knowledge of RSSIs modeled as a normal
distribution with standard deviation 7.3 dBm.
5.5.2 Optimal Attacker Strategy
To break Condition 3, an attacker must generate a consistent view that collapses at least
|C| − |LNS | conforming identities. We give three observations about the optimal attacker
strategy for this goal.
1. Collapsing |C| − |LNS | identities is easiest with larger |LNS |. Thus, the optimal
attacker uses only one physical node to claim Sybils—the others just lie.
2. For a particular false view to be consistent, all supposedly non-Sybil identities must
indict the same identities, e.g., have the same RSSI guesses for the collapsed con-
forming identities. The optimal attacker must divide its (mostly Sybil) identities into
groups, each using a different set of guesses.
3. More groups increases the probability of success, but decreases the number of Sybils
actually accepted, as each group is smaller.
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We assume the optimal attacker wishes to maximize the probability of success and thus uses
minimum-sized groups (three identities, for size-4 signalprints).
For each group, the attacker must guess RSSI values for the conforming identities with




such sets and the
optimal attacker guesses values that maximize the probability of at least one (across all
groups) being correct. The first group is easy; the |C| guesses are simply the most likely
values, i.e., the expected values for the conforming identities’ RSSIs, under the uncertainty
distribution.
For the next (and subsequent) groups, the optimal attacker should pick the next most




sets. However, the sets share elements (only |C|
RSSIs are actually guessed), so the attacker must determine the most probable sets that are
compatible. This is a non-trivial problem, so for our analysis, we assume that all sets are
compatible (e.g., one group can guess −78 dBm and −49 dBm RSSIs for nodes a and b, but
−82 dBm and −54 dBm RSSIs for nodes a and c). This is clearly impossible, but leads to
a conservative lower bound on the probability that the attacker fails—a feasible, optimal
strategy is less likely to succeed.
Figure 5.8 shows contours of this lower bound on the probability that Condition 3 holds
as a function of |C| and |LNS |. When the conforming nodes outnumber the attacker nodes
by at least 1.5×—the expected case in real networks—the condition holds with very high
probability. In practice, it will hold with even higher probability, as this is a lower bound.
5.6 Detecting Mobile Attackers
A mobile attacker can defeat signalprint comparison by changing locations or orientations
between transmissions to associate distinct signalprints with each Sybil identity. Fortunately,
in the networks we consider, most conforming nodes (e.g., human-carried smartphones and










































Figure 5.9: Contours showing the response time (in ms, 99th percentile) to precisely switch
between two positions required to defeat the challenge-response moving node detection.
Thus, multiple transmissions should have the same signalprint, as noted, but not pursued, by
Xiao et al. [5]. From this observation, we develop a protocol to detect moving attackers.
Again, the lack of trusted observations is troublesome. Instead of comparing signalprints,
we compare the initiator’s observations: all transmissions from a conforming node should
have the same RSSI. As shown in Section 5.8, this simple criterion yields acceptable
detection.
The protocol collection phase (Figure 5.2a) is extended to request multiple probe packets
(e.g., 14) from each identity in a pseudo-random order (see Subsection 5.7.1). During
the classification phase (Figure 5.2c) each participant rejects all identities with large RSSI
variation across its transmissions (specifically, a standard deviation larger than 2.5 dBm). In
essence, an attacker is challenged to quickly and precisely switch between the multiple posi-
tions associated with its Sybil identities (6.25 cm location precision according to coherence
length theory [120] and 3° orientation precision according to our measurements).
Figure 5.9 plots the required response time for an attacker to pass the challenge. Given
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human reaction times [121], reliably mounting such an attack would require specialized
hardware—precise electromechanical control or beam steering antenna arrays—that is
outside our attack model and substantially more expensive to deploy than compromised
commodity devices.
5.7 The Mason Test
This section presents the full Mason test protocol, implementing the concepts introduced in
the previous sections. Those results impose four main requirements on the protocol.
1. Conforming neighbors must be able to participate. That is, selective jamming of
conforming identities must be detectable.
2. Probe packets must be transmitted in a pseudo-random order. Further, each participant
must be able to verify that no group of identities controlled the order.
3. Moving identities are rejected, so to save energy and time, conforming nodes that are
moving when the protocol begins should not participate.
4. Attackers must not know the RSSI observations of conforming identities when com-
puting lies.
We assume a known upper bound on the number of conforming neighbors, i.e., those
within the one-hop transmission range. In most applications, a bound in the hundreds (we
use 400 in our experiments) will be acceptable. If more identities attempt to participate,
the protocol aborts and no classification is made. This appears to open a denial-of-service
attack. However, we do not attempt to prevent, instead only detect, DOS attacks, because
one such attack—simply jamming the wireless channel—is unpreventable (with commodity
hardware). See Section 5.9 for more discussion.
The rest of this section describes the two components of the protocol: collection of
















Figure 5.10: RSSI correlation as a function of the maximum device acceleration between
observations.
protocol and leads the collection, but all identities still individually and safely perform Sybil
classification.
5.7.1 Collection of RSSI Observations
Phase I: Identity Collection. The first phase gathers participating neighbors, ensuring
that no conforming identities are jammed by attackers. The initiator sends a REQUEST
message stating its identity, e.g., a public key. All stationary neighbors respond with their
identities via HELLO-I messages, ACKed by the initiator. Unacknowledged HELLO-Is are
re-transmitted. The process terminates when the channel is idle—indicating all HELLO-
I’s were received and ACKed. If the channel does not go idle before a timeout (e.g., 15
seconds), an attacker may be selectively jamming some HELLO-Is and the protocol aborts.
The protocol also aborts if too many identities (e.g, 400) join.
Phase II: Randomized Broadcast Request: The second phase is the challenge-response
protocol to collect RSSI observations for motion detection and Sybil classification. First,
each identity contributes a random value; all are hashed together to produce a seed to
generate the random sequence of broadcast requests issued by the initiator. Specifically, it
sends a TRANSMIT message to the next participant in the random sequence, who must
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quickly broadcast a signed HELLO-II, e.g., within 10 ms in our implementation10. Each
participant records the RSSIs of the HELLO-II messages it hears. Some identities will not
hear each other; this is acceptable because the initiator needs observations from only three
other conforming identities. |I| × s requests are issued, where s is large enough to ensure a
short minimum duration between consecutive requests for any two pairs of nodes, e.g., 14 in
our tests. An identity that fails to respond in time might be an attacker attempting to change
positions and is rejected.
Phase III: RSSI Observations Report. In the third phase, the RSSI observations are
shared. First, each identity broadcasts a hash of its observations. Then the actual values are
shared. Those not matching the respective hash are rejected, preventing attackers from using
the reported values to fabricate plausible observations. The same mechanism from Phase 1
is used to detect selective jamming.
5.7.2 Sybil Classification
Each participant performs Sybil classification individually. First, the identity verifies that its
observations were not potentially predictable from those reported in prior rounds, possibly
violating Condition 3. Correlation in RSSI values between observations decreases with
motion between observations, as shown by our experiments (Figure 5.10). Thus, a node
only performs Sybil classification if it has strong evidence the current observations are
uncorrelated with prior ones11, i.e., it has observed an acceleration of at least 2 m s−2.
Classification is a simple application of the methods of Section 5.6 and Section 5.4.
Each identity with an RSSI variance across its multiple broadcasts higher than a threshold is
rejected. Then, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are used to identify a γ-true Sybil classification
over the remaining, stationary identities.
10These packets can be signed ahead of time and cached—signatures do not need to be computed in the
10 ms interval.
11Note that although we did not encounter this case in our experiments, it is conceivable that some devices
will return to the same location and orientation after motion.
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Table 5.2: Thresholds for Signalprint Comparison and Motion Filtering
Name Threshold (dBm)
Signalprint Distance dimension-2 0.85
dimension-3 3.6
dimension-4 1.2
RSSI Standard Deviation 2.5
5.8 Prototype and Evaluation
We implemented the Mason test as a Linux kernel module and tested its performance on
HTC Magic Android smartphones in various operating environments. It sits directly above
the 802.11 link layer, responding to requests in interrupt context, to minimize response
latency for the REQUEST–HELLO-II sequence (12 ms roundtrip time on our hardware).
For rapid prototyping, the classification algorithms are implemented in Python.
Wireless channels are environment-dependent, so we evaluated the Mason test in four
different environments.
Office I Eleven participants in two adjacent offices for fifteen hours.
Office II Eleven participants in two adjacent offices in a different building for one hour, to
determine whether performance varies across similar, but non-identical environments.
Cafeteria Eleven participants in a crowded cafeteria during lunch. This was a rapidly-
changing wireless environment due to frequent motion of the cafeteria patrons.
Outdoor Eleven participants meeting in a cold, open, grassy courtyard for one hour, cap-
turing the outdoor environment. Participants moved frequently to stay warm.
In each environment, we conducted multiple trials with one Sybil attacker12 generating 4,
20, 40, and 160 Sybil identities. The gathered traces were split into testing and training sets.




































Figure 5.11: ROC curve showing the classification performance of signalprint comparison
in different environments for varying distance thresholds. Only identities that passed the
motion filter are considered. The knees of the curves all correspond to the same thresholds,
suggesting that the same value can be used in all locations.
5.8.1 Selection and Robustness of Thresholds
The training data were used to determine good motion filter and signalprint distance thresh-
olds, shown in Table 5.2.
The motion filter threshold was chosen such that at least 95% of the conforming partic-
ipants (averaged over all training rounds) in the low-motion Office I environment would
pass. This policy ensures that conforming smartphones, which are usually left mostly
Table 5.3: Classification Performance
Environment Sensitivity (%) Specificity (%)
Office I 99.6 96.5
























































Figure 5.12: Confusion matrices detailing the classifier performance in the four environments
tested. S means Sybil and C means conforming. Multiple tests were conducted in each
environment, so mean percentages are shown instead of absolute counts.
stationary, e.g., on desks, in purses, or in the pockets of seated people, will usually pass
the test. Devices exhibiting more motion (i.e., a standard deviation of RSSIs at the initiator
larger than 2.5 dBm)—as would be expected from an attacker trying to defeat signalprint
detection—will be rejected.
The signalprint distance thresholds were chosen by evaluating the signalprint classifica-
tion performance at various possible values. Figure 5.11 shows the ROC curves for size-4
receiver sets (a “positive” is an identity classified as Sybil). Note that the true positive and
false positive rates consider only identities that passed the motion filter, in order to isolate
the effects of the signalprint distance threshold. The curves show that a good threshold has
performance in line with prior work [5, 109], as expected.
In all environments, the knees of the curve correspond to the same thresholds, suggesting
that these values can be used in general, across environments. A possible explanation is
that despite environment differences, the signalprint distance distributions for stationary
Sybil siblings are identical. All results in this paper use these uniform thresholds, show in
Table 5.2.
5.8.2 Classification Performance
The performance of the full Mason test—motion filtering and signalprint comparison—is

















Figure 5.13: Relative frequencies of the three causes of false positives.
environment, so average percentages are shown instead of absolute counts. To evaluate the
performance, we consider two standard classification metrics derived from these matrices,
sensitivity (percentage of Sybil identities correctly identified) and specificity (percentage of
conforming identities correctly identified).
Note that 100% sensitivity is not necessary. Most protocols that would use Mason
require a majority of the participants to be conforming. The total identities are limited (e.g.,
400) so rejecting most of the Sybils and accepting most of the conforming identities is
sufficient to meet this requirement.
Table 5.3 shows the performance for all four environments. The test performs best in the
low-motion indoor environments, with over 99.5% sensitivity and over 85% specificity. The
sensitivity in the cafeteria environment is just 91.4%, likely due to the rapid and frequent
changes in the wireless environment resulting from the movement of cafeteria patrons. In
the outdoor environment, with participants moving, the specificity is 61.1% because some
conforming identities are rejected by the motion filter13.
An identity is classified as Sybil for three reasons: if it has similar signalprints with
another, the initiator has too few RSSI reports to form a signalprint, or it fails the motion filter.
Figure 5.13 shows the relative prevalence of these causes of the false positives. Interestingly,





















Figure 5.14: Runtime overhead in seconds of the collection phase as a function of the
number of participating identities. The stacked bars partition the cost among the participant
collection (HELLO I), RSSI measurement (HELLO II), and RSSI observation exchange
(RSST) steps.
the first cause—collapsing—is rare, occurring only in the first office environment. Not
surprisingly, missing RSSI reports are an issue only in the environments with significant
obstructions, the indoor offices, accounting for about half of these false positives. In the
open cafeteria and outdoor environments, all false positives are due to participant motion.
5.8.3 Overhead Evaluation
Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15 show the runtime and energy overhead for the Mason test
collection phase, with the stacked bars separating the costs by sub-phase. For a protocol
not run frequently (once every hour is often sufficient), the runtimes of 10–90 seconds are
acceptable. Likewise, energy consumption is acceptable, with the extreme 18 J consumption
for 400 identities representing 0.01% of the 17.500 J capacity of a typical smartphone
batteries.
Figure 5.16 show the classification phase overheads for 2–100 identities. At a small
fraction of the collection costs, these are also acceptable. For more than 100 participants,
costs become excessive due to the O(n3) scaling behavior14. Limiting participation to 100
identities may be necessary for energy-constrained devices, but will generally not reduce



























Figure 5.15: Energy consumption in joules of the collection phase as a function of the
number of participating identities. The stacked bars partition the cost among the participant
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Figure 5.16: Runtime and energy consumption of the classification phase.
performance because having 100 non-Sybil, one-hop neighbors is rare.
The periodic accelerometer sampling used to measure motion between Mason test rounds
consumes 5.2% of battery capacity over a typical 18 h work day.
5.9 Discussion
Sybil classification from untrusted observations is difficult and the Mason test is not a
silver bullet. Not requiring trusted observations is a significant improvement, but the test’s
limitations must be carefully considered before deployment. As with any system intended
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for real-world use, some decisions try to balance system complexity and potential security
weaknesses. In this section, we discuss these trade-offs, limitations, and related concerns.
High Computation Time: The collection phase time is governed by the 802.11b-induced
12 ms per packet latency and the classification runtime grows quickly, O(|I|3). Although
typically fast (e.g., <5 s for 5–10 nodes), the Mason test is slower in high density areas (e.g.,
40 s for 100 nodes). However, it should be run infrequently, e.g., once or twice per hour.
Topologies change slowly (most people change locations infrequently) and many protocols
requiring Sybil resistance can handle the lag—they need only know a subset of the current
non-Sybil neighbors.
Easy Denial-of-Service Attack: An attacker can force the protocol to abort by creating
many identities or jamming transmissions from the conforming identities. We cannot on
commodity 802.11 devices solve another denial-of-service attack—simply jamming the
channel—so defending against these more-complicated variants is ultimately useless. Most
locations will at most times be free of such attackers—the Mason test provides a way to
verify this condition, reject any Sybils, and let other protocols operate knowing they are
Sybil-free.
Requires Several Conforming Neighbors: The Mason test requires true RSSI observations
from some neighbors (i.e., 3) and is easily defeated otherwise. Although beyond the page
limits of this paper, protocols incorporating the Mason test can mitigate this risk by (a) a
priori estimation of the distribution of the number of conforming neighbors and (b) careful
composition of results from multiple rounds to bound the failure probability.
Limit On Total Identities: This limit (e.g., 400) is unfortunately necessary to detect when
conforming nodes are being selectively jammed while keeping the test duration short enough
that most conforming nodes remain stationary. We believe that most wireless networks have
typical node degrees well below 400 anyway.
Messages Must Be Signed: Packets sent during the collection phase are signed, which can
be very slow with public key schemes. However, this is easily mitigated by (a) pre-signing
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the packets to keep the delay off the critical path or (b) using faster secret-key-based schemes.
Details are again omitted due to page constraints.
Pre-Characterization Reveals RSSIs: An attacker could theoretically improve its collaps-
ing probability by pre-characterizing the wireless environment. We believe such attacks are
impractical because the required spatial granularity is about 6.25 cm, the device orientation
is still unknown, and environmental changes (e.g., people moving) reduces the usefulness of
prior characterization.
Prior Rounds Reveal RSSI Information: The protocol defends against this. Conforming
nodes do not perform classification when their RSSI observations are correlated with those
from the prior rounds (see Subsection 5.7.2).
High False Positive Rates: With the motion filter, the false positive rate can be high, e.g.,
20% of conforming identities rejected in some environments. We believe this is acceptable
because most protocols requiring Sybil resistance need only a subset of honest identities.
For example, if for reliability some data is to be spread among multiple neighbors, it is
acceptable to spread it among a subset chosen from 80%, rather than all, of the non-Sybils.
5.10 Conclusion
We have described a method to use signalprints to detect Sybil attacks in open ad hoc and
delay-tolerant networks without requiring trust in any other node or authority. We use
the inherent difficulty of predicting RSSIs to separate true and false RSSI observations
reported by one-hop neighbors. Attackers using motion to defeat the signalprint technique
are detected by requiring low-latency retransmissions from the same position.
The Mason test was implemented on HTC Magic smartphones and tested with human
participants in three environments. It eliminates 99.6%–100% of Sybil identities in office
environments, 91% in a crowded high-motion cafeteria, and 96% in a high-motion open out-
door environment. It accepts 88%–97% of conforming identities in the office environments,
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87% in the cafeteria, and 61% in the outdoor environment. The vast majority of rejected
conforming identities are removed due to motion.
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CHAPTER 6
Characterization of Microblogging User
Behavior and the Retweet Graph
6.1 Introduction
Quantitative modeling of Twitter usage is important both for understanding human com-
munication patterns and optimizing the performance of other microblogging-esque com-
munication platforms. However, prior analysis is focused on the social graph [122–126] or
on individual information cascades that represent a small fraction of all tweets [127–131].
Descriptions of basic behaviors are missing from the literature. For example, the qualitative
distributions of the number of followers and friends is available [122], but not the distribution
of tweet rates. Common factors of tweets that are heavily retweeted are known [127], but
propensity of users to retweet, i.e., distribution of retweet rates, is not. We begin to fill these
gaps by considering user behavior as a whole, providing quantitative descriptions of the
distributions of lifetime tweets, tweet rates, and inter-tweet times.
We are motivated by increasing interest in decentralized microblogging systems designed
to protect user privacy and resist censorship. FETHER [69], Cuckoo [70], and Litter [71]
reduce dependence on a single provider, while Shout [132] and Twister [133] are explicitly
designed to avoid censorship and reprisal by government agencies. Designing a decentralized
system capable of handling the message rates and volumes of Twitter is already a significant
challenge and is nearly impossible without a good understanding of those usage patterns.
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Given the complexity of these systems, understanding of the trade-offs in the perfor-
mance and cost metrics—throughput, latency, energy consumption—is obtained through
simulations, but such simulations are only as accurate as the data and models driving
them. Consider fair allocation of network resources—fairness looks very different when
the expected distribution of tweets is a power law and not uniform. Or, consider measuring
delivery latencies, with messages queuing at intermediate nodes, a metric dependent on the
(non-Poisson) arrival process, i.e., the inter-tweet duration distribution. Quantitative models
of these basic behaviors are needed.
The underlying human behaviors should extend across communication platforms—tweet
rates should mirror call rates in the telephone network and total lifetime tweets should mirror
total lifetime contributions to Wikipedia or YouTube—suggesting that models of those
behaviors [134–136] be used in proxy for microblogging design. However, our analysis
of the Twitter data shows differing behavior, indicating possible faults in several of these
models. Our results for Twitter should enable future work to identify or refine further
commonalities in human communication.
Tweets generally travel via the explicit social followers graph [122], which has been
well-studied. Surprisingly, the retweet graph, in which a directed edge connects two users
if the source has retweeted the destination, has received almost no attention. This implicit
graph may be actually more relevant to information propagation in decentralized systems.
A throughput-limited system needs some way of prioritizing messages. People are usually
more selective in what they say than to whom they listen, so the retweet graph may better
encode true interest and trust relationships among users. For example, Shout1 does not
support friend/follower relationships, so the retweet graph is the only available social graph.
We conduct the first study of the retweet graph obtained from a 4-month sample of 10% of
all tweets and compare it to the social followers graph.
1Shout [132] is decentralized, geographic microblogging system in which messages are broadcast to users
within radio range of the sender. Other users may re-shout the message, extending its reach, but the protocol
does not directly support multi-hop delivery.
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These results have wide applicability. The quantification of communication behaviors
and the social graph, beyond allowing direct comparison with other already-characterized
platforms, enables the development of generative models explaining the underlying pro-
cesses. In a more direct view, knowing the number of tweets, tweet rates, and inter-tweet
times are sufficient for simulating and optimizing microblogging platform performance and
the confirmation that the retweet graph is scale-free and small-word enables the generation of
random retweet graphs for empirical evaluation. We focus on two such applications, the de-
sign of distributed microblogging systems and the detection of spammers using connectivity
in the retweet graph.
We have the following findings.
• The distribution of lifetime tweets is discrete Weibull (type-II), generalizing a power
law form shown by Wilkinson for other online communities [134]. We conjecture
that the Weibull shape parameter reflects the average amount of (positive or negative)
feedback available to contributors. (Section 6.3)
• The distribution of tweet (and retweet) rates is asymptotically power law, but exhibits
a lognormal cutoff over finite-duration samples. Thus, high tweet rates are much more
rare in practice than the asymptotic distribution would suggest. We also discount a
double Pareto lognormal (DPLN) explanation previously advanced in the context of
call rates [135]. (Section 6.4)
• The distribution of inter-tweet durations is power law with exponential cutoff, mirror-
ing that of telephone calls [136]. (Section 6.5)
• The retweet graph is small-world and (roughly) scale-free, like the social followers
graph, but less disassortative and more highly clustered. It is more similar than the
followers graph to real-world social networks, consistent with better reflection of
real-world relationships and trust. (Section 6.6)
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In Section 6.7, we discuss the implications of these results for decentralized microblog-
ging architectures and in Section 6.8 we consider using the structure of the retweet graph
for spammer detection.
6.2 Datasets
The Twitter API rate limits and terms of service prevent collection and sharing of a single
complete tweet dataset suitable for all our queries [137]. Our largest and most recent dataset—
10% of all tweets sent between June and September 2012—is the focus of our analysis, but
we supplement with sets from other researchers as necessary. This section summarizes these
datasets and describes our main procedure for inferring population statistics from the 10%
sample.
6.2.1 2009 Social Graph
Kwak et al.’s 2009 crawl [122] remains the largest and most complete public snapshot of
the Twitter social followers graph, covering 41.7 million users and 1.47 billion relations.
The data is dated, but still the best available. Repeating this crawl is infeasible under current
rate limits and feasible sampling strategies (e.g., snowball-sampling [138]) lead to results
that are difficult to interpret [139]. We use this social graph snapshot for all comparisons
with the retweet graph.
6.2.2 Lifetime Contribution Dataset
No tweet dataset is complete enough to compute lifetime contributions, the number of tweets
sent before quitting Twitter, but the Twitter API exposes (subject to rate limits) the necessary
information. We collected account age, date of last tweet, and total tweet count (as of June
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Table 6.1: 10% Sample (Gardenhose) Dataset
10% Sample Actual Value†
# of Tweets 4 097 787 713 41 256 584 408
# of Retweets 953 457 874 9 664 691 519
# of Tweeters 104 083 457 166 335 390
# of Retweeters 51 319 979 84 278 086
# of Retweetees 38 975 108 69 224 526
† Estimated using the described EM procedure.
2013) for 1 318 683 users selected uniformly randomly from the 2009 social graph set2.
525 779 of these users were inactive,3 i.e., had not tweeted in the prior six months [134].
Their ages and tweet counts form the lifetime contribution set used in Section 6.3.
6.2.3 SNAP Tweet Dataset
Computing inter-tweet intervals requires consecutive tweets—a random sample is insuffi-
cient4. For our inter-tweet distribution analysis in Section 6.5, we use a collection of 467
million tweets gathered by the SNAP team in 2009 [140]. The full dataset is no longer
publicly available per request from Twitter, but the authors kindly shared the inter-tweet
metadata.
6.2.4 10% Sample (Gardenhose) Dataset
Our primary dataset is a uniform random 10% sample5 of all tweets (the “gardenhose”
stream) sent in the four month period spanning June through September 2012. Table 6.1
shows the scope of the dataset, using the following definitions. A tweeter is a user that
sends a tweet, an original message. A retweeter is a user that sends a retweet, forwarding a
2The 2009 social graph dataset is the closest to a uniform random sample of Twitter users we could find.
More recent sets are biased towards users that tweet more often.
3The creation dates of protected tweets are hidden, so all users with protected tweets were excluded.
4A random sample would be sufficient if the process were Poisson, but it is not.
5More precisely, each tweet is included in this sample with 10% probability.
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previous tweet. A retweetee is a user whose tweet was retweeted.
Retweets were identified using both Twitter-provided metadata and analysis of the
message contents for retweet syntax, e.g., “RT@”. Retweeting was not an official feature
in Twitter’s early years, but instead developed organically. A variety of syntaxes appeared
(e.g., RT@username, retweeting username, and via username) and are still






In 2009, Twitter officially6 added support for retweeting to their backend schema and the
user interface. These retweets are identified by the Twitter API.
The sampled data poses a challenge for drawing quantitative conclusions about user
behavior and the structure of the retweet graph. For many of the distributions we wish to
quantify, the sample is biased towards users that tweeted more frequently. In fact, most users
with fewer than ten tweets will not appear at all. Much prior work in the social network and
graph analysis literature has focused on qualitatively characterizing the errors introduced by
subsampling, motivated by quicker analysis [139, 141]. We instead develop an approach to
accurately estimate quantitative population statistics from the 10% random sample.
6.2.5 Estimating Population Distributions from the 10% Sample Dataset
For simplicity, we describe the method for a concrete problem: determining the distribution
of tweets per user during the four month window. The method is trivially adapted to a variety
of such problems, including multivariate joint distributions as in Subsection 6.6.3. Similar
6https://blog.twitter.com/2009/project-retweet-phase-one
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approaches are used in other fields [142]. We wish to determine the number of users, fi, with
i ∈ N+ tweets given the number of users, gj , with j ∈ N+ tweets observed in the sample. gj
includes some users from each fi≥j , with the binomial distribution B0.1(i, j) describing how
the users in fi are partitioned among the various gj≤i. Intuitively, a good estimate f̂ is that
which maximizes the probability of the observation g, i.e., standard maximum likelihood
estimation.
The corresponding likelihood function is not analytically tractable, so we employ an
expectation maximization algorithm [143, 144] to compute the estimate f̂ , summarized here
(see Section 6.9 for details). Let φi be the probability that a user sends i tweets conditional
on at least one of them being observed and ci,j be the probability a user with i tweets has j
of them observed conditional on j ≥ 1 (i.e., the binomial probability conditional on at least









where φ are the parameters to estimate and f and g are the hidden and observed variables,
respectively. We compute the parameter estimate by iteratively selecting a new estimate
φk+1 that maximizes the expected likelihood under the previous estimate φk, i.e.,

















This process is known to converge [145]. Letting γ ,
∑
1≤j gj be the total number of





















Figure 6.1: Distribution of tweets per user for the scaled sample (j observed tweets maps
to 10j sent tweets) and the underlying population as estimated by the EM algorithm. The
differences (particularly for the range 1–100) illustrate the importance of recovering the
actual distribution via, for example, our EM algorithm.





Figure 6.1 shows the result using the distribution of tweets sent during our four-month
collection window as an example. The correct distribution computed via the EM algorithm
is substantially different, particularly in the lower decades, from the uncorrected or scaled
(i.e., assuming that observing j tweets implies 10j were sent) distributions.
6.3 Distribution of Lifetime Tweets
Strong regularities in participation behavior have been observed across many online peer
production systems, suggesting a common underlying dynamic. Wilkinson found that for
Bugzilla, Essembly, Wikipedia, and Digg, the probability that a user makes no further
contributions is inversely proportional to the number of contributions already made, sug-
gesting a notion of participation momentum [134]. Huberman et al. observed the same in



































Figure 6.2: Distribution of total lifetime tweets. Distribution parameters (Table 6.3) were
obtained by maximum likelihood estimation. In the inset, equal-count binning obscures the
cutoff. The sparse upper tail causes a wide and thus seemingly-outlying last bin.
We quantify contribution as the number of tweets sent7, so the lifetime contribution is
the tweet count when the user becomes inactive. Following Wilkinson [134], a user that has
not tweeted for six months (as of June 2013 when our lifetime contributions dataset was
collected) is inactive.
Figure 6.2 plots the logarithmically-binned [147] empirical distribution. It is heavy-
tailed, but decays more quickly in the upper tail than a true power law. The higher density
in the last bin (∼200 000 tweets) is due to Twitter’s rate limits of 1000 tweets per day and
100 tweets per hour, because users that would occupy the upper tail (>200 000 tweets) are
forced into this bin.8 YouTube exhibits the same non-power law, upper tail cutoff [146],
consistent with a common dynamic underlying both systems.
7One could instead consider retweets, replies, or direct messages, but obtaining data for these is more
difficult.
8The rate limit means that the lifetime contribution distribution can be viewed as a censored [148] version
of the “natural” distribution.
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Table 6.2: Power-Law Exponents for Lifetime Contributions in Various Online Communities,
Computed Incorrectly Using Equal-Count Binning
Contribution Type α p-value min. k
Essembly votes† 1.47 0.59 3
Digg votes† 1.53 0.64 15
Twitter tweets 1.54 0.96 12
Bugzilla comments† 1.98 0.74 5
Essembly submissions† 2.02 0.25 7
Wikipedia edits† 2.28 0.69 10
Digg submissions† 2.40 0.04 15
Youtube submissions‡ 2.46 — —
† from Wilkinson [134]
‡ from Huberman, Romero, and Wu [146]
6.3.1 Critique of Previously-Reported Power Law Behavior
Surprisingly, the cutoff does not match the strong power law evidence reported for Bugzilla,
Essembly, Wikipedia, and Digg [134]. We believe those systems do contain a similar cutoff,
but it was obscured by the analysis methods used. We observe three weaknesses of the prior
approach. First, the equal-count binning9 method used obscures the upper tail behavior;
logarithmic binning is preferred [147]. Second, maximum likelihood estimation, not binned
regression, should be used for fitting [149]. Finally, the goodness-of-fit should be computed
against the empirical distribution function (Kolmogorov–Smirnov or Anderson–Darling
test) [149], not against binned data (the G-test).
The original datasets are unavailable10, so we tested our hypothesis by applying the
same methods to our Twitter data. As expected, equal-count binning, shown in the inset
of Figure 6.2, hides the known cutoff. The G-test for a power law fit by regression to the
improperly binned data indicates a good match (Table 6.2), despite the obvious mismatch
in the real data. Clearly, these methods can obscure any underlying cutoff. Our results
9In equal-count binning, each bin is sized to contain the same number of samples and thus the same area
under the density function. For B bins, the height of a bin bi is computed as B/w(bi), where w(bi) is the
width of bi.
10Emails to the author bounced as undeliverable.
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Table 6.3: Parameters for Distributions of Lifetime Tweets
Distribution Parameters



















are consistent with Bugzilla, Essembly, Wikipedia, and Digg contributions containing the
same cutoffs as Twitter and YouTube, but the original data would be needed to prove this
conclusion.
6.3.2 Lifetime Tweets Follow a Weibull Distribution
If the distribution is not power law, what is it? Examining the hazard function, or probability
that a user who has made x contributions quits without another, provides the answer. Shown
in Figure 6.3, the hazard function is an obvious power law. Wilkinson referred to this
behavior in other online communities as participation momentum [134]; we will return to
that interpretation later.
The power law hazard function α−1
x1−β
is that of the Weibull distribution11, for continuous
support. For discrete support, the distribution with a power law hazard function is called a
Type II Discrete Weibull12 [150] and has mass function










A maximum likelihood fit to the lifetime contribution data yields β = 0.17 and α = 1.32, as
shown in Figure 6.2. The upper tail deviates slightly, which we attribute to Twitter’s rate
11The Weibull distribution is sometimes called the stretched exponential.
12The much more common Type I Discrete Weibull [151] instead preserves the exponential form of the























Figure 6.3: The probability that a user who has sent x tweets quits without sending another,
i.e., the hazard rate. The decreasing trend suggests a sort of momentum; the more times
a user has tweeted, the more likely he is to tweet again. The power law parameters are
calculated from Table 6.3, not fit to the data.
limit policy. Some users that would have tweeted more than ∼200 000 times were artificially
limited to fewer tweets, increasing the weight in that portion of the upper tail.
6.3.3 Interpreting the Hazard Function as Participation Momentum
Wilkinson [134] used a notion of participation momentum to explain the power law hazard
function. For his assumed power law distribution, C 1
xα
, the hazard function is α−1
x
and α
can be seen as a metric for the effort needed to contribute. Higher required effort leads to
a higher probability of quitting. Table 6.2 shows the α’s for several systems. Intuitively,
tweeting seems more taxing than voting on Digg stories but less so than commenting on
Bugzilla reports. And indeed, we find that αDigg < αTwitter < αBugzilla.
Alternatively, the hazard function might be more directly related to account age than total
contributions. To reject this possibility, we compared the Kendall tau rank correlations [152]
between lifetime contributions, age, and average tweet rate (lifetime contributions/age).
Unsurprisingly, age (i.e., longer life) correlates with increased lifetime contributions (τ =
0.4708, p = 0.00, 95% CI [0.4690, 0.4726]). In contrast, the tweet rate is essentially
uncorrelated with lifetime contributions (τ = −0.0067, p = 0.00, 95% CI [−0.0085,
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−0.0049]), indicating that the momentum function is not driven by age. If it were, the
correlation would be strongly positive because faster tweeters would generate more tweets
in their (independently determined) lifetimes. The strong negative relationship between
tweet rate and age (τ = −0.5687, p = 0.00, 95% CI [−0.5705, −0.5669]) further supports
this conclusion. The hazard rate is determined by the current total contributions, so users
with higher tweet rates must have shorter lifetime ages.
The hazard function we observe ( α−1
x1−β
instead of Wilkinson’s α−1
x
) invites additional
thought. The new parameter β (β = 0 in Wilkinson’s model) models momentum gain—a
higher β translates to more momentum gain per contribution. For example, one could imag-
ine that β reflects the effect of feedback. Positive (negative) viewer-generated feedback like
retweets and replies in Twitter or comments and view counts in YouTube might accelerate
(decelerate) momentum gains relative to systems without such visible feedback, like Digg
votes or Wikipedia edits.13 Refinement of this interpretation is a promising area for future
work.




viewed as participation momentum. α reflects the effort needed to contribute and β
the amount of feedback provided by system. The power law momentum leads to a Type II
Discrete Weibull distribute for lifetime contributions. This dynamic holds across a variety
of online communities [134, 146].
6.4 Distribution of Tweet Rates
The distribution of tweet rates is arguably the most important statistic for microblogging
system design. An architecture designed for uniform messaging rates across the network will
struggle with a heavy-tailed rate distribution. In this section, we describe an analytical model
13Wilkinson’s reported results are consistent with this hypothesis. The contribution types with the most
visible feedback—Essembly and Digg submissions—show little support for a power law, with p-values of 0.25
and 0.04. β > 0 would explain the non-power law behavior. The distribution for YouTube by Huberman et al.


















Power Law w/ Lognormal Cutoff
Figure 6.4: Distribution of tweets per user for the four month period from June through
September 2012.
and generative mechanism for the rate distribution and reject a model previously proposed
for telephone call rates. Although we are most interested in the tweet rate distribution, we
model the easier-to-consider tweet count distribution. The former is easily recovered by
dividing out the 4-month sampling duration.
6.4.1 An Analytical Approximation of the Tweet Rate Distribution
Figure 6.4 plots the logarithmically-binned empirical tweet distribution. It is heavy-tailed,
consistent with other forms of authorship [153]. The tails form two different regimes meeting
at X = ∼2000, each heavy-tailed but with different exponents. We show in Subsection 6.4.3
that this phase change is a dynamic effect related to the sample period length (i.e., four
months)—the crossing point increases with the square of the sample period length.
Simulating microblogging performance and comparing rates across communication
systems benefits from a closed-form of the distribution. The forthcoming generative model
in Subsection 6.4.3 is not analytically tractable, so we describe an analytical approximation
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first. Figure 6.4 suggests a cutoff power law, but the upper tail is heavier than the common








where Φc is the complementary CDF of the standard normal distribution and c is a normaliz-
ing constant. The maximum likelihood fit is shown in Figure 6.4, with β = 1.13, µ = 7.6,











for z  1,















The power law exponent in the lower tail is β, the phase change to the cutoff regime occurs
at exp(µ), and the upper tail steepness is controlled by σ.
6.4.2 The Distribution is Not Double Pareto–Lognormal
At first glance, Figure 6.4 appears to be Double Pareto-Lognormal (DPLN), a recently-
discovered distribution that has found wide-spread popularity across many fields, perhaps
due to its clear generative interpretation [154]. Seshadri et al. suggested its use for commu-
nication rates, specifically call rates in a cellular network, interpreting the generative process
as evolving social wealth [135]. However, in this section we show that the DPLN does not
correctly capture the lower tail behavior of tweet rates (or call rates). In the next section, we
describe a different mechanism to explain the shape.
We first summarize the origin of the DPLN distribution [154]. Given a stochastic process
14We use a continuous model for simplicity. The integral data can be viewed as a rounded version of the
product of the true tweet rate and sampling period.
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X evolving via Geometric Brownian motion (GBM)
dX = µX + σX dW, (6.9)
where W is the Wiener process, with lognormally distributed initial state, logX0 ∼
N (ν, τ 2), then Xt is also lognormally distributed, logXt ∼ N (ν + µ−σ
2
2
t, τ 2 + σ2t).
If the observation (or killing) time t , T is exponentially distributed, T ∼ Exp(λ), then the
observed (or final) state has DPLN distribution, XT ∼ DPLN(α, β, ν, τ), where α > 0 and









z − λ = 0. (6.10)
Seshadri et al. [135] proposed that the number of calls made by an individual reflects an
underlying social wealth that evolves via such a GBM. For an exponentially growing popu-
lation, the age distribution of the sampled users is exponential and the resulting distribution
of calls (or social wealth) will be DPLN. This model seems qualitatively reasonable for
Twitter as well, but cannot capture the correct power law exponent in the lower tail (see
Figure 6.4). The call distribution data exhibits a similar mismatch, challenging the model’s
suitability there as well.
























A(θ, ν, τ) = exp
(




and Φ and Φc are the CDF and complementary CDF of the standard normal distribution. f1
and f2 are the limiting densities as α → ∞ and β → ∞, respectively, and are called the
right Pareto lognormal and left Pareto lognormal distributions.
Two observations stand out. First, the distribution is Pareto in both tails, with minimum
slope of −1 in the lower. Second, the left Pareto lognormal form is nearly equivalent to our
expression Equation 6.7, which differs only by accommodating lower tail exponents below
−1. Figure 6.4 shows maximum likelihood fits of both the DPLN and left Pareto lognormal
distributions. The lower tail is steeper than allowed by the DPLN (−1.13 < −1) and fits
poorly. The call distribution data shows a similar mismatch. Although the DPLN is widely
applicable, it does not model these communication patterns. Our model from the following
section should better fit the call data [135] as well.
In the upper tail, both distributions fit equally well (i.e., a likelihood ratio test does
not favor either fit). The data are insufficient to distinguish a lognormal from a power law
upper tail, a common issue [149]. We favor the lognormal form for Equation 6.7 because
it is simpler (i.e., has fewer parameters) and most real world “power laws” exhibit some
cutoff [149].
6.4.3 An Urn Process Generating the Tweet Rate Distribution
In this section we develop an urn process to describe tweet distribution in Figure 6.4. The
phase change is a dynamic effect governed by the sampling period. As the period increases,
the distribution approaches that of the lower tail—approximately Pareto with exponent
−1.13. In practical terms, high-rate tweeters are much rarer in a finite sample than the
asymptotic distribution would predict.
Figure 6.5 shows the distribution for two sample periods, illustrating the dynamic phase



















Figure 6.5: Distribution of tweet counts over various sample periods, showing the time-
dependent cutoff. The asymptotic distribution is Pareto. Traces for the urn model describing
this effect were obtained by simulation.
growing networks evolve similarly. Although simple preferential attachment of new nodes
leads to a straight power law [155], when existing nodes also generate new edges via
preferential attachment, the distribution is double Pareto (with exponents -2 and -3) with a
time-dependent crossing point (kc = [b2t(2 + αt)]
1/2) [7].15 A similar model describes the
tweet distribution.
Consider the evolution of the sample of tweets. Users join the sample upon their first
tweet (during the sample period) and then continue to produce additional tweets at some
rate. Discretize time relative to new users joining the sample, i.e., one user joins at each time
step so there are t users at time t. Let k(s, t) be the (expected) tweet count at time t for the
user first observed at time s. Assume new tweets are generated at a constant average rate c,
i.e., ct new tweets appear at each time step, distributed among existing users with frequency
proportional to A+ k(s, t)α. A is the initial attractiveness and α is the non-linearity of the






preference [157]. The resulting continuum equation16 is
∂k(s, t)
∂t
= (1 + ct)
A+ k(s, t)α∫ t
0
A+ k(u, t)α du
(6.15)
An analytical solution exists when A = 0 and α = 1 [8], but for the general case we
resort to Monte Carlo simulations. Figure 6.5 shows the close match to the empirical density
when A = 1 and α = 0.88.17 Assuming the power law form of the asymptotic density,
p(k) ∝ k−β, the power law form of the rate distribution can be recovered. Taking λ as the
tweet rate and noting that λ ∝ k−α when k  A, then





Thus, for α close to 1, the power law exponent recovered from Figure 6.4 slightly overesti-
mates that of the tweet rate.
Relating back to the analytical approximation of Equation 6.7, µ is related to ct by
µ ≈ 1.32 ln(ct) + 0.56. β = 1.13 and σ = 1.06 are constants best determined by fitting.
6.4.4 Distributions of Retweeter and Retweetee Rates
The retweet and retweetee rates show a similar dynamic behavior in Figure 6.6. The retweet
behavior differs only in the average rate c, which is about 2× lower. The retweetee distri-
bution exhibits two interesting differences. First, it extends further to the right, indicating
that retweets of popular users outnumber tweets from extensive users. Second, the slopes of
the power law regimes are more consistent with a pure preferential attachment process (i.e.,
α = 1). The retweetee rate comes directly from a preferential attachment process—initial
retweets increase exposure, begetting additional retweets—and thus should match the linear
form seen in other systems. The power law form of the tweet and retweet rates describes the
16We use the notation and continuous approximation of Dorogovtsev and Mendes [8].



















Figure 6.6: Distributions for tweets sent, retweets sent, and times retweeted for the 1 week
and 4 month samples. All categories show similar time-dependent phase changes, suggesting
the same underlying mechanism. Retweets differ from tweets only in a lower average rate
(parameter c in the urn model).
underlying propensity to tweet, but without the same generative interpretation.
6.5 Distribution of Intertweet Durations
Arrival processes in communication systems are traditionally assumed to be Poisson [158],
but per-individual interval distributions for various activities including email, printing, and
telephone calls are heavy-tailed [136, 159, 160]. We show that this same behavior holds in
Twitter, with our analysis mirroring that of Candia et al. for telephone calls [136] to enable
easy comparison. The SNAP tweet dataset is used for this analysis.
We group the users by their total tweets to isolate the effects of differing tweet rates.
Figure 6.7 plots the empirical distributions. Scaling by the group’s average interevent time
(∆ta) collapses the distributions to a single curve, shown in Figure 6.8. This universal trait






















Figure 6.7: The interevent distributions with users grouped by number of tweets for the
three month period covering June through August 2009. The line is a best-fit power law
with exponential cutoff.







, where F (·) is independent of the average rate. The best-fit cutoff
power law is






with exponent α ≈ 0.8 and cutoff τc ≈ 8.1 d, shown as the black line in Figure 6.8. ∆Ta is
taken as the whole population average here.
6.6 Characteristics of the Retweet Graph
The natural and explicit network in Twitter—the social graph in which a directed edge
represents the follower relationship—has been well-studied. Kwak et al. first reported on
basic network properties like degree distribution, reciprocity, and average path length [122],
and later works have studied these and other characteristics in more detail [123–126].

























Figure 6.8: The interevent distributions of Figure 6.7 collapse when scaled by the group’s
average interevent duration, ∆Ta. The line is a best-fit power law with exponential cutoff.
indicates that the source retweeted the destination—has been neglected. We conduct the first
characterization of the retweet graph and confirm that it, like many real-world networks, is
small-world and scale-free. The reported metrics are useful for generating random retweet
graphs using general parametric models like R-MAT [162] (a = 0.52, b = 0.18, c = 0.17,
d = 0.13) or other specific generative models [163].
We pay particular attention to contrasting the social following18 and retweet graphs.
Intuitively, they should be similar because retweets are usually sent by followers. However,
we conjecture that the retweet graph more closely models the real-world social and trust
relationships among users, because it derives from a more forceful action—not just listening
to others’ ideas, but forwarding them to one’s own friends. Using the follower graph as
a trust proxy has been proposed for applications ranging from spam filtering [164–166]
to Sybil detection [106, 167]. We conjecture that the retweet graph is a better choice and
provide some supporting evidence. Full treatment of this conjecture is beyond our scope.
18The social following graph is simply the social follower graph with the edge direction reversed to match










































Figure 6.9: Distribution of number of edge weights in the retweet graph, corrected using the
EM method. A directed edge indicates that one user retweeted another and the weight is the
number of such retweets.
6.6.1 Analyzing a Random Subsample of the Retweet Graph
The retweet graph is constructed from our largest dataset, the 10% sample, and thus does
not contain all edges. An edge is included with probability proportional to the number of
retweets sent along it. However, 60% of edges have a single retweet and 98% have fewer than
10 (see Figure 6.9), so for simplicity we assume each edge is included with 10% probability.
Many measured properties in an edge-sampled graph differ from the original graph. When
possible, we use the EM-based method from Subsection 6.2.5 to correct our results. When
not, we estimate the errors using the literature on sampled graphs [139, 141, 168].
6.6.2 Degree Distributions
We begin with the in- and out-degree distributions. The in-degree kiin of a node i is the
number of unique users who retweeted i and the out-degree kiout is the number of unique


























Figure 6.10: In and out degree distributions for the retweet graph. Both exhibit the double-
Pareto behavior common to evolving networks [7, 8]. In the upper tail, the in-degree
power-law exponent is 2.2 and 3.75 for the out-degree.
defined average out-degree 〈kout〉 = 74.3. V is the set of nodes and N their cardinality. In
reality 〈kin〉 = 〈kout〉; the observed difference is an artifact of the EM-based population
estimation. The degree standard deviations are σin = 4187.3 and σout = 228.4. Higher
in-degree variance is expected because, as with real-world networks [141], popularity (the
number of users who retweeted an individual) is more variable than extensivity (the number
of users an individual retweeted).
The distributions, shown in Figure 6.10, are similar to the social following graph [122].
Both are heavy-tailed and exhibit the same two-phase power law common to such networks.
Similarly to the tweet rate distribution (Subsection 6.4.3), the two phases are a dynamic
effect arising from two forms of evolution in the graph [7, 8]—the addition of new nodes
and preferentially-attached new edges between existing nodes. The outgoing (incoming)
node i for a new edge is selected with relative probability dout(i) + δout (din(i) + δin), where
δout and δin are the initial attractiveness constants and d(·) returns the node degree. Bollobás
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et al. elucidate this process for a general context [163].
The power law exponents are determined by δout (δin). The lower tails are similar with
α ≈ 1.3. In the upper tail, αout = 3.75 and αin = 2.2. ain matches the followers graph
(2.3) [122] and is in the range of most real-world networks (2–3). αout exceeds that range
because extensivity is not inherently preferential (like popularity).
6.6.3 Reciprocity
Reciprocity is the fraction of links that are bidirectional. Many social networks have high
reciprocity—most relationships are bidirectional (68% in Flickr [169] and 84% on Yahoo!
360 [170]). In the Twitter follow graph, reciprocity is lower at just 22.1% [122]. If retweeting
is more discriminating than following, the retweet reciprocity should be lower. Indeed, it
is just 11.1%.19 Higher reciprocity in the follower graph may stem from the popularity of
follow-back schemes in which a user, in an attempt to gain followers, promises to follow
back anyone who follows him. The low reciprocity suggests that using the retweet graph
as a proxy for trust is promising. Although a malicious node can establish many outgoing
links, it has little control over the incoming structure.
6.6.4 Average Shortest Path Length (Degree of Separation)
The real-world human social network has a small average shortest path length (APL) of
about six, shown most famously by Stanley Milgram [171, 172]. Many online networks are
similar [173,174], but the social followers graph is denser with an APL of 4.12 [122]. Kwak
et al. attribute this difference to Twitter’s additional role as an information source. Edges
are more dense because users follow both social acquaintances and sources of interesting
content.
19We estimated the distribution of all non-zero pairwise edge weight tuples (the number of retweets in both

































Figure 6.11: Distribution of average path length (degree of separation) in edge-sampled
retweet graph. The gray line is the estimated distribution for the full graph.
We determined the path length distribution of the 10% edge-sampled graph by computing
all shortest paths for both 1000 and 5000 random starting nodes. The obtained distributions
(shown in Figure 6.11) overlap, indicating a sufficient sample size. Lee et al. showed that
edge sampling increases the APL by 1.5–3× (the gray range in the inset plot) depending
on the graph structure [139]. We use 1.5×, determined by sampling the followers graph20,
to estimate the full distribution (grey line in plot). The estimated APL is 4.8 and the 90th-
percentile or effective diameter [175] is 8.5. The difference from the followers graph is
within estimation error.
The best-fit distribution (solid line in plot) is log-normal21 with µ = 1.5 and σ = 0.27.
This differs from undirected Erdös-Rényi (ER) graphs, for which the limiting distribution is
Weibull [176], but we do not know of similar theoretical results for directed graphs.
6.6.5 Assortativity (Node Degree Correlation)
Degree assortativity—the tendency of nodes to connect with others of similar degree—
summarizes the structural characteristics that in part determine how content (e.g., retweets
or disease) spreads and resilience to node removal [177]. In an assortative network, content
20The 2009 crawl [122] is complete, so we compared the true statistic against that of a 10% subsample.






















Figure 6.12: Directed assortativities r as a function of edge sampling rate. Edge sam-
pling does not affect assortativity because all node degrees are sampled independently and
identically.
easily propagates through a connected component of tightly clustered, high degree nodes
that is resistant to node removal, but may not reach the low degree boundary of the network.
Conversely, a disassortative network has a larger connected component so content propagates
further, but can be partitioned by the removal of a high degree node.
For undirected networks, assortativity is simply the Pearson correlation between the
degrees of adjacent nodes. The concept generalizes to directed networks by considering all
possible directional degree pairs as separate assortativity metrics [178], r(in, in), r(in, out),









where α, β ∈ {in, out}, kiα (k
j
β) is the α-degree (β-degree) of source (destination) node
i (j), the averages 〈·〉 are taken over all directional edges (i → j), and σkα (σkβ ) is the
variance of the α-degree (β-degree).
We characterize and contrast these metrics for both the Twitter social following graph [122]
and retweet graph. Edge sampling impacts the degrees of all nodes identically and thus does
not effect assortativity (see Figure 6.12) [139].



























Figure 6.13: Directed assortativity r of the retweet graph and the social following graph.
The retweet graph has higher assortative, more consistent with real world social networks
than most online social networks.
networks are assortative [177], online social networks are instead disassortative [179]. The
social followers graph is no exception, showing weak disassortativity across all measures.
In contrast, the retweet graph is more assortative across all measures. It is near-neutral
for both r(in, ·) metrics, indicating independence between one’s own retweet behavior
and the number of retweets received. This is consistent with the graph containing useful
trust information, because a user cannot influence the quantity of retweets received by
selectively retweeting popular (r(in, in)) or extensive (r(in, out)) users. The high (out, out)
assortativity is more consistent with real-world social networks and indicates that extensive
retweeters retweet each other. Interestingly, they are not tightly clustered (or the (in, out)-
assortativity would be higher).
In Twitter, tweets propagate to followers, so the social graph disassortativity is helpful.
The connected component is larger and tweets disseminate further more quickly. Increased
susceptibility to node failure is acceptable in a centralized system. In a decentralized system
that relies more heavily on the retweet graph for propagation, e.g., Shout [132], the resilience
to node failure implied by its neutral and positive assortativities would instead be helpful.
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Cycle Middleman In Out
Figure 6.14: The four types of open (solid edges) and closed (solid and dashed edges)
directed triplets used for cluster analysis. A vertex can form up to eight such triplets with
each pair of neighbors, two of each type. The clustering coefficient Cβ∈{cycle, middleman, in, out}
is the fraction of β-triplets (open and closed) that are closed.
6.6.6 Clustering Coefficient
A clustering coefficient quantifies the tendency of neighboring nodes to form highly con-
nected clusters. Many real-world networks exhibit tighter clustering than would be expected






where N3 is the number of open or closed triplets (three vertices connected by two or three
edges) andN4 is the number of closed triplets (3-vertex cliques). Unlike the alternative local
clustering coefficient, this definition is suitable for networks with isolated nodes [180]. In
essence, C gives the probability that any two neighbors of a node are themselves connected.
Following the approach introduced by Fagiolo for the local clustering coefficient [181],
we extend the metric to directed graphs by separately considering the four types of directed
triplets, shown in Figure 6.14. The four clustering coefficients Cβ∈{cycle, middleman, in, out} are
the fraction of β-triplets that are closed.






seen by noting that a triplet is included in the sample with α2 probability and as a closed
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Figure 6.15: The clustering coefficient estimator Ĉ , 1
α
C as a function of edge sampling
rate on the social “following” graph. Although potentially biased, the estimator is quite


























Figure 6.16: Clustering coefficients for the social “following” graph and the retweet graph.
Clustering is significantly more prominent in the retweet graph and more consistent with
real-world social networks.
triplet with α3 probability. This estimate is biased, because the triplets are not independent
and edges can be concentrated towards open (or closed) triplets. In practice however, it
performs well on large samples, as shown in Figure 6.15 for the social following graph.
Figure 6.16 plots the results for both the social and retweet graphs. The former has low
clustering, but clustering in the retweet graph is significant in metrics except in. Cycle is the
only fully (transitively) connected triplet type, and thus cycle-clustering should best reflect
true clustering in the underlying social groups and interest topics. The higher clustering in
the retweet graph indicates that retweet relationships are more concentrated than following
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relationships, consistent with our hypothesis of higher trust.
Although the middleman, in, and out cycle are all rotations of the same basic non-
transitive triplet, their coefficients differ due to the non-uniform degree distribution. Cin
is low because the majority of (in, in) edge pairs are from a few popular users who are
retweeted by many otherwise-unrelated users. The high Cmiddleman and Cout coefficients
are reflections of the same phenomenon—transitive retweeting. User f retweeting user i’s
retweet of user a is recorded by Twitter as f retweeting a (hence the name middleman).
Often f will also retweet some of i’s original content, closing the triplet. In the out case,
node i plays the role of f instead of the middleman. Surprisingly, such transitive retweeting
happens frequently (Cmiddleman = 0.32 and Cout = 0.29). In other words, 30% of these
possible two-degree retweet relationships exist.
6.6.7 Summary
We have confirmed that the retweet graph is scale-free and small-world, like many social
networks. Interestingly, its clustering and assortativity are closer to real-world networks than
typical online networks, indicating that it may better capture real-world relationships and
have application as a proxy for trust. Full treatment of this conjecture is beyond our scope.
The scale-free, small-world confirmation enables the generation of random instances, e.g.,
using R-MAT [162], for empirical study. We use this approach in Section 6.8 to evaluate the
use of connectivity in the retweet graph to detect spammers.
6.7 Implications for the Design of Decentralized
Microblogging Architectures
The preceding sections characterized tweet behavior—total quantity, average rate, and
interevent time—and the retweet graph structure. Although interesting in their own right,
in this section we discuss a particular application—the implications for the design of
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performance-constrained, decentralized microblogging platforms like Shout [132]. In such
systems, bandwidth and energy—scarce resources—must be carefully allocated to achieve
some notion of fairness. We discuss implications for such allocation strategies.
Power Law Participation Momentum: Most users quit after a few contributions, so greedy
allocation of resources to new users is wasteful. For example, a routing scheme prioritizing
messages from users with more contributions would implicitly direct bandwidth away from
temporary users.23 The known power law form of the momentum function enables the design
of optimal allocation strategies. For example, consider storing old messages by distributing
them across participating nodes. Nodes with more contributions are more reliable (less
likely to leave the network) and thus require a lower storage replication factor. These failure
probabilities can be easily modeled.
Heavy-Tailed Rate Distribution: The two-phase tweet rate distribution has implications
for short-term message delivery and long-term message storage. The message generation rate
may be modeled as lognormal—messages are naturally better-distributed in the network than
a power law would suggest, reducing points of congestion and better balancing bandwidth
use. In the long term, however, the average tweet rates follow the asymptotic power law
with its much heavier tail, posing issues for archiving and retrieval of tweets. For example,
sharding messages across nodes by author will result in a few nodes storing and serving
the majority of the archived content. The archiving system must be designed to handle the
power law distribution.
Heavy-Tailed Interevent Distribution: Simulations and other performance analysis must
use heavy-tail distributions for the interevent times. Standard Poisson distributions will
grossly underpredict these times, increasing simulated congestion and resulting in over-
provisioned designs.
Small-World, Assortative, Clustered Retweet Graph: In a centralized platform, a single
entity can moderate bad behavior, reject spammers, and ensure fair division of resources.
23We do not consider how malicious users might manipulate such schemes, but resistance to such attacks
would be important for any practical protocol.
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Participants in a decentralized platform must perform these same tasks themselves without
implicit trust in others. The implicit retweet graph seems to encode some information
about the real-world relationships of users that could be inferred for such purposes. The
higher assortativity is more indicative of a real world network than a social network and the
high clustering implies that users have some commonalities around which they gather. We
explore this direction in the next section, using spammer detection via connectivity in the
retweet graph as an example.
6.8 Leveraging the Retweet Graph for Spammer
Detection
Spam is a problem for many communication platforms [166, 182], but seems particularly
concerning for a system like Shout. A malicious user can easily flood its one-hop neigh-
borhood with a multitude of useless or spam shouts. Twitter, a centralized service, can
decree what constitutes spam, use its full knowledge of user behavior to detect viola-
tors [164, 165, 183–187], and limit the creation of new accounts. In a decentralized system,
however, the lack of a trusted authorities implies that participants must do their own spam
filtering, either individually or collaboratively.
In this section, we use the analysis of a spam detection method as an example use case
for the preceding characterizations of the retweet graph. Specifically, we employ synthetic
graphs that mimic the structure of the retweet graph to characterize the performance of a
retweet (or reshout) graph-based spam technique.
6.8.1 Possible Approaches to Spam Detection
Although at first glance Shout appears to be highly susceptible to spammers, the underlying
distributed architecture provides some implicit protection. Shouts are carried beyond a
one-hop radius only if manually reshouted. Conforming users will not reshout spam,
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implying that the spammers must do so themselves. As such, the cost of spreading spam is
proportional to the number of users impacted, either in time (if the spammer moves about
the network) or equipment costs (if the spammer uses multiple transmitters at different
locations). Even occasional waves of spam are still undesirable, so a method for filtering
spam from one-hop neighbors as well is needed.
Detection approaches can focus either on individual messages, spam detection, or on
the sender, spammer detection. The latter is most applicable to microblogs, because the
short message lengths—less than 250 characters—make content analysis difficult [164].
Spammer detection takes two forms differentiated by the default presumption. Blacklisting
assumes that users are not spammers until proven otherwise, while whitelisting presumes
the opposite. The former is a non-starter in Shout because blacklisted accounts are easily
and cheaply replaced. Some form of whitelisting is required.
The most obvious form of whitelisting—and one applicable to Shout—is explicit labeling
of accounts. The initial assumption of guilt implies that the first messages from a new user
will not be seen—other nodes will filter it as spam. To bootstrap around this problem, users
may explicitly whitelist accounts they wish to hear. For example, new users should ask to
be added to their friends whitelists, allowing their messages to be seen.
Explicit whitelisting is sufficient for Shout to be usable. Original content is only seen by
one’s explicitly whitelisted friends, but can still spread via reshout. Consider a user A who
has whitelisted user B who has whitelisted C. A messages from C will initially only be
seen by B (not A). If interesting enough though, B will reshout, making it visible to A as
well. This approach essentially mimics the flow of information in Twitter, i.e., along edges
in the social graph, but requires geographic proximity as well. Some initially whitelisted
nodes might later begin spamming (either as an intentional bait-and-switch or due to device
hijacking), but are easily manually blacklisted. The whitelist is built manually and thus is
relatively short, so corrective blacklisting will not be overwhelming.
Explicit whitelisting will often be overly strict, however. Interesting or useful messages
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from geographically-proximate users outside of one’s social circle will, at best, appear only
after being retweeted by a friend, possibly after significant delay. We would like to instead
be able to automatically infer the whitelist label for such users. We require this inference to
be decentralized, so the possible approaches fall in two categories. The first uses only locally
available information, e.g., the local database of overheard shouts, to perform classification.
The second can use some form of transitive trust, e.g., the whitelists from other nodes or
implicit signals of trust like reshouts.
Many researchers have considered spam detection using (locally available, in Shout)
attributes of tweets [164, 165, 183–187]. In particular, Benevenuto studied the classification
performance of 60 tweet and tweeter attributes, ranging from hashtags per tweet to the
ratio of followers to friends. Aside from the obvious inclusion of URLs and account age24,
the most sensitive attributes were related to social behavior—ratio of followers to friends,
number of replies to messages, etc. Noting that spammers can easily alter the content of
tweets, they suggest focusing on these harder-to-manipulate attributes for detection. Their
proposed classifier has a 70% true positive rate (TPR) and a 4% false positive rate (FPR).
Other researchers have considered incorporating the classifications from other partici-
pants, a form of transitive trust. However, such protocols can be subject to Sybil attacks,
in which an attacker creates many identities reporting falsified observations to out-vote the
honest identities. As a defense, Yu et al. developed SybilGuard, a Sybil detection scheme for
social networks based on the observation that most Sybil identities will be weakly connected
to the network [105]. Most people do not “friend” fake accounts on social networks, so fake
identities receive only a limited number of connections. We consider similar graph-based
approaches for spam detection.
Song, Lee, and Kim [165] applied this observation to spam detection in Twitter using the
followers graph. In particular, they consider two metrics in the graph: distance—measured
as the shortest path between two nodes—and connectivity—measured via max-flow and




Figure 6.17: Portion of a retweet graph showing how spammers are less connected. Non-
spammer B is connected to non-spammer A by three independent paths, the shortest of
which has length two. Spammer S is connected by only a single length-three path.
random walk. A classifier over these attributes had a 95% TPR and a 4% FPR on their
dataset. Including attributes like URLs per tweet improved the performance to a 99% TPR
and 1% FPR.
Shout does not include explicit social relationships, so the followers graph cannot be
used. Instead, we consider the implicit retweet graph. Intuitively, content from spammers
will not be heavily retweeted, and thus they will be less connected to non-spammers in the
graph, as illustrated in Figure 6.17. Node A is connected to non-spammer B by three edge
independent paths, the shortest of which has length two. Spammer S, on the other hand,
is only connected via a single path of length three. A separates spammers by classifying
nodes based on their distance from and edge-independent connectivities (i.e., max-flow with
unit-weighted edges) to itself.
Unfortunately, these techniques are not manipulation-resistant. Although they perform
well on existing datasets, attackers that are aware of the classification method can adjust their
own strategies to defeat detection. In particular, an attacker can “bait-and-switch”—initially
broadcast non-spam content to gain reshouts (or followers) and then, once connected, switch
to spreading spam. Although gaining an initial reshout (or follower) takes some effort, that
one attacker account can then easily introduce more bait-and-switchers by reshouting their
initial good content. Others who see that content will reshout, forming many edges back to
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the new attacker nodes.
More abstractly, these techniques attempt to infer trust relationships from the behavior of
the participants (e.g., reshouts) and then use transitive application of those trust relationships
to classify spammers. Formal treatments of this problem domain (motivated by the design
of recommender systems) [188–190] have revealed theoretical limitations on the power of
such techniques. First, a tradeoff exists between detecting falsified reports and believing
honest reports—any technique that limits the influence of falsified reports will also ignore
some of the honest reports [189]. Second, safely employing transitive trust relationships
implies some identities that would have been accepted as non-spammers (i.e., had a high
enough trust balance) in by a direct trust protocol will be rejected as spammers (i.e., will not
have a high enough trust balance) [190]. In Subsection 6.8.5, we summarize how our spam
detection problem can instead be treated in manipulation-resistant fashion, although still
subject to those two impossibility results.
6.8.2 Spam Detection Using the Retweet Graph
Retweet graph-based spam detection works as follows. Each participant in the system
maintains his own partial25 list of past messages sent by himself and others. A partial
retweet graph is constructed from this dataset, with one vertex per sender and directional
edges linking each retweeter to the corresponding retweetees. Denoting the participant’s
own vertex as the root26, the remaining participants are classified by two attributes, their
distance from the root and the maximum flow from the root to them. Users that are classified
as non-spammers are whitelisted.
This approach presents two bootstrapping problems. How does a new user with no
recorded history construct a retweet graph and do the messages from a new user that has
25Only some messages sent by other will be heard. E.g., in Shout [132] only those message broadcast in the
vicinity of the node will be heard and included.
26Trusting one’s own vertex as non-spammer breaks the otherwise problematic symmetry between the
non-spammer and spammer portions of the graph.
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never been retweeted ever get seen? For the first question, a user can copy the tweet history
from a trusted friend or bootstrap by explicitly whitelisting his friends. For the second, the
user can ask his friends to whitelist him, so they can then see and retweet his messages,
linking him to the graph. We also anticipate that some (particularly bored) users will choose
to view all incoming tweets, retweeting some that are not spam.
The approach relies on the following assumptions.
• Non-spammers retweet spammers much less frequently than non-spammers.
• Spammers only send spam content; they do not bait-and-switch.
The second assumption is, of course, unrealistic. Although it appears to hold in the current
dataset, attacks would respond to the deployment of graph-based spam filtering by altering
their behavior to manipulate the classification. This method forces spammers to employ
some sort of manipulation scheme, increasing the cost of introducing spammer identities
(it takes time for the initial good messages to be reshouted) and limiting their total number
(practical concerns limit the rate at which users will reshout), but does not provably restrict
their advantage. Instead, schemes that are provably resistant to such manipulation, i.e., have
bounded attacker advantage [188, 190] could be used, as we discuss Subsection 6.8.5.
For our analysis, we also make the following assumption.
• Spammer retweet spammers and non-spammers in the same fashion that non-spammers
retweet non-spammers.
This assumption simplifies the generation of synthetic retweet graphs, but is not necessary
for the detection approach. A spammer may choose to behave differently, but doing so
simply introduces more structural differences in the retweet graph, making detection even
easier.
The following sections analyze the performance of this classification procedure on our












Figure 6.18: Percentage of removed and extant Twitter users as a function of distance from
benign users in the retweet graph. Most removed users are spammers, so this graph shows
that distance is highly correlated with spammer behavior.
6.8.3 Performance on the Twitter Retweet Graph
We first consider the performance on our 10% sample of the retweet graph. This sample is
problematic because most of the paths between non-spammers are not included (90% of
edges are missing) but is sufficient to show that the hypothesized differences exist.
We randomly chose 100 source–destination pairs of users who distances in the retweet
graph ranged from 1 to 45, for 4500 pairs in total. We obtained ground truth classification
for these 9000 users by querying the Twitter API to determine if the account had been
removed in the 18 months following the initial collection. Twitter actively seeks out and
bans spammers, so the majority of the spammers will have been removed. Some non-
spammers will have also deleted their own accounts, so we refer to these categories as
removed and extant. We believe that most removed users were spammers [182].
We consider only the pairs whose source node is extant. Figure 6.18 shows the percentage
of destination nodes in each category by the distance from their sources. Clearly, distance
in the retweet graph is correlated with spammer tendencies. A classifier over this attribute
alone achieves a TPR of 75% with an FPR of 25%.
The second attribute, connectivity, shows no correlation in the 10% sample graph because



































Figure 6.19: Illustration of the modified R-MAT algorithm for generating synthetic retweet
graphs and a resulting adjacency matrix. Fewer edges are placed in the benign–spam
quadrant to model the lower likelihood of such retweets. Within each quadrant, edges are
cascaded in proportion to probabilities a, b, c, and d to generate a scale-free, small-world
structure.
the original graph contains only zero or one paths in the sampled graph, making it impossible
to distinguish a non-spam node linked by ten paths from a spam node linked by one. Instead,
we turn to synthetic retweet graphs to study the performance of the combined classifier.
6.8.4 Performance on Synthetic Retweet Graphs
The analysis in Section 6.6 showed that the retweet graph is scale-free and small-world,
enabling the generation of synthetic retweet graphs using the R-MAT (Recursive Matrix),
an algorithm designed to generate a variety of such networks [162]. Although metrics
like assortativity and clustering are not directly controllable—R-MAT cannot capture the
differences between the followers and retweet graphs 27—it is sufficient for our purposes
as we depend only on the connectivity implied by the small-world structure and limited
number of incoming edges to spammer nodes.
R-MAT produces scale-free, small-world graphs by treating edge assignment in the adja-
cency matrix as a two-dimensional binomial cascade. We modify the procedure to generate
relatively fewer edges from benign to spammer nodes (B–S) than the other possibilities
(B–B, S–S, S–B), modeling the notion that non-spammers rarely retweet spammers.
27Unfortunately, this prevents us from comparing retweet-based with follower-based spam detection. A full
sample of the retweet graph would be needed.
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The modified R-MAT process is illustrated in Figure 6.19. We desire a graph with some
number of benign and spammer nodes, some number of non-B–S edges, and a relatively
smaller number of B–S edges. The adjacency matrix is divided into four quadrants and the
edges split among the B–B, S–S, and S–B quadrants in proportion to their areas. Within
each quadrant, the R-MAT algorithm is used to place the edges. For each edge, the sub-
quadrant in which to place the edge is chosen according to probabilities a, b, c, and d
(a + b + c + d = 1). The process recurses until a single cell is selected for the edge. The
result of the process for a small graph is shown in Figure 6.19.
The parameters a, b, c, and d are obtained via AutoMAT-fast [162], i.e., fitting the degree
distribution of the retweet graph to that of the model. The R-MAT process is essentially
a two-dimensional binomial cascade, with the out-edges assigned to the upper and lower
halves with probabilities p , a+ b and 1− p and the in-edges assigned to the left and right
halves with probabilities q , a+ c and 1− q. Letting N = 2n be the number of nodes and













where B(k; a, b) is the mass function of the binomial distribution B(a, b). The in-edge
distribution is computed similarly. Fitting to the retweet graph, we obtain a = 0.52,
b = 0.18, c = 0.17, and d = 0.13.
We fix the fraction of spam nodes to 10% and assume that spammer retweet behavior
mimics that of benign nodes retweeting each other. Differences are not in the attackers’
interest, as they would enable additional classification methods.
The performance of the classifier is primarily affected by two metrics—the fraction of
possible B–B edges that are present and the number of B–S edges per spammer vertex—so
we conduct parameter sweeps of these values.

































Figure 6.20: Connectivity of benign pairs as a function of the benign edge density. Above
5%, almost all pairs are connected. We expect that density does not grow with network
size, so this limits the network size for which the false positive rate is acceptable. For large
networks, the technique will only work within clusters.
positive rate will be high. Figure 6.20 plots this density against the fraction of benign pairs
that are connected for a variety of network sizes. Above 5%, most pairs are connected and
above 10%, essentially all pairs are connected. We expect the number of edges in a retweet
graph to (above some point) grow linearly in the number of users, so this relationship places
a limit on the network size for which the technique is usable. For larger networks (e.g., the
world population), the technique will only work within clusters for which the edge density
is high enough—users outside of one’s own cluster will be identified as spammers. For
example, the average out-degree of Twitter, 75, would support 25000 participants. However,
social relationships are clustered, so this limitation should rarely be an issue in practice.28
In a network like Shout [132], the effective community size is already limited by geography.
Figure 6.21 shows the classification performance. We use the J48 decision tree classifier
28This limitation does prevent the discovery of content from outside of one’s own group, possible with






























Figure 6.21: Performance of J48 classifier over distance and connectivity attributes in the
synthetic graphs. The benign edge density (marker symbol and color) range from 0.00002
to 0.003 and the number of B–S edges per spammer node (marker size) ranges from 0.01 to
1. Each marker is a single point on the resulting ROC curve.
over both the distance and connectivity (max-flow) attributes, using 10-fold cross validation.
We sweep both the benign edge density (marker symbol and color) from 0.0002 to 0.003
and the number of B–S edges per spammer (marker size) from 0.01 to 1. To reduce clutter,
a single point29 from each resulting ROC curve is plotted. Two trends are immediately clear.
Decreasing the benign edge density increases the FPR, but an FPR below 5% requires just
a 0.3% edge density. Increasing the B–S rate (number of B–S edges per spammer node)
decreases the true positive rate. If less than one-tenth of spammers are retweeted by benign
nodes, the TPR is universally above 98%. The sensitivity to B–S rate increases with edge
density because the spammer nodes are more interconnected (we hold the S–B and S–S
densities equal to the B–B density).
This performance—98% TPR and <5% FPR—is consistent with the results observed on
29The selected points are generally near the knees of the curves, but within a class are intentionally chosen
to have similar FPRs.
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the Twitter followers graph by Song, Lee, and Kim [165] and substantially better than the
70% TPR and 4% FPR observed by Benevenuto et al. [164] for attribute-based classification.
The false positives are due to the low edge density of in the cluster of benign nodes. Each
user only retweets an average of 75 other users, so as the node count increases, that cluster
becomes increasingly disconnected. The false negatives are due to benign nodes occasionally
retweeting spammers. A few spammers are (randomly) retweeted by enough users to become
connected to the graph. These retweets are rare and essentially random though (e.g., an
accidental press of the retweet button) and thus the false negative rate remains low.
In summary, Figure 6.18 shows that the inter-node distance in the retweet graph is
highly correlated with being a spammer, enabling detection. Simulations on the synthetic
graphs show that inter-node distance and inter-node max flow can identify spammers with
greater than 98% TPR and less than 5% FPR when fewer than one-tenth of spammers are
retweeted and at least 0.3% of possible edges between benign nodes are present. For a
community-sized network of 25000 participants, this implies an average node degree of
75, i.e., that of the Twitter retweet graph. For larger networks, the classification works best
within smaller sub-clusters where the edge density is higher.
6.8.5 Discussion of Provably Manipulation-Resistant Schemes
We have shown only that the retweet graph-based spam filtering method works against
current spammer behavior. Were the technique deployed, spammers could alter their
behavior to manipulate the structure of the graph, e.g., by initially tweeting some non-
spam content to gain retweets. Detection techniques that are provably resistant to such
manipulation would be preferred. In this section, we briefly summarize how two such
techniques, developed in the context of recommender systems but generally-applicable, can
be applied to spam detection. Full evaluation is beyond our scope and is left for future work.
We first consider the influence limiter [188], an overlay scheme to make any recom-
mender scheme provably manipulation-resistant. Here, the goal is to generate recommenda-
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tions (over some domain of items) for a user (the target) using the ratings provided by other
users (the raters). Dishonest (and possibly Sybil) raters can submit false ratings designed to
manipulate the generated recommendations. The influence limiter computes an influence
for each rater based on the (predictive) accuracy of his ratings. Ratings that improve the
recommendation accuracy (measured by how much better the prediction matches the target’s
future ratings) increase influence and vice versa. When generating a recommendation,
ratings are weighted by their respective rater’s influence. New users are bootstrapped by
starting them with a small amount of initial influence. This formulation maps directly to
retweet-based spammer detection. The tweeters are the raters and the contents being tweeted
are the items. A tweet serves as a positive rating for that content. A retweet by a target
indicates agreement with that rating. This scheme is (n,c)-robust (the expected damage by
an attacker controlling n identities is upper bounded by c) with information loss (honest
ratings that are under-weighted during recommendation) of the some order of magnitude as
a (possibly loose) provable lower bound [189].
The influence limiter does not chain the rater reputations transitively, e.g., a target A
assigning high influence to rater B who assigned high influence to rater C does not directly
result in A assigning high influence to C. Like the retweet graph-based classifier, we can
consider transitive trust relationships, but in a manipulation-resistant fashion [190]. In this
model, each participant associates a trust balance with each other participant. These trust
balances are used to decide whether a participant should engage in an interaction (e.g., do I
have enough, possibly transitive, trust in that user to “cover” the risk of the interaction). In
our case, a user (the principal) reading a tweet from another user (the agent) is a transaction.
An (honest) principal indicates that the transaction was successful (i.e., the tweet was
useful) by retweeting it. Intuitively, the trust balances of any participants involved in an
interaction (i.e., including those used for transitive trust) should be increased (decreased)
after successful (unsuccessful) interactions between participants. The choice of trust update
protocol determines the manipulation-resistance, as attackers may lie about success (i.e.,
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retweet spam). Specifically, we desire that the incorporation of transitive trust not give the
attacker (who can control many participants) any more advantage than he would have if only
direct trust was used. One formalization of this property is called sum-sybilproofness and is
provided by the hedged-transitive update protocol [190]. Unfortunately, it is also known
that any sum-sybilproof protocol will reject some interactions that would be allowed by a
protocol employing direct trust only, limiting the overall usefulness of indirect trust.
Spam detection based on these techniques (i.e., a manipulation-resistant recommender
system [188, 189] and sybil-sumproof incorporation of transitive trust [190]) offer a signifi-
cant improvement over the retweet-graph based approach. Their manipulation-resistance
is provably quantifiable (and tight against theoretical bounds), no matter how clever the
attacker. Future efforts towards implementing spam detection in Shout should incorporate
them.
6.9 Derivation of the EM Method
Using the same notation as Subsection 6.2.5, the likelihood to maximize is
LC(φ|f, g) = log p(f, g|φ) (6.22)















The expected likelihood under an estimate φk is


















and the iterative maximization step is
φ(k+1) , arg max
φ
Q(φ, φ(k)). (6.28)
The maximum is computed under the constraint
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We have presented an initial characterization of aggregate user behavior, describing the
distributions of lifetime contributions, tweet rates, and inter-tweet durations. These behaviors
are thought to be common across communication platforms, but our results differ from
prior analysis, suggesting future study to determine the true extent of the similarities. Our
retweet graph analysis revealed structural differences from the followers graph that are more
consistent with real world social networks. Explaining the underlying causes of the observed
differences—we conjecture that retweets more closely mirror real-world relationships and
trust—is an open problem. Finally, we developed a method for detecting spammers via their




This thesis has advocated the development of non-hierarchical networks to combat censor-
ship and surveillance in communication networks. Continued work is needed to ready such
systems for everyday use, but this thesis has taken the following steps.
• Private, reprisal-resistant communication for friends and family: We proposed Whis-
per, a MANET architecture that uses a novel routing scheme based on the predictability
of human motion to increase scalability. Privacy and anonymity are provided by a
novel onion-routing variant that does not require a priori selection of potential onion
routers. The Mason test was developed to enable the use of random nodes from
those encountered during daily travels for onion routing, ensuring that the proportion
of selected onion routers that are attackers is limited by the proportion of physical,
participating nodes owned by the attackers.
• Censorship-resistant public microblogging: We proposed Shout, a MANET mi-
croblogging architecture that uses geographic proximity and manual human action to
disseminate messages in a non-hierarchical fashion. To combate spam, we developed
a novel spammer detection technique based on the intuition that messages from spam-
mers will be repeated and forwarded less frequently that those from non-spammers.
We developed analytical models of user behavior in Twitter to enable simulation-based
study and optimization of Shout-like microblogging systems. We used our characteri-
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zation of the retweet graph to generate random reshout graphs suitable for studying
the classification performance of our spammer detection technique.
The results described in this thesis represent early steps in the development of non-
hierarchical networks. Current smartphones have extremely limited battery capacities,
limiting the potential for Whisper, which relies on other devices to forward messages. Both
Whisper and Shout require a critical mass of users before messages can propagate far enough
to be useful. Centralized services will often be more convenient. The public must care about
privacy before they will tolerate the inevitable inconveniences of decentralized and non-
hierarchical alternatives. I hope that once privacy has become a first-order requirement for
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